




ALLIED FORCE HQA NUMBERS

COPY NO. 13

S. O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

TO

LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. A. EDDY.

APPENDICES

{ Issued as indicated under
DISTRIBUTION on Page 6 of Main Plan }

- APPENDIX A - Instructions to OSS Representative, CASABLANCA.
- APPENDIX B - Instructions to OSS Representative, ORAN.
- APPENDIX C - Instructions to OSS Representative, ALGIERS.
- APPENDIX D - Instructions to OSS Representative, TUNIS.

14 October, 1942

SECRET

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SECRET
 (USUAL ENTRY MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

By authority of
 C-in-C, AF
 Initials: *XX*
 Date: 11 October 1943

3. O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS



TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. A. EDDY, U. S. MARINES

INFORMATION.

1. The Allied Force is divided into three TASK FORCES, EASTERN TASK FORCE (which includes EASTERN ASSAULT FORCE travelling in the first convoy) landing at ALOIERS, CENTER TASK FORCE at ORAN, WESTERN TASK FORCE at PORT LYAUTEY, FEDALA and SAFT, at a date and hour that will be communicated to you separately.
2. From ALOIERS, EASTERN TASK FORCE (1st ARMY) is to advance with all speed into TUNISIA with the object of forestalling any German or Italian counter moves.

INTENTION.

3. The joint OSS/SOE organization will assist by subversive action the landing and subsequent operations of the three TASK FORCES and the subsequent advance of the 1st ARMY into TUNISIA.

METHOD.

COMMAND.

4. Chief OSS/SOE:

- a. You have been appointed staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief and head of the joint OSS/SOE organization in FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.
- b. By order of the President, Mr. MURPHY has been charged with carrying out certain preliminary negotiations with French Leaders in NORTH AFRICA. The success of these negotiations may greatly reduce, or even make unnecessary, the tasks given you in these instructions.
- c. Mr. MURPHY will be the only person with first-hand knowledge of the progress of these negotiations, and you will therefore, take directions from him both as to the timing of SO preparations and as to any modifications that may be necessary therein. Mr. MURPHY may also find it convenient to control subversive operations himself in ALGERIA and TUNISIA, and if he does so he will inform you accordingly.
5. Deputy Chief OSS/SOE: Colonel BRIEN CLARKE will be your deputy, and under your direction will control the SO base at GIBRALTAR, the OSS/SOE radio net-work, the supply of equipment, and the existing SOE organizations in NORTH AFRICA.
6. Headquarters: On about D-3 (or earlier at your own discretion if for example the local political situation becomes strained), you will transfer your Headquarters from TANGIER to GIBRALTAR.

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(USUAL ENTRY MOST SECRET)

Operation Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel G. H. QUENTHER, A. MURPHY, US Marines.
(USCIB)

SUBVERSIVE ACTION

7. a. The OSS representatives in CASABLANCA, ORAN, ALGIERS and TUNISIA will prepare to carry out the subversive tasks outlined in Appendices A, B, C and D, respectively.
- b. You will appreciate that it is vital to the success of the whole operation that there should be no leakage as regards the nature and date of the operation. These OSS representatives will, therefore, be directed by Mr. MURPHY as to the date after which they can start disclosing plans to their agents.
- c. The actual date on which each agent is instructed in his duties should be postponed as long as possible and will be dependent on the individual's reliability and the time he will require to prepare for his assignment.
- d. The actual date of the landing should, however, not be disclosed to anyone by your OSS representatives until the last possible moment.

8. D-Day.

- a. Colonel G. H. QUENTHER will inform you verbally of D-Day and H-Hour. Mr. MURPHY will inform you when you can release this information to your OSS representatives.
- b. It may be necessary to postpone landings due to weather or other causes. A final decision may not be made until 24 hours beforehand, when you will confirm or inform by radio any changes in D-Day to your representatives at CASABLANCA, ORAN, ALGIERS and TUNIS.

ALL TIMING ARE GMT (GCT).

9. Initiation of Plans.

- a. PEACE Plans: Unless other instructions have been received by radio, PEACE Plans will be put into operation, as shown in Appendices, without further orders.
- b. WAR Plans: WAR Plans will not be put into operation until ordered by:

(1) The Commander-in-Chief before D-Day.

OR

(11) TASK FORCE COMMANDERS at any time after the landing of their respective forces.

- a. TUNISIAN Plans: Plans for the advance into TUNISIA, with the exception of Priority one of Plan STRAFE, will only be put into operation as and when required by G-C-O, 1st ARMY. Priority one of STRAFE Plan will be put into operation immediately if an entry is made by German or Italian forces in TUNISIA.

LIAISON WITH TASK FORCES.

10. In order to control SO operations and provide liaison:

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SO Operation Instructions to French North Africa, US Marines.
(Cont'd.)

between Task Force Commanders and the SOE/OSS organization located at GIBRALTAR. OSS executive officers with detachments of radio personnel are being provided as indicated below. In addition to their SO duties, these officers will be available to advise TASK FORCE COMMANDERS on local conditions and civil administration.

a. Eastern Task Force.

- | | |
|--|------------------------------------|
| (1) For initial landing, Mr. Knox, | } No. 1 Special Signal Detachment. |
| (2) For advance to Tunisian border; an assistant to Mr. Springs, | |
| (3) For advance into Tunisia, Mr. Springs | |

- b. In addition two SOE officers, Lt. Col. Anstruther and Major Torrance are accompanying the force in order to provide continuity in SO planning during the advance to and occupation of TUNISIA, and to establish and control the SO advanced base in ALGIERS from which patriot groups in TUNISIA and Eastern ALGERIA can be provided with arms, equipment and radio communications. They will also organize and control any SO operations that Mr. Knox or Mr. Springs may delegate to them.

b. Center Task Force.

Mr. Rounds. No. 2 Special Signal Detachment.

c. Western Task Force.

Mr. Culbert. No. 3 Special Signal Detachment.

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS.

11. SO Advanced Headquarters will be established at the following points:

- a. SO Advanced Headquarters will be opened by Colonel BRIEN CLARKE at 1200 hrs on D + 10. The primary function of this advanced headquarters will be, when authorized, to supply stores by air and possibly by sea to theaters of operation outside FRENCH NORTH AFRICA. For this purpose the following personnel and stores are being provided:

(1) Personnel.

One NCO storeman, RE } Arriving by KMF3
One parachute packer, RAF } about D + 13.

Further signal personnel required will be obtained from ME 16 GIBRALTAR or the UK as and when required.

(2) Equipment.

The following equipment will be arriving by KMS3 about D + 17:

Wireless. 4 B type suitcase sets.
8 A type suitcase sets.

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(CLASSIFIED BY 1001 (SECRET))

(Cont. 5)

22 type A containers (each 2 Sterns with	1500 rpg)
22 containers with type V.3 cells (each 9 Sterns	with 300 rpg)
22 " " type V.2 cells (each 120 lbs	explosives with pencil time fuses and accessories)
44 containers with type V.5 cells (each grenades	and revolvers)
22 containers each of: one type B.5 cell	(altimeter switches and accessories)
	one type B.6 cell
	(incendiaries)
	one type V.1 cell
(40 lbs. explosives with electrical	detonators and accessories)
15 spare containers filled with packing for	W/T sets
Parachutes (container)	162
Parachutes (personnel)	
Type A large	25
Parachutes (personnel)	
Type X small	10

(1) Personnel.

Further personnel will be obtained from ME 16 GIBRALTAR or the UK as and when required.

(2) Equipment.

~~Wireless~~ 10 A type suitcase sets with
No 1 Signal Detachment.

Arms and Stores - arriving by KML about D + 2.

5 spare containers filled with packing for
W/T sets.
8 type A. containers (each 2 Brens with 1500 rpg)
8 containers with type V.3 cells (each 9 Stens with
300 rpg)
8 " " type V.2 cells (each 120 lbs
explosive with pencil time fuses and accessories)
16 containers with type V.5 cells (each grenades and
revolvers)
8 containers each of: one type B.5 cell
(altimeter switches and accessories)
one type B.6 cell
(incendiaries)
one type V.1 cell
(40 lbs explosives with electrical
detonators and accessories)

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(DETAILS WITHIN MONTHLY REPORT)

(ORIGINALS WITH MOST SECRET)
 SO Operation Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel W. A. Eddy, US Marines.
 (Cont'd.)

Parachutes (container)	50
Parachutes (personnel)	
Type A large	5
Parachutes (personnel)	
Type X small	10

2,000 rifles with 400 rpg.
 1,000 Stens with 800 rpg.
 4,000 hand grenades.
 8,000 Hawkins Grenades (anti-tank mines).

In addition HMS MINNA, of the CWF, will be arriving from GIBRALTAR on D + 2. She will carry the stores given in the attached list (Annex I) which will be available for infiltration by sea into Eastern ALGERIA and TUNISIA. These stores will be made up into man loads not exceeding 70 lbs weight. She will also carry the following personnel:

- 1 Naval Officer as Staff Officer at Base.
- 1 Naval Officer as Assistant to above.
- 6 men as skippers and skeleton crews for 3 small craft that may be requisitioned at ALGIERS.
- 1 Storekeeper TUE for Advanced Base Headquarters.

ALTERNATIVE HEADQUARTERS.

12. In the event of GIBRALTAR being neutralized an alternative HQ will be set up in ORAN and every attempt will be made to evacuate stores, equipment and personnel from GIBRALTAR to ORAN. The following equipment is being held in reserve in the UK.

Wireless. One mobile main line wireless station consisting of four lorries.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

13. a. OCS/COE signal communications will be based on GIBRALTAR and will communicate with all agents sets and through them control OCS and COE representatives and agents in the field.
- b. During the approach voyage you will pass to the TASK FORCE COMMANDERS, through G-2 and by Naval wireless at GIBRALTAR, summaries of all important intelligence and information received from SO sources in the field.
- c. After landing, special signal detachments attached to the SO Executive Officers with TASK FORCES will be in wireless contact with SO Signal Base at GIBRALTAR every two hours. They will be available to you for inter-communication with SO Executive officers.
- d. Detailed signal instructions have been issued separately.

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(ORIGINALS WITH MOST SECRET)

SO Operation Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Eddy, US Marine.
(Cont'd.)

2. In addition, Mr. MURPHY has been provided with a special radio set and codes with which he can communicate directly with the Commander-in-Chief and with the three TASK FORCE COMMANDERS while at sea.

By command of Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

L. L. Lemnitzer
L. L. LEMNITZER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:

Main Plan	C O P Y N U M B E R S A P P E N D I C E S				
	A	B	C	D	
Colonel EDDY	1	1 & 2	1 & 2	1 & 2	
Mr. MURPHY	2	3	3	3	
Col. BRIEN CLARKE	3	4	4	4	
J. P. Hq, G-3	4 & 5	5 & 6	5 & 6	5 & 6	
Political Section	6	7	7	7	
Eastern Task Force	7	-	-	8	
Eastern Assault Force	8	-	-	9	
Center Task Force	9	-	8	-	
Western Task Force	10	8	-	-	
Mr. KNOX	*11 & 12	-	-	*10 & 11	
Mr. ROUNDS	13	-	9	-	
Mr. CULBERT	14	9	-	-	
Colonel GUENTHER	15 & 16	10 & 11	10 & 11	12 & 13	
JOE	17 & 18	12 & 13	12 & 13	14 & 15	
Commander-in-Chief	19	14	14	16	
Deputy Commander-in-Chief	20	15	15	17	
Naval Commander, X F	21	16	16	18	
3, Paratroop Task Force	22	-	17	-	
Extras (filled in G-3 Section)	23-25	17-25	18-25	19-25	
				18-25	

* One for Mr. SPRINGS

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(NORMAL EDITION MOST SECRET)

STORES REQUIRED FROM GIBRALTAR TO BE
BROUGHT BY H.M.S. "MINNA".

ARMS & AMMUNITION

<u>Item.</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>T. Cwt.</u>
1. Sten Guns	500	
2. 9 m/m Paralellum ammo	200,000 rounds	
x3. Sten Gun Magazines	2,500	4 - 10
4. Mills Grenades & arming units	1,000	16
5. Revolvers .38 colt (Army pat)	100	
x6. .380 revolvers ammo.	5,000	3
7. Fighting Knives	500	5
x8. Type VI (Petard) Grenade	500	10
9. Spring Cosh	500	3
10. Smatchets	300	5
Total		6 - 12

STORES

<u>Item.</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>T. Cwt.</u>
--------------	-----------------	----------------

A. Explosives.

1. 808 or Gelignite	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons:	5 - 5
2. Plastic Explosive	500 lbs.	- 4 $\frac{1}{2}$

B. Incendiaries.

1. M.L. Flares	1000	-10
2. P.R.5s.	Black 250)	
	Red 250)	
	White 200)	
	Green 200)	- 2
	Yellow 50)	
	Blue 50)	
3. Tysules	1000	- 1
x4. Thermite Bombs	500	-10

C. Fuses Delays etc.

1. Bickford Safety	6,420	- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
2. " M/E lengths	500	-
3. A.C. delays Complete		
with ampoules and bursters	512	- 5
4. Pencil time fuses:-		
Black	450)	
Red	500)	
White	500)	
Green	400)	- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Yellow	300)	
Blue	150)	
5. Copper tube igniters	4000	- $\frac{1}{2}$

D. Primers etc.

1. Primers C.E.	3850	- 3 $\frac{3}{4}$
2. Detonators No.8.A.S.A.	4000	- $\frac{1}{2}$
13. Cordtex	19,500 ft.	- 4 $\frac{1}{2}$

E. Miscellaneous

1. Adhesive Tape	500 Reels	- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
2. Fuses	800 boxes	- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$

- 2 -

Item.	Quantity	T	Qty
E. Miscellaneous (contd)			
3. Striker Boards	700		
4. Detonators Magazines	200		
5. Magnets $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.	1000		4
x6. Crimping tools	175		1
7. Pull Switches	560		1
8. Pressure "	224		1
9. Release Switches	224		1
10. Fog Signals	224		1
11. Wire .014"	224 coils		1
12. Vaseline	224 tubes		1
13. Bontik Solution	224 tubes		1
14. Rubberised fabric	1120 sq. ft.		1
x15. No. 3 taps (waterproofing and of Gordtex)	2800		1
16. Beehives (6 lbs)	500	1	2
x17. Tube tyre bursters complete with driving tubes and hammers	2000	1	0
18. Limpets Rigid.	100		7
19. " Flexible	100)		
20. " Saddles	200)		3
x21. Small Mobile Mines	10		1
22. Containers deep water complete with lines floats etc. 6			3
x23. Electric Torches	100)		
x24. " Batteries	200)		1
x25. Torch tubes	200)		
26. Lancer Jack Knives	200		1
27. Emergency Rations	10		
28. Field dressings	200		
29. Haversacks	30		1
30. Holdfasts	10		1
31. Wirecutters	50		1
32. Water purifying tablets	2000		
33. Veroy Pistols	2		
34. Veroy Ammunition Red	24)		
Green	24)		1
Illuminating	24)		
Grand Total		11	3

ADDITIONAL

35. Green Handies (Mines)	10
36. 6" steel plates 2' x 2' x 1/2"	24
37. 6" steel plates 2' x 2' x 1/2"	24

**Grand Total of Arms, Ammunition
in Stores**

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(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

APPENDIX A

INSTRUCTIONS TO G.S.S. REPRESENTATIVE, CASABLANCA

COPY

No. 11

INFORMATION.

1. The WESTERN TASK FORCE is landing in the vicinity of CASABLANCA at a date and time which will be notified to you separately. This date will be confirmed or any postponement notified to you through Wireless LINCOLN 24 hours in advance of the landing.

All timings are G.M.T. (G.C.T.).

INTENTION.

2. You will assist the landing of the TASK FORCE and its subsequent occupation of CASABLANCA by organizing subversive action.

METHOD.

3. Plans.

You will be prepared to carry out subversive tasks outlined in the attached Annex.

You will appreciate that it is vital to the success of the whole operation that there should be no leakage as regards the nature and date of the operation. You will therefore be directed by Mr. MURPHY as to the date after which you can start disclosing these plans to your agents.

The actual date on which each agent is instructed in his duties should be postponed as long as possible and will be dependent on the individual's reliability and the time he will require to prepare for his specific assignment. The actual date of the landing should, however, not be disclosed to anyone until the last possible moment.

4. Initiation of Plans.

(a) PEACE Plan. Unless other instructions have been received PEACE Plan will be put into operation as shown in the Annex without further orders.

(b) WAR Plan. This Plan will NOT be put into operation until ordered by:

- (i) Commander-in-Chief before D-Day.
- or (ii) Task FORCE COMMANDERS at any time after the landing of their respective forces.

Messages for initiating or modifying pre-arranged plans will be dispatched to you in the following form:

To LINCOLN. PEACE. Omit (repeat) omit
priority 3 (repeat)
priority 3.

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

(EQUALS BOMB PROOF BOMBING)

Appendix A - Instructions to CCE Representative, GIBRALTAR. (Cont'd.)

5. Control.

You should bear in mind that it is possible that diplomatic relations between the United States and France may be broken off, and you should, therefore, insure that the necessary machinery exists for carrying out your plans even were the United States Consulate closed.

6. Command.

Colonel EDDY is the Comdr-in-Chief's staff officer and head of the joint U.S.S./S.O.E. organization in North Africa. His headquarters will be at GIBRALTAR from D-3.

Colonel EDDY is, however, subordinate to Mr. MURPHY and the latter will give direction as to the timing of S.O. preparations and any modifications that may be necessary therein for political reasons.

Until such time as you make direct contact with the TASK FORCE COMMANDER, all instructions to you, whether from the Commander-in-Chief or from the TASK FORCE COMMANDER will come to you either through Mr. MURPHY direct, or through Colonel EDDY by means of 'Wireless Plan LINCOLN.

7. Equipment.

The following equipment will be dispatched to you by pouch from TANGIER:

30 red 5-minute flares with 15 holders.

(Note. The flare should be placed in the holder and the cardboard disc on top torn off. This disc is a striker board and should be used for sharply rubbing the match composition on top of the flare."

8. Recognition.

To insure the recognition of Allied Supporters in NORTH AFRICA by individuals and units of the LANDING FORCE the following recognition signs will be used by your agents:

- (a) Password "BORDEAUX".
- (b) White paper inside caps with password written on it.

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(EQUALS BOMB PROOF BOMBING)

(NOVA) (NOVA) (NOVA) (NOVA)

URGENTU.S.S. TASKS TO BE CARRIED OUTA. ACTION REQUIRED WHETHER FRENCH RESIST OR NOTCode Word - PEACE

Unless other instructions have been received by wireless PEACE PLAN will be put into operation without further orders.

Priority	Hour	Day	Action																								
1	H -1	D	Cut telephone connections to and, if possible, neutralize or destroy the following coast defense batteries: (i) <u>At CASABLANCA</u> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>TABLE d'AOUKACHA</td> <td>4 - 3.9" guns</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AIN SEBAA Area</td> <td>8 - 3" guns</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Base of JETEE TRANS-VERSALLE</td> <td>4 - 90mm guns</td> </tr> <tr> <td>JETEE DELURE</td> <td>4 - 90mm guns</td> </tr> </table> (ii) <u>At FEDALA</u> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>PATTEREN de FEDALA</td> <td>3 - 3.9" guns</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td>2 - 3" guns</td> </tr> </table> (iii) <u>At MEDIA.</u> Batteries near MEDIA <table border="0"> <tr> <td>LIGHTHOUSE</td> <td>4 - 4.5" guns</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2 medium guns caliber unknown</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">If possible destroy net across river mouth.</td> </tr> </table> (iv) <u>At RABAT</u> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>PORT HERPPE</td> <td>2 - 155mm guns</td> </tr> </table> (v) <u>At SAPI</u> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>POINTE de la TOUR</td> <td>4 - 5.1" guns</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Battery 600 meters North of SIDI BUKRI</td> <td>75mm guns</td> </tr> </table>	TABLE d'AOUKACHA	4 - 3.9" guns	AIN SEBAA Area	8 - 3" guns	Base of JETEE TRANS-VERSALLE	4 - 90mm guns	JETEE DELURE	4 - 90mm guns	PATTEREN de FEDALA	3 - 3.9" guns		2 - 3" guns	LIGHTHOUSE	4 - 4.5" guns	2 medium guns caliber unknown		If possible destroy net across river mouth.		PORT HERPPE	2 - 155mm guns	POINTE de la TOUR	4 - 5.1" guns	Battery 600 meters North of SIDI BUKRI	75mm guns
TABLE d'AOUKACHA	4 - 3.9" guns																										
AIN SEBAA Area	8 - 3" guns																										
Base of JETEE TRANS-VERSALLE	4 - 90mm guns																										
JETEE DELURE	4 - 90mm guns																										
PATTEREN de FEDALA	3 - 3.9" guns																										
	2 - 3" guns																										
LIGHTHOUSE	4 - 4.5" guns																										
2 medium guns caliber unknown																											
If possible destroy net across river mouth.																											
PORT HERPPE	2 - 155mm guns																										
POINTE de la TOUR	4 - 5.1" guns																										
Battery 600 meters North of SIDI BUKRI	75mm guns																										
2	H	D	Seize aerodromes near PORT LYAUTY, CASABLANCA and RABAT (two each) and secure or if necessary destroy the planes thereon. Preserve installations and supplies so long as consistent with retaining them.																								
3	H	D	Seize, if possible, but avoid damage to the group of radio stations at CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTY and FEDALA. Seize at risk of destruction the radio stations at RABAT.																								

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(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

SECRET

Western Task Force - OSS Tasks to be carried out - Action required whether French resist or not. (Cont'd.)

Priority	Hour	Day	Action
4	H	D	Seize and preserve intact (including records) the main telephone, telegraph and repeater stations, in the area around CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA.
5	H	D	Prevent destruction of cable huts, tell cable and open wire lines along routes in the area around CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA.
6	H	D	Prevent damage to the main power stations at and near CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY and FEDALA.
7	H	D	Prevent damage to docks and port equipment at CASABLANCA, PORT LYAUTEY, FEDALA and SAFI.
8	H	D	Provide 4 guides with good knowledge of the following towns and their vicinity: (i) SAFI. Rendezvous Hotel, Avenue MOULAY YOSSEF. (ii) FEDALA. Rendezvous TOWN HALL. (iii) LYAUTEY. Rendezvous TOWN HALL.
9	H	D	Prevent damage to key road and railroad bridges and tunnels with priority in the order of the difficulty of their replacement.
10	H	D	Arrange, if possible, without disclosing secret information for the elimination or neutralization of German and Italian armistice commissioners. It is essential that the records and documents of these commissioners should be preserved intact.
11	-	D + 1 and after	Release United Nations prisoners.

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(ORIGINAL SENTIN MOST SECRET)

ACTION IN CASE OF SERIOUS WAR PLANCase No. 1 - WAR

WAR PLAN will not be put into operation until ordered by:

- (1) Commander-in-Chief before D-Day.
 or (ii) Task FORCE COMMANDERS at any time after the landing of their respective forces.

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
1			As ordered If possible immobilize destroyers or larger at the time. warships and sink submarines or small craft. Avoid blocking the harbor.
2	"	"	Neutralize coast defense batteries given in Priority 1, Section A, above.
3	"	"	Destroy the following: (i) Rail and road bridges at MECHRA DEL KSIRI over the Oued Sebou, 152.5 Kilometers from TANGIER. (ii) Rail and road bridges at SIDI SLEMANI over the Oued Beth, 17 Kilometers West of PETIT-JEAN. (iii) Rail bridge at PETITJEAN over Oued Rdom. (iv) Rail and road bridge at MECHRA BEN ARBOU over the Oued Rbia, 129 Kilometers from LARRACHECH. (v) 2 tunnels at FES. 2 viaducts at FES BAB FTOUCH, 8 Kilometers East FES.

SECRET

SECRET

COPIES
11

INSTRUCTIONS TO U.S.S. REPRESENTATIVE UNIT

INFORMATION

1. The CENTER TASK FORCE is landing in the vicinity of ORAN at a date and time which will be notified to you separately. This date will be confirmed or any postponement notified to you through Wireless FRANKLIN 24 hours in advance of the landing.

All timings are G.M.T.(G.C.T.)

ATTENTION

2. You will assist the landing of the TASK FORCE and its subsequent occupation of ORAN by organizing subversive action.

METHOD

Plans

You will be prepared to carry out subversive tasks outlined in the attached Annex.

You will appreciate that it is vital to the success of the whole operation that there should be no leakage as regards the nature and date of the operation. You will therefore be directed by Mr. MURPHY as to the date after which you can start disclosing these plans to your agents.

The actual date on which each agent is instructed in his duties should be postponed as long as possible and will be dependent on the individual's reliability and the time he will require to prepare for his specific assignment. The actual date of the landing should, however, not be disclosed to anyone until the last possible moment.

Initiation of Plans

- (a) PEACE Plan Unless other instructions have been received by W/T, PEACE Plan will be put into operation as shown in the Annex without further orders.
- (b) WAR Plan This Plan will NOT be put into operation until ordered by:-
 - (1) Commander-in-Chief before D-Day.
 - or (2) Task FORCE COMMANDERS at any time after the landing of their respective forces.

Messages for initiating or modifying pre-arranged plans will be despatched to you in the following form:-

"To FRANKLIN. PEACE. Omit (repeat) omit
priority 1 (repeat)
priority 1."

Control

You should bear in mind that it is possible that diplomatic relations between the United States and France may be broken off, and you should, therefore, ensure that the necessary machinery exists for carrying out your plans in spite of the United States Consulate being closed.

SECRET

SECRET
 EQUALS BRITISH
 MOST SECRET

SECRET
 (TOTALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

6. Command

Colonel EDDY is the Command-in-Chief's staff officer and head of the Joint C.S.S./S.O.E. organization in North Africa. His headquarters will be at GIBRALTAR from D-5.

Colonel EDDY is, however, subordinate to Mr. MURPHY and the latter will give direction as to the timing of S.O. preparations and any modifications that may be necessary therein for political reasons.

Until such time as you make direct contact with the TASK FORCE COMMANDER, all instructions to you, whether from the Command-in-Chief or from the TASK FORCE COMMANDER will come to you either through Mr. MURPHY direct, or through Colonel EDDY by means of Wireless Plan FRANKLIN.

7. Equipment

The following equipment will be dispatched to you by pouch from TANGIER:-

30 red 5-minute flares with 15 holders.

Note. The flare should be placed in the holder and the cardboard disc on top torn off. This disc is a striker board and should be used for sharply rubbing the match composition on top of the flare.

8. Recognition

To ensure the recognition of Allied Supporters in NORTH AFRICA by individuals and units of the LANDING FORCE the following recognition signs will be used by your agents:-

- (a) Password "MADEMOISELLE DE BAR LE DUC".
- (b) White paper inside caps with password written on it.

- 2 -

SECRET
 EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET
 (TOTALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

ENIGMA BRITISH
MOST SECRET

(REMAINS MOST SECRET)
CENTRAL TASK FORCE

O.S.S. TASKS TO BE CARRIED OUT

A. ACTION REQUIRED WHETHER FRENCH RESIST OR NOT

Code Word - PEACE

Unless other instructions have been received by wireless
PEACE PLAN will be put into operation without further orders.

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Hour</u>	<u>Day</u>	<u>Action</u>
1	H-1	D	Cut telephone connections to and, if possible, neutralize or destroy the following coast defense batteries:- (1) ARZUE North 1200 metres N.W. of oscillating light at FORT POINTE 4 - 4.1" or 3.5" guns 2 - 36" S/Ls. (2) ARZEU FT. DE LA POINTE N.E. side of town on FORT POINTE 2 - 3" guns (3) CAP FALCON P.D. 4 - 3" guns (4) GAMBETTA 4.7" guns about 2700 ft. NNE of ORAN light. Outside an Old Fort Light MGs. on edge of cliff 4 - 4.7" guns 4 - 3" guns ? Mobile AA MGs. 3 AA. S/Ls. Sound detector. (5) RAVIN BLANC On top of seaward edge of plateau at RAVIN BLANC 2600 ft. W. of ORAN light. 4 - 3" ? HA/IA guns 2 - 1.5" AA 1 S/L
2	about H - 1/2 to H + 1/2	D	Light a succession of red 5-minute flares, as indicated on the attached map, to guide aircraft. Special means of guiding the aircraft are being provided at the point marked "3" on the map. The individual in charge at "3" will give the signal by torch and whistle to light the flares at 1 and 2 or, if he fails to give this signal, flares at 1 and 2 will be lit either when an aircraft drops a parachute flare over the SEBKRA 6 - 10 miles to the West of their position or when the sound of a number of aircraft is heard. Flare No. 4 should only be lit when the aircraft are heard in the near vicinity.
3	H	D	Seize TAPAROU and LA SENIA airdromes and secure or if necessary destroy French planes thereon, but preserve installations and supplies. This operation should not be attempted unless it is reasonably certain that it will be successful.
4	H	D	Seize if possible, but avoid damage to, the main military and naval radio stations at ORAN. Relief by our forces may not arrive for two days.

SECRET
MOST SECRET

SECRET
(When action MOST SECRET)

Priority	How	By	Action
5	H	D	Seize and preserve intact (including records, the main telephone, telegraph and repeater stations, in the area around ORAN. Communications should be interrupted until the arrival of Allied Forces. In doing so no damage should be done that cannot be repaired in 48 hours.
6	H	D	Prevent destruction of cable huts, toll cable and open wire lines in the area around ORAN.
7	H	D	Prevent damage to the main power stations at and near ORAN.
8	H	D	Prevent damage to docks and port equipment at ORAN, ARZEU and MOSTA CANEM.
9	H + 5	D	Provide groups, each of 5 guides, at the following points:-

Eastern exit of STE. CLOUD
ASSI-AMEUR
BOU-SFER
STE. BARBE DU TLELAT

Composition of guide groups

- 1 for docks area
- 1 for radio station
- 1 for water-works
- 1 for DUCROS armament works
- 1 general guide for city and vicinity.

Recognition signs

- (a) Password "MADEMOISELLE DE BAR LE DUC"
- (b) White paper inside caps with password written on it.

10	H	D	Prevent damage to key road and railroad bridges and tunnels with priority in the order of the difficulty of their replacement.
11	H	D	Arrange, if possible, without disclosing secret information, for the elimination or neutralisation of German and Italian armistice commissioners. It is essential that the records and documents of these commissioners should be preserved intact.
12	-	Del and after	Release United Nations prisoners.

II. ACTION IN CASE OF OBVIOUS FRENCH RESISTANCE

Code Word - WAR

WAR PLAN will not be put into operation until ordered by:-

(1) Commander-in-Chief before D-Day.

(2) Field Force Commanders at any time after the landing of their respective forces.

SECRET
(When action MOST SECRET)

SECRET
(When sent MOST SECRET)

Priority	Hour	Day	Action
1	As ordered	at the time	If possible immobilize destroyers or larger warships and sink submarines or small craft. Avoid blocking the harbor.
2	"	"	Neutralize coast defense batteries given in Priority 1, Section A, above.
3	"	"	Block railroad between SIEL-BEL-ABDES and TIBACEN, and between RELIZANE and CLICHANT by one of the following methods only:- (a) Removal of rails and destruction of road-bed. Culverts over 5 metres span will NOT be destroyed. (b) Demolition of a series of small culverts, each under 5 metres in span.
4	"	"	Block roads at PERREGAUX, East of SAINT DENNIS-DU-SIG, or SAINT LUCIEN at AINE TEMOUCHMENT and the N.W./S.E. road in the vicinity of DJEBEL TISSALA.


- 3 -

SECRET EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET

SECRET

(When sent MOST SECRET)





SECRET

APPENDIX C.

(Special Eastern MOI SECRET)

Copy No. 13

INSTRUCTIONS TO O.S.S. REPRESENTATIVE, ALGIERS.**INFORMATION**

1. The EASTERN ASSAULT FORCE is landing in the vicinity of ALGIERS at a date and time which will be notified to you separately. This date will be confirmed or any postponement notified to you through Wireless YANKEE 24 hours in advance of the landing. ALL TIMINGS ARE G.M.T. (G.C.T.)

After the arrival of the ASSAULT FORCE an advanced O.S.S./S.O.E. H.Q. is being established at ALGIERS from which arms, stores, equipment and W/T sets will be infiltrated to groups in Eastern ALGERIA and TUNISIA.

ATTENTION

2. You will assist the landing of the ASSAULT FORCE and its subsequent occupation of ALGIERS by organizing subversive action.

METHOD**Plans**

(a) You will be prepared to carry out subversive tasks outlined in the attached Annexure.

You will appreciate that it is vital to the success of the whole operation that there should be no leakage as regards the nature and date of the operation. You will therefore be directed by Mr. MURPHY as to the date after which you can start disclosing these plans to your agents.

The actual date on which each agent is instructed in his duties should be postponed as long as possible and will be dependent on the individual's reliability and the time he will require to prepare for his specific assignment. The actual date of the landing should, however, not be disclosed to anyone until the last possible moment.

(b) You will make preliminary arrangements for distributing to groups under your control the stores arriving by sea given in para. 7. This will include the provisional selection of sea landing points and dropping points for air supplies, so that distribution can be carried out with the minimum of delay after D-day.

(c) You will ear-mark suitable wireless operators for attachment to the groups under your control. Wireless sets will be provided by the special O.S.S./S.O.E. signal detachment (known as No. 1 Special Signal Detachment) which is accompanying the ASSAULT FORCE and is under the control of Mr. KNOX.

(d) You will ensure that a representative is available to accompany the advance of the 1st Army up to the TUNISIAN border. This representative should be fully acquainted with all details of the groups under your control and their capabilities.

Initiation of Plans

(a) **PEACE Plan.** Unless other instructions have been received PEACE Plan will be put into operation without further orders.

(b) **WAR Plan.** This Plan will NOT be put into operation unless ordered by:-

(i) Commander-in-Chief before D-day

OR (ii) Task Force COMMANDER at any time after the landing of their respective forces

SECRET

(SECRET)

SECRET
(When sent MOST SECRET)

- (c) TUNISIAN Plan. Plans for the advance into TUNISIA will be put into operation only on the specific instructions of the O.S.S. representative, H.Q. 1st ARMY.

Messages for initiating or modifying pre-arranged plans will be despatched to you in the following form:-

"To YANKEE. FRACE. Cmit (repeat) cmit priority 3
(repeat) priority 3."

Control.

You should bear in mind that it is possible that diplomatic relations between the United States and France may be broken off, and you should, therefore, ensure that the necessary machinery exists for carrying out your plans even were the United States Consulate closed.

Command.

Colonel EDDY is the Commander-in-Chief's staff officer and head of the joint O.S.S./S.O.E. Organisation in NORTH AFRICA. His Headquarters will be at GIBRALTAR from D -3.

Colonel EDDY is, however, subordinate to Mr. MURPHY and the latter will give direction as to the timing of S.O. preparations and any modifications that may be necessary therein for political reasons.

Until such time as you make direct contact with the TASK FORCE COMMANDER, all instructions to you, whether from the Commander-in-Chief or from the TASK FORCE COMMANDER will come to you either through Mr. MURPHY direct, or through Colonel EDDY by means of Wireless Plan YANKEE.

Equipment.

- (a) The following equipment will be despatched to you by pouch from TANGIER :-

20 red 5-minute flares with ... holders.

(Note. The flare should be placed in the holder and the cardboard disc on top torn off. This disc is a striker board and should be used for sharply rubbing the match composition on top of the flare).

- (b) The following equipment will be arriving by sea with the ASSAULT FORCE.

Wireless Ten suitcase sets Type A. with No. 1 Signal Detachment.

Arms and Stores - arriving by K.M.S. 1 about D.; 1 or 2.

Containers for dropping from aircraft

- 5 spare containers filled with packing sets for W/T sets.
- 8 type A. containers (each 2 Brns with 1500 r.p.g.)
- 8 containers with type V.3 cells (each 9 Brns with 300 r.p.g.)
- 8 " " type V.2 cells (each 120 lbs explosives with pencil time fuses and accessories).
- 16 containers with type V.5 cells (each grenades and revolvers)
- 8 containers each of:- one type B.5 cell (altimeter switches and accessories)
- one type B.6 cell (incendiaries)
- one type V.1 cell (40 lbs explosives with electrical detonators and accessories)

SECRET
(When sent MOST SECRET)

(FOUO)

Arms and Equipment

SECRET

**STORES ACQUIRED FROM CHINA
BOUGHT BY U.S. ARMY**

A. IS. & AMMUNITION

Item	Quantity	T. Cwt.
1. Sten Guns	500	
2. 9 m/m Parabellum ammo	200,000 rounds	4 - 10
3. Sten Gun Magazines	2,500	
4. Mills Grenades & arming units	1,000	16
5. Revolvers .38 colt (Army pat)	100	
6. 380 revolvers ammo.	5,000	3
7. Fighting Knives	100	5
8. Type VI (Petard) Grenade	500	10
9. Spring Cosh	500	3
10. Snatchets	300	5
Total		6 - 12

B. RES

Item	Quantity	T. Cwt.
------	----------	---------

A. Explosives.

1. 808 or Gelignite	5 1/2 tons	5 - 5
2. Plastic Explosive	500 lbs.	- 4 1/2

B. Incendiaries.

1. M.L. Flares	1000	-10
2. P.M.B.s.		
Black	250	
Red	250	
White	200	
Green	200	- 2
Yellow	50	
Blue	50	
3. Tysulac	1000	- 1
4. Thermit Bomba	500	-10

C. Fused Delays etc.

1. Bickford Safety	6,420	- 1 1/2
2. " M/E lengths	500	-
3. A.C. delays Complete with ampoules and bursters	512	- 5
4. Pencil time fuses:-		
Black	450	
Red	500	
White	500	
Green	400	- 1 1/2
Yellow	300	
Blue	150	
5. Copper tube igniters	4000	- 1/2

D. Primers etc.

1. Primers C.E.	3650	- 3 1/2
2. Detonators No. 8.A.S.A.	4000	- 1
3. Geratex	19,500 ft.	- 4 1/2

E. Miscellaneous

1. Adhesive Tape	850 Rolls	- 1 1/2
2. Paper	500 boxes	- 1

QTY.	Quantity	Unit	Cwt
Miscellaneous (contd)			
		n/Twd.	7 - 11
4.	Striker Boards	700	
4.	Detonators Magazines	200	
5.	Magnets $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.	1000	
6.	Crimping tools	175	
7.	Pull Switches	360	
8.	Pressure "	224	
9.	Release Switches	224	
0.	Tag Signals	224	
1.	Wire .014"	224 coils	
2.	Vaseline	224 tubes	
3.	Sonic Solution	224 tubes	
4.	Rubberized fabric	1150 sq. ft.	
5.	No. 3 tape (waterproofing end of Cordtex)	2200	
6.	Beehives (8 lbs)	500	1 - 2
7.	Tube tyre bumpers complete with driving tubes and hammers	2000	1 - 0
8.	Limpets Rigid.	100	7
9.	" Flexible	100)	
0.	" Saddles	200)	3
1.	Small Mobile Mines	15	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
2.	Containers deep water complete with lines floats etc. c		3
3.	Electric Torches	100)	
4.	Torch batteries	200)	- 1
5.	Torch bulbs	200)	
6.	Deer Jack Knives	200	$\frac{1}{2}$
7.	Emergency Rations	10	
8.	Field dressings	200	-
9.	Haversacks	30	1
0.	Holdfasts	10	1
1.	Wingsuits	50	1
2.	Water purifying tablets	2000	
3.	Veroy Pistols	2	
4.	Veroy Ammunition Red	24)	
	Green	24)	$\frac{1}{2}$
	Illuminating	24)	
Grand Total			11 - 3

Additional

5.	Wood handles (wooden)	12	
6.	$\frac{1}{2}$ " steel plates 2'6" x 2'6"	24	1 - 1
7.	Pickaxe G.S.	24	1
Grand Total of Arms, Ammunition & Stores			12 - 12

SECRET**(ORIGINAL COPY MOST SECRET)**
EASTERN TASK FORCE**O. S. S. TASKS TO BE CARRIED OUT****A. ACTION REQUIRED WHETHER FRENCH RESIST OR NOT.****Code Word - PEACE**

Unless other instructions have been received
PEACE PLAN will be put into operation without further
 orders.

Priority	Hour	Day	Action
1	H -3 (2200 hrs)	D -1.	Break electrical connections between infra red detector stations, observation stations and the following coast defence batteries :- (1) LAZARET 280 metres S.S.W. hill 37. 4 - 7.6" guns on CAPS MATIFOU (11) DUPERRE 800 metres S.W. of POINTE DES CONSULS 4 - 7.6" (?) and 3/4 -1.6" AA guns (111) SIDI FERRUCK In old fort N.E. of SIDI FERRUCK village. 4 -(?) 6" guns.
2	H	D	Cutting telephone to, and if possible neutralising or destroying the following batteries :- (1) des ARCADES 3 - 3.7" guns (11) on GRAND MOLE 2 - 3" guns or 1.0" MG's
3	H -1/2	D	Mark the beach half way between CASERNE DE DOUANIER and LES DEUX MOULINS (see attached map) by flashing a white light to seaward 5 times consecutively every thirty seconds until the Allied Force arrives. A torch suitably shielded so as not to show light to a flank should be used.
4	H	D	Seize BLIDA, MAISON BLANCHE aerodromes and secure, or if necessary, destroy French planes thereon. Preserve installations, fuel, stores, ammunition, etc.
5	H -3 (2200 hrs)	D -1.	Immobilise armoured fighting vehicles at HUSSIN DEY by putting sugar or other material in petrol tanks.
6	H	D	Seize and preserve intact the main civil broadcasting station at ALGIERS.

SECRET**(ORIGINAL COPY MOST SECRET)**

Priority	Hour	Day	Action
H	D		Seize and preserve land (including reserves) main telephone and telegraph exchanges, reporting stations and relay facilities in, or near ALGIERS. Telephone communications should be interrupted until the arrival of the Allied Forces. In doing so no damage should be done that cannot be repaired in 48 hours. If possible the secret exchange in the cellars of the Gouvernement General Building should be destroyed.
H	D		Prevent destruction of principal cable huts, cables and open wire lines in the ALGIERS area.
H	D		Prevent damage to main power stations.
H	D		If possible prevent damage to docks and dock installations at ALGIERS and BOUGIE.
H+2	D		Provide the following guides at OBSERVATORY HILL.

Composition of guide groups

- 12 to know City and environs of ALGIERS
- 6 to know docks area intimately.

Recognition Signs

- (a) Password "WHISKY"
- (b) White paper inside caps with password written on it.
- (c) Guides will light a red 5-minute flare at OBSERVATORY HILL once every 15 minutes starting from H+2 hours.

2	H	D	Prevent damage to key road and railway bridges and tunnels, especially road and railway bridges at MAISON CARREE.
3	H	D	Arrange, in so far as consistent with maintaining secrecy, for the seizure or neutralisation of German and Italian armistice commissioners. The preservation of their records and documents is essential.
4		D+1 and after	Release United Nations prisoners.

B. ACTION IN CASE OF SERIOUS FRENCH RESISTANCE.

Code Word - WAR

WAR PLAN will not be put into operation until ordered by :-

- (1) COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF before D-day.

OR (1a) TASK FORCE COMMANDERS at any time after the landing of their respective forces.

Priority	Hour	Day	Action
1	As ordered at the time		If possible immobilise destroyers or larger warships and sink submarines or small craft and blockading the harbor.

SECRET

(CONTINUED ON P. 11)

SECRET**(ORIGINALS REMAIN MOST SECRET)**
ADVANCE OF 1ST ARMY INTO ALGERIA**G.S.S. TASKS TO BE CARRIED OUT****G. ACTION REQUIRED IF THE FRENCH ACQUIESCE OR ASSIST IN THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF ALGERIA.****Code Word - DOVE**

No action will be taken on this plan without specific instructions from the O.S.S. Representative with H.Q. 1st ARMY.

Priority**Action**

- 1 Ensure that the airdromes at DJEDJELLI, PHILIPPEVILLE and BONE are in friendly hands at the earliest opportunity and ready to be handed over to Allied air, sea or land borne forces as soon as they arrive.
- 2 Ensure that the two main roads to the East are kept open.

D. ACTION REQUIRED IF THE ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH GARRISONS IN THE INTERIOR IS UNCERTAIN**Code Word - WARNING EAGLE**

No action will be taken on this plan without specific instructions from the O.S.S. Representative with H.Q. 1st ARMY.

Priority**Action**

- 1 Block approaches from the South to the main road BOUIRA - SETIF - CONSTANTINE below the general line 8 - 10 miles South of that road. The most suitable roads to block are given below.

- (i) BOU SAADA - ANNALE
- (ii) BOU SAADA - M'SILA - BJ. BOU ARRERIDJ
- (iii) COLBERT - SETIF
- (iv) AMPERE - SETIF
- (v) BATNE - CONSTANTINE
- (vi) AIN BEIDA - CANROBERT - OULED RAHMOUN - CONSTANTINE
- (vii) EL GUERRAH - OULED RAHMOUN

E. ACTION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS FRENCH RESISTANCE.**Code Word - EAGLE**

No action will be taken on this plan without specific instructions from the O.S.S. Representative with H.Q. 1st ARMY.

Priority**Action**

- 1 Prevent French garrisons from interfering with Allied movement on the coastal road by blocking approaches to that road from FORT NATIONAL, SETIF and CONSTANTINE on the following roads:-

SECRET

- (1) FORT NATIONAL - BONE OU INDOUR
- (11) SERTIF - SOUK EL TINE
- (111) CONSTANTINE - ST. GELLES

F. ACTION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF A GERMAN COUNTRY INVASION
FROM TUNISIA INTO ALGERIA

Code Word - STRAP


No action on this plan will be taken without further instructions from the O.S.S. Representative with H.Q. 1st ARMY.

Priority

Action

- 1 Delay enemy progress to the West by blowing successive lines of road and rail bridges, tunnels and defiles as far West as the line BONE - SOUK - AHRAS.

SECRET



at a date and time which will be notified to you separately. This date will be confirmed or any postponement notified to you through Wireless PULHAM 24 hours in advance of the landing. From ALGERIA the 1st ARMY is advancing into TUNISIA.

UNLESS YOU RECEIVE OTHER ORDERS ALL THINGS ARE O.M.T. (O.O.T.)

After the arrival of the ASSAULT FORCE an advanced O.S.S./S.O.E. headquarters is being established at ALGERIA from which arms, stores, equipment and W/T sets will be infiltrated to groups in Eastern ALGERIA and TUNISIA.

INTENTION

2. You will assist the advance of the 1st ARMY into TUNISIA and delay or prevent any Axis counter moves by organising subversive action.

METHOD

3. Plans

- (a) You will be prepared to carry out subversive tasks outlined in the attached Annexure.

You will appreciate that it is vital to the success of the whole operation that there should be no leakage as regards the nature and date of the operation. You will therefore be directed by Mr. MURPHY as to the date after which you can start disclosing these plans to your agents.

The actual date on which each agent is instructed in his duties should be postponed as long as possible and will be dependent on the individual's reliability and the time he will require to prepare for his specific assignment. The actual date of the landing should, however, not be disclosed to anyone until the last possible moment.

- (b) You will make preliminary arrangements for receiving stores that may be despatched to you by sea or air from ALGERIA and for distributing such stores to the groups under your control. These stores are listed in para. 7. This will include the provisional selection of sea landing points and dropping points for air supplies, so that distribution can be carried out with the minimum of delay after D. day.
- (c) You will earmark suitable wireless operators for attachment to groups under your control as it may be possible to supply them by sea, air or land from ALGERIA with wireless sets.
- (d) You will ensure that Mr. HIRINGS is in ALGERIA on D. Day ready to accompany the 1st ARMY during its advance into TUNISIA. He should be fully acquainted with all details of the groups under your control and their capabilities, and also of any arrangements that have been made for receiving stores and wireless sets under the arrangements referred to in para. 3 (b) and (c) above.

Information of Plans

- (a) COVE Plan. This plan will not be put into operation until the date of the landing is known to the O.S.S. representatives in the area.

SECRET

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

Priorities one will be put into operation without further orders as soon as this force land at or near these ports.

"To PILGRIM. Start DOVE 0400 hours 30th January."

You should bear in mind that it is possible that diplomatic relations between the United States and France may be broken off, and you should, therefore, ensure that the necessary machinery exists for carrying out your plans even were the United States Consulate closed.

Colonel EDDY is COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF's staff officer and head of the joint O.S.S./S.O.E. Organisation in NORTH AFRICA. His headquarters will be at GIBRALTAR from D +3.

Colonel EINDY is, however, subordinate to Mr. MURPHY and the latter will give direction as to the timing of S.O. preparations and any modifications that may be necessary therein for political reasons.

All instructions to you whether from COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF or from the H.Q. 1st ARMY will come to you either through Mr. MURPHY direct, or through Colonel EDDY by means of Wireless Plan PILGRIM. Should it be possible to infiltrate wireless sets to your groups, vide para. 3(c) above, these sets will communicate direct to No. 1 Special Signal Detachment which will be under Mr. SPRINGS' control.

The following equipment will be arriving by sea with the ASSAULT FORCE and will be distributed from O.S.S./S.O.E. advanced base at UGTERS.

Wireless - 10 A. type suitcase sets with No. 1 Signal Detachment.

Arms and Stores - arriving by K.M.S.1 about D +1 or 2.

Containers for dropping from aircraft -

- 5 spare containers filled with packing for W/T sets.
8 type A. containers (each 2 Brens with 1500 r.p.g.)
8 containers with type V.3 cells (each 9 Stens with
300 r.p.g.)
8 containers with type V2 cells (each 120 lbs explosives
with pencil time fuses and accessories)
16 containers with type V5 cells (each grenades and
revolvers)
8 containers each or :- one type B.5 cell (altimeter
switches and accessories)
one type B.6 cell (incendiaries)
one type V.1 cell (40 lbs
explosives with electrical detonators and accessories)
Parachutes (container) 58
parachut type A
large 5

SECRET

Parachutes (personal type X small) 10 (RECALL 10/11/13 7:11:00)

Stores and Equipment

2,000 rifles with 400 r.p.g.
1,000 Stens with 800 r.p.g.
4,000 hand grenades
8,000 Hawkins Grenades (anti-tank mines)

In addition, MINNA of the O.W.F. will be arriving from GIBRALTAR on D + 2. She will carry the stores given in the attached list which will be available for infiltration by sea into Eastern ALGERIA and TUNISIA. These stores will be made up into man loads not exceeding 70 lbs weight. She will also carry the following personnel :-

- 1 Naval Officer as Staff Officer at Base.
- 1 Naval Officer as Assistant to above.
- 6 men as skippers and skeleton crews for 3 small craft that may be requisitioned at ALGIERS.
- 1 Storekeeper R.E. for the Advanced Base Headquarters.

8. Recognition

To ensure the recognition of Allied Supporters in NORTH AFRICA by individuals and units of the Allied Force, the following recognition signs will be used.

- (a) Password WHISKEY.
- (b) White paper inside caps with password written on it.

SECRET

BROUGHT BY SEA

ARMES & AMMUNITION

Item.	Quantity	T. Cwt.
1. St Guns	500	
2. 9 /m Paralellum ammo	200,000 rounds	4 - 10
3. St Gun Magazines	2,500	
4. Mi la Grenades & arming units	1,000	16
5. Re olvers .38 colt (Army pat)	100	
6. .38 revolvers ammo.	5,000	3
7. Fighting Knives	500	5
8. IV e VI (Petard) Grenade	500	10
9. St ing Cosh	500	3
10. St tchets	300	5
Total		6 - 12

STORES

Item.	Quantity	T. Cwt.
<u>A. Explosives.</u>		
1. 808 or Gelignite	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons:	5 - 5
2. Plastic Explosive	500 lbs.	- 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
<u>B. Incendiaries.</u>		
1. M I. Flares	1000	-10
2. P.B.5a. Black	250)	
Red	250)	
White	200)	
Green	200)	- 2
Yellow	50)	
Blue	50)	
3. Tysules	1000	- 1
4. Thermite Bombs	500	-10
<u>C. Time Delays etc.</u>		
1. Bickford Safety	6,420	- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
" M/E lengths	500	-
A.C. delays Complete		
with ampoules and burners	512	- 5
Pencil time fuses:-		
Black	450)	
Red	500)	
White	500)	
Green	400)	- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
Yellow	300)	
Blue	150)	
2. Copper tube igniters	4000	- $\frac{1}{2}$
<u>D. Primers etc.</u>		
1. Primers G.E.	3850	- 3 $\frac{1}{2}$
Detonators No.8.A.S.A.	4000	- 4
2. Cordtex	19,500 ft.	- 4 $\frac{1}{2}$
<u>E. Miscellaneous</u>		
1. Adhesive Tape	550 Rolls	- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$
2. Patches	500 boxes	-

Item	Quantity	E/Pwd.	7	11
Miscellaneous (contd.)				
3. Striker Boards	700			
4. Detonators Magazines	200			
5. Magnets $\frac{1}{2}$ lb.	1000			4
x6. Crimping tools	175			1
7. Pull Switches	560			1
8. Pressure "	224			1
9. Release Switches	224			1
10. Fog Signals	224			1
11. Wire .014"	224 coils			1
12. Vaseline	224 tubes			1
13. Bostik Solution	224 tubes			1
14. Rubberised fabric	1120 sq. ft.			1
x15. No. 3 taps (waterproofing end of Cordtex)	2800			1
x16. Beehives (5 lbs)	500	1	-	2
x17. Tube tyre bursters complete with driving tubes and hammers	2000	1	-	0
18. Limpets Rigid.	100			7
19. " Flexible	100)			
20. " Saddles	200)			3
x21. Small Mobile Mines	15			1
22. Containers deep water complete with lines floats etc.	6			3
23. Electric Torches	100)			
24. Dry Batteries	200)	-		1
25. Torch bulbs	200)			
26. Dagger Jack Knives	200			1
27. Emergency Rations	10	-		
28. Field dressings	200	-		
29. Haversacks	30	-		1
30. Holdfasts	10	-		1
31. Wirecutters	50	-		1
32. Water purifying tablets	2000	-		
33. Veroy Pistols	2			
34. Veroy Ammunition Red	24)			
Green	24)			
Illuminating	24)			
Grand Total		11	-	3

Additional.

35. Broom Handles (wooden)	12			
36. $\frac{1}{2}$ " steel plates 2'6" x 2'6"	24	1	-	1
37. Pickaxes G.S.	24			1

**Grand Total of Arms, Ammunition
& Stores**

19 - 15

(USUALS SYSTEM MOST SECRET)

ADVANCE OF THE ALLIED FORCESO.S.S. TASKS TO BE CARRIED OUTACTION REQUIRED IF FRENCH ACQUIESCE OR AGREE IN THE ALLIED
OCCUPATION OF TUNISIACode Word - DOVE

No action will be taken on this plan without specific instructions from the O.S.S. representative with H.Q. 1st ARMY.

PriorityAction

1. Ensure that the aerodromes at BIZERTE and TUNIS are in friendly hands at the earliest opportunity and ready to be handed over to Allied air, sea or land borne forces as soon as they arrive.
2. Ensure that the two main roads to the East are kept open.

B. ACTION REQUIRED IN THE EVENT OF A GERMAN COUNTER-INVASION INTO
TUNISIACode Word - STRAFE

Priority 1 of this plan will be put into operation without further instructions from the O.S.S. representative with H.Q. 1st ARMY as soon as Axis forces land at or near those ports.

PriorityAction

- 1 (a) Immobilise the harbours of BIZERTE, TUNIS, SFAI and GABES by wrecking the power stations and burning fuel dumps.
- (b) Immobilise or destroy main telephone and telegraph exchanges, broadcasting and W/T stations at these ports.

No action on these priorities will be taken without specific instructions from the O.S.S. representative with H.Q. 1st ARMY.

- 2 Destroy or block tunnels and blow bridges on the roads and railways leading North and West from the ports in Priority 1.
- 3 Delay enemy's progress to the West by blowing successive lines of road and rail bridges, tunnels and defiles as far West as the general line BONE - SOUK AHRAS.
- 4 Delay enemy's progress along the coast from the South by destroying road and rail bridges in the area West of SFAI and GABES.

SECRET

(USUALS SYSTEM MOST SECRET)

S. O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS

TO

LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. A. EDDY

1. Reference the S.O. Operation Instructions issued to Lt. Colonel W. A. Eddy, U.S. Marines on the 14th October, 1943.

2. These have now been discussed with Colonel Eddy and his comments as to which targets can, or cannot, be dealt with are attached for information.

3. These comments refer to the possibility of attacking each individual target, but it must be realized that the S.O. resources may be insufficient to deal simultaneously with all the targets given. This question must be one for the S.O. representative in each area to decide, after calculating the numbers required for each assignment. There can therefore be no guarantee of all the possible tasks being carried out.

By command of Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

L. L. LEHNITZER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:COPY NUMBERSCOMMENTS ON APPENDICES

	A	B	C	D
Colonel Eddy	1 & 2	1 & 2	1 & 2	1 & 2
Colonel Brien Clarke	3	3	3	3
A P Hq, G-3	4 & 5	4 & 5	4 & 5	4 & 5
Political Section	6	6	6	6
Eastern Task Force	-	-	7	7
Eastern Assault Force	-	-	8	-
Center Task Force	-	7	-	-
Western Task Force	7	-	-	-
Mr. Knox	-	-	9 & 10 & 11	9
Mr. Baugh	-	8	-	-
Mr. Culbert	-	-	-	-
Colonel Eddy	9 & 10	9 & 10	9 & 10	9 & 10
GSC	11 & 12	11 & 12	11 & 12	11 & 12
Commander in Chief	13	13	13	13
Deputy Commander in Chief	14	14	14	14
Chief of Staff, G-3	15	15	15	15
CO, Palawan, Luzon	16	16	16	16

SECRET

(Equal to British Most Secret)
 (EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

COLONEL EDDY'S COMMENTS

on

Targets given to him in

ANNEX TO APPENDIX A.

S.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS OF 14th OCTOBER, 1942.

WESTERN TASK FORCE

Code Word - PEACE
Comment

Priority

- | | |
|----|---|
| 1 | (i) Nothing can be done as these are in the Port area. |
| | (ii) These can probably be dealt with. |
| | (iii) These can probably be dealt with. |
| | (iv) Very doubtful if any action can be taken against these guns. |
| | (v) These can probably be dealt with. |
| 2 | PORT LYAUTEY. These aerodromes can be dealt with.
CASABLANCA. Doubtful whether these aerodromes can be dealt with.
RABAT. Perhaps these aerodromes can be dealt with. |
| 3 | Yes. These targets can be dealt with. |
| 4) | |
| 5) | Yes. These targets can be dealt with. |
| 6) | |
| 7 | NOTHING can be done to prevent damage to docks and port equipment. |
| 8) | |
| 9) | Yes. These can be dealt with. |
| 10 | The Armistice Commissioners can be dealt with, but it is impossible to ensure the preservation of their records and documents as these may be destroyed on D -2 or D -1. |

Code Word - WAR

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 | Cannot be done |
| 2 | Cannot be done. It is only possible to neutralise these batteries for a short period and they could not be held for a day or so. |
| 3 | Can be done |

SECRET

COLONEL EDDY'S COMMENTS

on

Targets given to him inANNEX TO APPENDIX BS.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS of 14th OCTOBER, 1942.CENTER TASK FORCECode Word - PEACEPriorityComment

- 1)
- 2) Yes. This can probably be done.
- 3)
- 4 Only the main known Army Divisional radio sets can be dealt with. Naval and secret radio stations cannot be guaranteed.
- 5)
- 6) Yes. These can be done.
- 7)
- 8 NOTHING can be done to prevent damage to dock and port equipment as these are in the Port area.
- 9)
- 10) Yes. These can be done.
- 11 The Armistice Commissioners can be dealt with, but it is impossible to ensure the preservation of their records and documents as these may be destroyed on D -2 or D -1.
- 12 Yes. This can be done.

Code Word - WAR

- 1 No. This cannot be done.
- 2 Cannot be done. It is only possible to neutralise these batteries for a short period and they could not be held for a day or so.
- 3)
- 4) Yes. These can be done.

SECRET
 (When SECRET)
 (When SECRET)

SECRET (EQUAL BRITISH MOST SECRET)
(Equal British Most Secret)

23rd October, 1942

COLONEL EDDY'S COMMENTS

on

Targets given to him in

ANNEX TO APPENDIX C
S.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS of 14th OCTOBER, 1942

EASTERN ASSAULT FORCE AND EASTERN TASK FORCE

Code Word - PEACE

Priority

Comment

- 1)
- 2) Yes. These can probably be dealt with.
- 3 This task can be done.
- 4 This can probably be dealt with.
- 5)
- 6) Yes. These can be dealt with.
- 7 These can be dealt with, with the exception of the secret exchange. The destruction of this will have to be the matter of further study.
- 8)
- 9) Yes. These can be dealt with.
- 10 NOTHING can be done to prevent damage to dock and port equipment as these are in the Port area.
- 11)
- 12) Yes. These can be dealt with.
- 13 The Armistice Commissioners can be dealt with, but it is impossible to ensure the preservation of their records and documents as these may be destroyed on D -2 or D -1.
- 14 This can probably be done.

Code Word - WAR

- 1 This cannot be done.

Code Word - DOVE

- 1)
- 2) Yes. This can be done.

Code Word - WARNING EAGLE

- 1 Probably most of these roads can be blocked.

Code Word - EAGLE

- 1 Yes. This can be done.

Code Word - STRAFE

- 1 Yes. These tasks can be undertaken once the arms, and especially the explosives arriving with the EASTERN TASK FORCE and MINNA have been distributed.

SECRET
(Equal British Most Secret)

23rd October, 1942

COLONEL EDDY'S COMMENTS

10

on

Targets given to him inANNEX TO APPENDIX D
S.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS of 14th OCTOBER, 1942EASTERN TASK FORCECode Word - DOVEPriorityComment

- 1) These cannot be done as the S.O. groups in TUNISIA
- 2) are small and scattered and are not concentrated as in ALGIERS and MOROCCO.

Note: It is probable that the larger Algerian groups, once they have been armed and equipped, might be infiltrated into TUNISIA to attempt these tasks, especially those under Priority 2.

Code Word - STRAFE

- 1 (a) Can be done with the exception of SFAX which is doubtful.
- (b) Can be done.
- 2) Some demolitions can be carried out, but the
- 3) smallness of the groups will prohibit any extensive
- 4) demolition scheme.

Most Secret

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Initials *W.B.S.*
Date: 23 October, 1942COPY NO. 16

23 October, 1942

S. O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONSTOLIEUTENANT COLONEL W. A. EDDY.

1. Reference the S.O. Operation Instructions issued to Lt. Colonel W. A. Eddy, U.S. Marines on the 14th October, 1942.

2. These have now been discussed with Colonel Eddy and his comments as to which targets can, or cannot, be dealt with are attached for information.

3. These comments refer to the possibility of attacking each individual target, but it must be realized that the S.O. resources may be insufficient to deal simultaneously with all the targets given. This question must be one for the S.O. representative in each area to decide, after calculating the numbers required for each assignment. There can therefore be no guarantee of all the possible ~~tasks~~ being carried out.

By command of Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

1/4 1/2-1
1/3-1
L. L. LEANITZER,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION:COPY NUMBERSCOMMENTS ON APPENDICES

	A	B	C	D
Colonel Eddy	1 & 2	1 & 2	1 & 2	1 & 2
Colonel Brion Clarke	3	3	3	3
A F Hq, G-3	4 & 5	4 & 5	4 & 5	4 & 5
Political Section	6	6	6	6
Eastern Task Force	-	-	7	7
Eastern Assault Force	-	-	8	-
Center Task Force	-	7	-	-
Western Task Force	7	-	-	-
Mr. Knox	-	-	x 9 & 10 x 8 & 9	x One for
Mr. Rounds	-	-	-	Mr. Springs
Mr. Culbert	8	-	-	-
Colonel Gienther	9 & 10	9 & 10	11 & 12	10 & 11
SOE	11 & 12	11 & 12	13 & 14	12 & 13
Commander-in-Chief	13	13	15	-
Deputy Commander-in-Chief	14	14	16	-
Chief of Staff, A.F.	15	15	17	-
Chief of Staff, Eastern Task Force	-	-	-	-
Chief of Staff, Western Task Force	16-25	16-25	18-27	17-26

SECRET

NOT REPRODUCED

COLONEL EDDY'S COMMENTS

on

Targets given to him isANNEX TO APPENDIX A.S.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS of 14th OCTOBER, 1942.WESTERN TASK FORCECode Word - PEACECommentPriority

- | | |
|----|---|
| 1 | (i) Nothing can be done as these are in the Port area. |
| | (ii) These can probably be dealt with. |
| | (iii) These can probably be dealt with. |
| | (iv) Very doubtful if any action can be taken against these guns. |
| | (v) These can probably be dealt with. |
| 2 | PORT LYAUTEY. These aerodromes can be dealt with.
CASABLANCA. Doubtful whether these aerodromes can be dealt with.
RABAT. Perhaps these aerodromes can be dealt with. |
| 3 | Yes. These targets can be dealt with. |
| 4) | |
| 5) | Yes. These targets can be dealt with. |
| 6) | |
| 7 | NOTHING can be done to prevent damage to docks and port equipment. |
| 8) | |
| 9) | Yes. These can be dealt with. |
| 10 | The Armistice Commissioners can be dealt with, but it is impossible to ensure the preservation of their records and documents as these may be destroyed on D -2 or D -1. |

Code Word - WAR

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 | Cannot be done |
| 2 | Cannot be done. It is only possible to neutralise these batteries for a short period and they could not be held for a day or so. |
| 3 | Can be done |

23rd October, 1942

COLONEL EDDY'S COMMENTS

10

on

Targets given to him inANNEX TO APPENDIX BS.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS of 14th OCTOBER, 1942.CENTER TASK FORCECode Word - PEACEPriorityComment

- 1)
- 2) Yes. This can probably be done.
- 3)
- 4 Only the main known Army Divisional radio sets can be dealt with. Naval and secret radio stations cannot be guaranteed.
- 5)
- 6) Yes. These can be done.
- 7)
- 8 NOTHING can be done to prevent damage to dock and port equipment as these are in the Port area.
- 9)
- 10) Yes. These can be done.
- 11 The Armistice Commissioners can be dealt with, but it is impossible to ensure the preservation of their records and documents as these may be destroyed on D -2 or D -1.
- 12 Yes. This can be done.

Code Word - JAR

- 1 No. This cannot be done.
- 2 Cannot be done. It is only possible to neutralise these batteries for a short period and they could not be held for a day or so.
- 3)
- 4) Yes. These can be done.

SECRET

SECRET

COLONEL TUDY'S COMMENTS

on

Targets given to him inANNEX TO APPENDIX CS.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS of 14th OCTOBER, 1942EASTERN ASSAULT FORCE AND EASTERN TASK FORCECode Word - PEACEPriorityComment

- 1)
- 2) Yes. These can probably be dealt with.
- 3 This task can be done.
- 4 This can probably be dealt with.
- 5)
- 6) Yes. These can be dealt with.
- 7 These can be dealt with, with the exception of the secret exchange. The destruction of this will have to be the matter of further study.
- 8)
- 9) Yes. These can be dealt with.
- 10 NOTHING can be done to prevent damage to dock and port equipment as these are in the Port area.
- 11)
- 12) Yes. These can be dealt with.
- 13 The Armistice Commissioners can be dealt with, but it is impossible to ensure the preservation of their records and documents as these may be destroyed on D -2 or D -1.
- 14 This can probably be done.

Code Word - WAR

1 This cannot be done.

Code Word - DOVE

1) Yes. This can be done.

Code Word - WARNING EAGLE

1 Probably most of these roads can be blocked.

Code Word - EAGLE

1 Yes. This can be done.

Code Word - BTHAFH

Yes. These tasks can be undertaken once the arms, and especially the explosives arriving with the EASTERN TASK FORCE and BTHAFH have been distributed.

SECRET

20th October 1942

COLONEL EDDY'S COMMENTS

on

Targets given to him inANNEX TO APPENDIX DS.O. OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS of 14th OCTOBER, 1942EASTERN TASK FORCECode Word - DOVEPriorityComment

- 1) These cannot be done as the S.O. groups in TUNISIA
- 2) are small and scattered and are not concentrated as in ALGIERS and MOROCCO.

Note: It is probable that the larger Algerian groups, once they have been armed and equipped, might be infiltrated into TUNISIA to attempt these tasks, especially those under Priority 2.

Code Word - STRAFE

- 1 (a) Can be done with the exception of SPAX which is doubtful.
- (b) Can be done.
- 2) Some demolitions can be carried out, but the smallness of the groups will prohibit any extensive demolition scheme.
- 3)
- 4)

SECRET

W. L. TERRY
General Orders

GENERAL ORDERS

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- Number 4. Political Directive for TORCH
- Number 5. Guide: Manner in which Civil Affairs Genl
can Serve Commander
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- B.
Ordinances, 2. Gen. Eisenhower
- C.
Proclamation Gen. Eisenhower
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- E.
Proclamation Gen. Eisenhower, # 1.
- F.
Proclamation Gen. Eisenhower, # 2.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters, Theater of
Operations

Date: 10 Oct. 1942

GENERAL ORDER

NUMBER 3

(In the event that it becomes necessary to institute Military Government in any or all of the regions of North Africa, the following instructions will govern the establishment of Military tribunals.)

Military Tribunals.

Implementing the military government proclaimed and established in my proclamations and ordinances as have been issued by me, military tribunals will be established and administered in accordance with the following policies:

Here:

1. Military necessity: 1st consideration is prosecution of war to successful termination. For every intended act ask question whether it will forward or hinder accomplishment. Administration subordinate to military necessities of operations, security, supply, transportation and housing of troops.

2. Welfare of those under military control. Just, humane and mild as practicable - guided by principles of justice, honor and humanity. Object in waging war is to obtain favorable and enduring peace.

3. Kind and composition:

a. 3 kinds: Military Commissions, Superior Provost Courts, and Inferior Provost Courts.

b. Military Commissions - not less than 5 officers (law member, trial judge advocate, defense counsel - one or more assistant trial judge advocates and counsel

- c. Superior Provost Courts - one officer of field grade unless none such available.
- d. Inferior Provost Courts - one officer.
- e. Appointment of military tribunals in areas occupied by British Army will be in accordance and compliance with American normal procedure.

2. BY WHOM APPOINTED:

- a. Military Commissions - by appropriate special order by Task Force Commander, or Commanding Officer of units used as organs of military government, where said power has been so delegated to them by the C.G. T.O.
- b. Military governors and Civil Affairs Officers may appoint Superior Provost Courts and Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective areas as may be properly brought before them.
- c. Commanding officers of tactical units used as organs of military government may appoint Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective governmental jurisdiction as may be properly brought before them if that authority is delegated to them by the Military Governor. If but a single officer is on duty in a tactical unit used as an organ of military administration, or a single officer on duty in connection with civil affairs in a county or city similar territorial subdivision, such officer shall constitute an Inferior Court. Ref. Sec. V WD Basic FM 27-5, 1940. Shall be appointed by special order as if appointing a summary court-martial.

4. JURISDICTION:

- a. Over persons. All persons within controlled territories except those having diplomatic immunity and those subject to military or naval law of U.S. or allies. Persons subject to military law tried by court-martial.

-3-

b. Over offenses: All acts or omissions made crimes or offenses by laws of country occupied, offenses against laws of war, violations of proclamations, ordinances, regulations or orders promulgated by C.G. T.O. or subordinates within scope of authority. If courts of country under control are open and functioning satisfactorily, should be permitted to try persons charged with offenses against laws that country not involving U.S. and allies. C.Gs of Task Forces, or a subordinate under delegated power in civil affairs, may withdraw any case or class of cases from a court of controlled country and direct they be dropped or tried by military tribunal. Such power should be exercised with respect to any prosecution inimical to interest of U.S. and allies. Each military tribunal shall have jurisdiction over such charges only as may be referred to it for trial by officer appointing it or successor, except matters within jurisdiction of Inferior P.Courts. If officer authorized to appoint Inferior Provost Courts shall consider charges deserving of more severe punishment than can be imposed by court to which he may refer them, he will forward to higher authority, recommending reference to higher tribunal. An officer who is an Inferior Provost Court because he is the only officer present may try such charges as he or others may prefer, or may forward them to higher authority.

5. BAIL:

- a. As soon as practicable, Task F.C. or subordinate with such power delegated in civil affairs, will issue orders announcing cases and conditions for bail. Matter of discretion and not of right.

6. PROCEDURE:

- a. Military Commissions: Same as general courts martial except as obviously inapplicable.
- b. Provost Courts: Same - except in Inf.P.Courts no written charges need be filed.
- c. Counsel: Every defendant entitled as right, own selection and own expense. Military counsel provided only before military commissions.

and, except that in inferior Provoost Courts, no written report

Every defendant before a military court shall be afforded the right of counsel of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the same, counsel shall be provided only to him if he is unable to obtain counsel of his own choice.

At London, Co. of wit. no. 100

(1) Military witnesses: a. The attendance of military witnesses shall be determined by the court on the basis of the following factors:

22. Civilian witnesses: - Military personnel are required to attend to the needs of civilian witnesses. If necessary, they may require the assistance of civilian authorities or request that of the military police or commanding officer. Reasonable allowances will be paid for transportation of witnesses from the local jail to the place of the hearing, and for the cost of the witness's food and lodging. If the witness is a prisoner of the Government, the Government will be responsible for the cost of the witness's food and lodging. If the witness is a civilian, the cost of the witness's food and lodging will be paid by the Government. If the witness is a prisoner of the Government, the Government will be responsible for the cost of the witness's food and lodging. If the witness is a civilian, the cost of the witness's food and lodging will be paid by the Government.

Translation: -- If the defendant and his counsel, or the plaintiff and his counsel, are not conversant with the English language, the proceedings will be conducted in that language in which they will be most conveniently understood by the parties. If the plaintiff or the defendant is not conversant with the English language, the proceedings will be conducted in the language of the territory under control. If neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is conversant with the English language, an interpreter will be employed who will interpret the proceedings to the plaintiff and the defendant. The proceedings will be conducted in the English language if the plaintiff or the defendant is conversant with the English language. If the plaintiff or the defendant is not conversant with the English language, the proceedings will be conducted in the language of the territory under control. If neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is conversant with the English language, an interpreter will be employed who will interpret the proceedings to the plaintiff and the defendant. The proceedings will be conducted in the English language if the plaintiff or the defendant is conversant with the English language. If the plaintiff or the defendant is not conversant with the English language, the proceedings will be conducted in the language of the territory under control. If neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is conversant with the English language, an interpreter will be employed who will interpret the proceedings to the plaintiff and the defendant.

Previous convictions in a military tribunal may be considered, after a hearing and before imposition of sentence, evidence of guilt and shall be admissible if such military tribunals or civil courts provided a record of conviction of an offense legally punishable by imprisonment for one year (whether in fact so punished or not) shall be admissible up to the date of commission of such offense, but evidence of conviction of an offense not so punishable shall be admissible only if the offense was within one year next preceding the commission of any offense of which the defendant shall have been convicted at the trial then in progress.

any commission may be paid
or 1 per cent of the amount.

100-443887-100

contends Brian and
John 63-90 p. 20

THE RECORDS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON

... appropriate and
... prior provision about
... may determine

...to the United States...
...in his possession or control...
...If a...

...of the... or orders with respect to the...
...place, or once convicted of the operation of...
...which any member of the armed forces of the United States...
...contracted a venereal disease, a military tribunal...
...other lawful punishment, order that such place...
...fixed time.

...and manner of confinement -- The...
...of a military commission, Superior Provoost Court, or inferior Provoost...
...will issue orders as to the place of confinement of persons...
...such tribunals, to imprisonment, as to the order to be...
...as to other details of their confinement. ...
...graph 1 a. 7) the termination of the occupied...
...require their removal, persons serving sentences...
...should be confined within the territory under control.

8. RECORDS:

a. (1) Charges will be referred to...
...law on a printed "Charge Sheet" (Appendix...
...Provoost Courts. If that form is not available, it may be replaced by...
...written longhand, or on charge sheet in use at the time...
...Number 115) may be used, after changing such parts...
...and making such additions as are necessary. ...
...necessary. Charges will be referred by...
...to suitable tribunals.

(2) Inferior Provoost Courts will keep in their...
...record file, showing the charge, date of arrest, date of trial, ...
...fines, sentences and if confined, place of confinement. If...
...of the fine; if a fine and confinement, the amount of the fine...
...length of the confinement will be shown. Final action of...
...on review (if any,) the date entries were made, and the signature...
...Provoost Court Officer, two copies being forwarded to the appointing...

b. The records of trials by Superior Provoost Courts will be kept...
...on the back of the charge sheet. Inferior courts will keep a separate record...
...book.

c. Military commissions will keep a separate record of the trial...
...of each case in form as nearly as practicable like that of a general court...
...martial.

9. DISPOSITION OF FINES

Fines for... of convicted...
...and other... will be paid without...
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10. APPROVAL

...a military...
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UNITED STATES

Headquarters, _____

(Place)

and _____ (last name followed by first and middle name)

position _____

ex _____ marital status _____ number of minor

children or dependents other than wife _____

address _____

(State name and address and state for prosecution or defense)

articles or documents to be introduced in evidence, and state where each is to be introduced _____

previous convictions attached _____

(Number)

information as to restraint of accused _____

(State whether or not in confinement, and if so, since what date)

Headquarters _____

Office of Civil Affairs _____

(Name of command or office)

(Place)

(Date)

charges on the reverse side of this sheet are referred for trial to:

(Name, rank, grade)

(Place)

(Command or

carrying charges

(Signature)

Officer referring charges _____ no adjutant

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters Theater of Operations

October 11, 1942.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 4

POLITICAL DIRECTIVE FOR TORCH

I. Information.

A. Initial purpose -- prevent control of F.N.A. from falling into the hands of enemy and secure good will and cooperation of the people. The President will issue a proclamation to be dropped over Algiers, Oran and Casablanca at dawn on D-Day -- American flag and President's picture.

B. Expected that all government and civil service officials and employees who are trustworthy will remain on duty.

C. The Civil Affairs Section of headquarters will attach to each task and assault force a Civil Affairs Section and technical advisers on military government and administration. They must be prepared to supervise, when necessary, local government.

D. Each task force or assault force commander will be furnished with 5,000 copies of Proclamations 1 and 2 and Ordinance Regulations 1 and 2 in French and Arabic.

-2-

E. (1) Proclamation 1 and Ordinance 1 have been drawn up for distribution if we are received as friends or there is mere token resistance.

(2) Proclamation 2 and Ordinance 2 if there is open and prolonged hostility and resistance.

(3) Task force commanders will exercise their judgment in deciding the type of opposition.

II. Type of Military Control.

A. Every effort made consistent with mission to win over support and cooperation of the French, both civilian and military.

III. Relations with Civilian Authorities.

A. Principle is that regardless of resistance the French are friendly and are to be maintained in their government.

B. Agreed between U. S. and British that civil administration of controlled territory under American control.

C. Parleys and negotiations conducted by U. S. officers with assistance of political officer attached to each force. This does not prohibit direct dealings by British and French officials on claims, requisitions, etc., on which policies have been previously determined.

-3-

IV. Political Plan.

A. In the assault stage the idea of American command kept to the front.

B. Murphy is United States representative and will function as Chief Civil Administrator in North Africa. Before operations he will arrange for taking over authority throughout French North Africa when operations begin by Frenchmen who are friendly. He is authorized to give Frenchmen that he trusts certain assurances, which include equipment for the French troops that come over to our side, money to meet additional expenses, and guaranty of salaries, allowances, death benefits and pensions.

C. Believed that a part of French army and French air force will welcome arrival of American force, but naval force will resist.

D. (1) French agents who will assist the initial assault need rifles and ammunition; these will be carried by task force.

(2) Distribution of these rests upon the task force commander on advice of Murphy.

E. (1) Murphy will be represented by Deputy Civil Administrators, --

A -4-

With the Eastern Assault Force: John Knox

With the Center Task Force: Leland Rounds

With the Western Task Force: Frederick Culbert

(2) These Deputy Administrators will accompany each force from its point of embarkation and upon landing will endeavor to establish immediate contact as follows:

(a) Eastern Assault Force: With Murphy at Algiers, or if that impossible with Cole, American Consul, or Vice Consul Boyd. Mr. Knox will communicate with these, or if failing, directly with Mr. Chatel, Governor General of Algeria, and he will request convocation of Generals Juin, Koeltz (19th Army Corps), and Mast (friendly - Algiers Division, Vice Admiral Fenard (friendly - Permanent General Secretary of North Africa), and General Mendigaul, Commander of French Air Force in North Africa. Allied representatives will be Murphy, General Ryder, Cole and Knox.

b) Center Task Force: Mr. Knight, American consular control officer or upon Boujard, Prefect of Oran, to request an urgent convocation of General Hypolite (Oran Division), Colonel Jousse (Chief of Staff - friendly) and the senior naval officer and

-5-

senior air commander. Allied representatives here will be Major General Fredendall, Messrs. Rounds and Knight.

(c) Western Task Force: With Mr. Russell, Consul General at Casablanca, Vice Consuls Reid and Knight, or with General Bethouard and Vice Admiral Michellier at Casablanca, or, depending upon circumstances, Resident General Nogues, General Lascroux and General La Haouille, Commanding Air Morocco, at Rabat. Allied representation here - General Patton, Messrs. Russell and Culbert.

(3) Fourth Administrator Springs, Vice Consul at Tunis, will be available at Algiers to be attached to General Anderson's staff and accompany the advance eastward.

F. Upon agreement for cessation of firing within the area, the Commanding General will present his proclamations and ordinances defining his authority in civil affairs.

V. French Forces Offering to Fight on Our Side.

A. (1) Problem a military one; task force commander must not dampen enthusiasm and emphasis placed on refusal of U. S. to be responsible for Frenchmen shooting

-6-

Frenchmen. French should keep out of initial operations; when these concluded, they will be supplied with arms.

(2) Officer commanding the unit might be invited to join the force commander's headquarters.

B. When military necessity requires the disarming of a unit, it should be done by the commander.

VI. Direct Propaganda.

A. Direct responsibility of Commanding General and will not be delegated.

B. Leaflets main medium; strong broadcasting station to be in operation from the United Kingdom. Broadcasting resources of U. S. and United Kingdom directed to secure the flanks. Broadcasting teams will accompany the task force to run the Algiers, Oran and Rabat stations.

C. Wireless communication between Murphy and the commander in chief at Gibraltar and between Murphy and the task force commanders when operations begin.

VII. Power of Arrest Over French or Natives.

This to be done before properly constituted military tribunal which exercise proper discretion. Ordinary enforcement of laws left to local civilian authorities.

-7-

VIII. Authority and Methods to Requisition Buildings.

A. Land and buildings owned by individuals will be obtained by agreement between agents of U. S. and its allied forces and individual or agent of property desired to be occupied.

B. If cannot make satisfactory arrangement, inform Civil Affairs Officer, who will make requisition with proper authorities. Payment in cash or vouchers payable in cash. Price, fair market value.

IX. Authority and Methods for Local Purchase.

Task force commanders will create local purchase boards. Procurement of civilian personnel or equipment required by military will be responsibility of arm of service concerned.

X. Labor.

A. Civil Affairs force will handle this.

B. (1) Commissaries for sale of goods to civilian labor will be established as task force commander may direct. (2) Not to exceed 30 days supplies to 6,000 persons, following rates will be furnished for civilian labor consumption:

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Tea	.03 pounds per individual per day
Rice	.15 pounds " " " "
Sugar	.03 pounds " " " "
Cotton	.083 yards " " " "

C. (1) Only persons having badges and pay books are entitled to purchase; until goods are in sufficient supply only civil labor working directly under the military can purchase. At a later stage, local shops and commissaries will be supplied.

(2) For supervision of local labor, local employment exchanges.

(3) All necessary details will be filled in on engagement later.

(4) Natives must wear in conspicuous position a disc with initial letters of unit and identity number.

(5) Quartermaster, Army of U. S., will provide necessary employment record books or cards.

(6) Local rates of pay will be in accordance with current rates.

(7) Price of all supplies in North Africa which come from America will be determined in respect of retail distributors by Quartermaster, Army of U. S.

-9-

XI. Terms for Cessation of Hostilities.

Task and assault force commanders will be furnished alternate drafts. First draft is in event of slight or token resistance, second for prolonged resistance. Task commander determines what shall be done and what modifications, if any, will be made in draft.

XII. Claims.

Command Claims Officer for each U. S. task force who will investigate all claims for damages, personal and property. Personal claims service will be assigned where they can be best handled.

XIII. American Liaison Officers.

American army officers will be attached to General Anderson's and General Clark's staffs prior to embarkation from United Kingdom. They will act as liaison between British forces and French authorities.

ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters, Theater of Operations.

GENERAL ORDER)

CHAPTER 4

11 Oct. 1942

POLITICAL DIRECTIVE FOR "TORCH"1. INFORMATION.

a. The initial purpose of the operations in French North Africa is to prevent control of that territory from falling into the hands of our enemies, and to secure the goodwill and co-operation of our friends, the people of French North Africa. The President of the United States of America will make that Proclamation and appeal in a leaflet to be dropped over the Algiers, Oran and Casablanca area, at dawn, on D-day. This leaflet will carry the American flag and the President's picture.

b. It is expected that all governmental officials, officers and employees of the local government in all of its branches, and who are trustworthy, will remain in office, and that all officials and employees of the civil administration, civilian public services and facilities, will carry on their normal duties.

c. The Civil Affairs Section of HqTO will have attached to each Task and Assault Force, a Civil Affairs Section as technical advisors to Force commanders on matters pertaining to military government and administration; they will be prepared to supervise the functioning of the local civil government in all of its branches, insofar as may be necessary, if the occasion arises, to supervise the operation of all civil institutions and facilities with military personnel.

d. Each Task Force or Assault Force commander, will be furnished with 5,000 copies of Proclamation #1; Proclamation #2; Ordinances (regulations) #1; Ordinances (regulations) #2; printed in French and Arabic, issued by the Commanding General, prior to the embarkation of his force.

e. (1) Proclamation #1, and Ordinances #1, have been drawn up, for circulation and posting, if the reception afforded our forces is friendly or if a mere token resistance to our Military Occupation is made by French.

(2) Proclamation #2, and Ordinances #2, are provided as substitutes in the event there is open and prolonged hostility and resistance to our operations.

(3) Task Force commanders will exercise their best judgment in deciding which type of opposition they meet in their particular area, and will distribute the Proclamation and Ordinances which will best meet the situation.

2. TYPE OF MILITARY CONTROL:

a. As is outlined in par. 1 a. above, it is the desire of the President of the United States to secure and maintain the goodwill and friendship of the French people in this undertaking. Therefore, every effort must be made by all of our personnel in their dealings with the French and native people, as is consistent with the military mission of the Commanding General, and the Task and Assault Force commanders, to win the active support and cooperation of the French and native people.

the French and native military administration, and the general public, and to assist them in their normal lives.

3. RELATIONS WITH CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES:

a. The principle upon which all relations with the civilian authorities is to be based, is that regardless of resistance, the French are friendly and are to be maintained in their government. Within that understanding, commanders must use their own judgment in meeting local situations.

b. It has been agreed between the United States and the British authorities that civil administration of controlled territory shall be entirely under American control.

c. Parleys and negotiations will be conducted by United States officers, with the assistance of the Political Officer attached to each force. This does not prohibit direct dealings between British officers and French officials, on matters of claims, requisitioning, etc., on which policies have previously been determined.

4. POLITICAL PLAN:

a. In the assault stage the fact that the operation is predominantly American and under American command must always be kept in the forefront. The participation of British Naval and Air Forces from the outset cannot be concealed.

b. Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of the American Embassy, now at Algiers, will be the United States representative and will function as Chief Civil Administrator in North Africa. In the period before the beginning of the operation, he will make every endeavour for arrangements for the taking over of authority throughout French North Africa when the operations begin, by Frenchmen who are friendly to the Allied cause. Mr. Murphy is in touch with many important friendly Frenchmen there and he is authorized by the President to give them certain assurances with a view to arranging as friendly a reception as possible for the American forces when they arrive. These assurances include the provision of equipment as rapidly as possible for the French troops which come over to our side; provision of money to meet additional expenses incurred through cooperation with the American forces, and a guarantee by the United States Government of salaries and allowances, death benefits and pensions of the French military, naval and air forces, and civil officials who join with the Allied forces.

c. There is reason to believe that at least a part of the French Army and French Air Force will welcome the arrival of American forces. It seems certain that the French Naval Forces will resist.

d. (1) Mr. Murphy is also in touch with other friendly French agents and agents who, it is hoped, will be able to assist the initial assault and landings from inside the country. These elements, however, are few. Each task force will be supplied with a stock of rifles, ammunition, Bren guns, Stens, pistols, hand grenades and anti-tank weapons.

(2) Arrangements for the distribution of these arms and munitions to the proper agents of the friendly elements, will be a responsibility of the Task Force commanders upon the advice of Mr. Murphy and his Deputy accompanying the Task Force, who will make appropriate contact with the proper agent to receive such arms and munitions.

e. (1) The United States representatives in North Africa (The

Administrators. They will be attached to each of the Task Force Commands as Mr. Murphy's representatives:

With the Eastern Assault Force: Mr. John Knox.
 With the Center Task Force : Mr. Leland R. Rounds.
 With the Western Task Force : Mr. Frederic P. Culbert.

(2) These Deputy Civil Administrators will accompany each force from its point of embarkation, and, upon landing, when so instructed by the Task Force commander, they will endeavour to establish immediate contact as follows:

- (a) Eastern Assault Force: With Mr. Murphy, who will be in Algiers, or if that be impossible, with Mr. Cole, the American Consul or Vice Consul Boyd. Mr. Knox's mission will be through one of the channels, or if failing any of them, directly to call upon Mr. Chatel, Governor General of Algeria, and request the urgent convocation of Generals Juin (Commanding), Koeltz, (19th Army Corps), and Mast (Algiers Division-friendly),

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process of making a decision is to identify the problem or decision to be made. This involves gathering information about the situation and the options available. It is important to consider all relevant factors and to understand the needs and interests of all parties involved.

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1. DATE OF BIRTH

General J. G. Clark's staffs, prior to the arrival of the British Forces, of their respective forces. These officers will act in a capacity, between the British Forces and the French authorities, in the area of the front, and will receive instructions from their respective commanders. They will remain in this capacity, with their respective commands, until relieved by orders from this headquarters.

by command Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

BRIGADIER GENERAL, GSC, Chief of Staff

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters, T of O
12 Oct 1942

GENERAL ORDER
NUMBER 5

(NOTE: Manner in which Civil affairs section can serve commander. Intended as guide)

1. PURPOSE

Assist commander carrying out policies of CG. Maintain for CG civil governments, Territories FNA as soon as military control secured. Maintain existing form government in territories under control. Retain civil governments and officers and employees in present positions, so far as consistent with military mission and policy of CG. To supplant persons not in accord with war aims of U. S. and Ally, with local personnel, or with military personnel in event there is hostile action.

2. GENERAL POLICY

a. (1) The military control in accordance with treaties Hague conventions and Geneva conferences.

(2) Respect and strict observation of all state and property rights of neutral nations within territory.

(3) Person and property rights of neutral citizens to be respected so long as neutral. Violate none of the rules regarding neutrals as stipulated in Hague and Geneva treaties by U. S. and Ally.

b. Agreed by U.S. and British that civil administration shall be entirely American controlled. The CG Allied force assumes that responsibility. Civil affairs staff composed entirely of American Personnel.

c. Policy of CG-- principles of civil administration to be uniform in all territories so completely centralized.

d. CG to coordinate and control civil administration FNA. To be represented and assisted by task force commanders. Civil affairs personnel to assist commander.

3. Military Governors

- a. CG will be military Governor.
- b. Senior general officers in each area to be Military Governors that area.
- c. If situation warrants military governors of any area may subdivide area and appoint deputies.

4. CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS

- a. Will be members of staff of CG and task force and assault force commanders. Will be advisors on matters of civil affairs and administration.
- b. Civil Affairs Officers on Staff of CG will be chief civil affairs officer for controlled territory FNA and will be responsible for implementing policies and directives of CG on civil affairs matters.

5. TASK FORCE AND ASSAULT FORCE COMMANDERS

As military governors in respective areas may institute local policies not in conflict with policies higher authority.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES

- a. Prosecution of war to successful termination. Administration to be just, humane and mild as practicable. Welfare of total population.
- b. Plans must be flexible and suited to the people, the country, the time and strategical and tactical situation to which applied.
- c. Plans will be adopted with view to reducing to minimum

-3-

number of personnel from armed forces employed in administration.

7. PROCLAMATION AND ORDINANCES

a. Two types--printed English, French and Arabic--delivered to force commander prior arrival. Proclamation One will be issued by force commanders in event control effected with little or not resistance. Proclamation Two will be issued in event of heavily armed resistance and deemed essential that stringent control necessary.

Proclamation Number 2 will be issued by the force commander if there is heavily armed resistance by the French or other armed forces, and it is deemed essential by him that a most stringent form of control be maintained.

b. For similar purposes, in similar instances, two types of regulations, identified as Ordinances Number 1 and Number 2, in English, French and Arabic, will be prepared and delivered to commanders prior to their arrival in the zone of action.

c. Printing of the proclamations and ordinances in languages or dialects other than English, French and Arabic, may be procured from local sources if the local situation so warrants and the method is approved by the Task Force commander.

d. Proclamations and ordinances posted for information of the local population will be printed in French and Arabic, both languages on the same card or sheet. Because of the practical and logical effect that it may have upon the French and native inhabitants and the fact that the French and Arabic languages predominate, the bilingual proclamations and ordinances will not be printed in the English language, but a sufficient quantity for distribution to American and British forces for record and interpretive purposes will be printed in that language.

e. The translation of such proclamations and ordinances into French, Arabic, or other languages or dialects as later may be deemed necessary, will be most carefully made so that the native population will be able to construe their meaning.

5. TRANSLATION:

The English text of all proclamations, ordinances, orders or other papers of official nature, printed or written in other languages, will govern.

9. MILITARY DAMAGE:

a. Damage to governmental and public service installations and facilities and private property in general through military action will be kept to a minimum consistent with the success of the command mission.

b. Pilfering and wanton destruction of civil governmental property, public service installations, banks, communication installations and equipment is strictly prohibited.

c. The removal of documents, books, funds, records, maps, installations, equipment, currency office, tax collector's office, and/or any other institution or office or any other institution or establishment, property of the Commanding General or Task Force Commander, or of a person or persons designated by them, is prohibited.

d. Any property or installation seized by the troops will be turned over to the Civil Affairs officer.

10. PROTECTION:

a. The Task Force Commander of the Task Force will ensure that the civil inhabitants, banks, and other governmental institutions and their representatives are protected.

1. Task force commanders will take all measures necessary to prevent sabotage or other forms of premeditated destruction of civil and military installations and facilities.

2. It will be the responsibility of the Civil Affairs officer to advise, recommend, to continue in force, or otherwise establish or reestablish, the local police or gendarmerie and fire-fighting and fire prevention forces, and hereafter to supervise the normal functioning of such routine duties.

3. It will further be the responsibility of the Civil Affairs officer to maintain law and order and the prevention of crime among the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. He will supervise civilian police, fire departments and brigades, the traffic in liquor and narcotics, the circulation of civilians and matters of similar nature.

4. G-2 will establish censorship policies. The Civil Affairs officer will advise and assist in connection with that section of the General Staff. He will prepare orders and regulations for the local population with respect to censorship. The responsibility for censorship within the occupied territory is that of the station commander, the duty of supervising the enforcement of censorship upon the inhabitants is that of the Civil Affairs officer.

11. PUBLIC WORKS, UTILITIES AND COMMUNICATIONS:

a. All public works, utilities and communication facilities, with their civil officials and employees, will continue their normal activities.

b. The Civil Affairs officer will supervise the use of railroads, harbors, rivers, light-houses, buoys, reefs, bridges, busses, trucks, street railways, gas and electric plants and systems, water works, sewerage, drainage, irrigation, forests, postal service, telegraph and telephone, radio, and other similar installations, insofar as concerns the needs of the civil population.

c. In the event of non-cooperation on the part of the civil inhabitants, or of open hostility on the part of the French, or other armed forces, to military control, the personnel required further to assist the supervision of or to operate the facilities vital to the military occupation will be furnished from combat units by the military governor of the area or areas concerned.

d. The procurement of civilian personnel or equipment required by the military will be the responsibility of the army service concerned, except when necessary through the use of Civil Affairs personnel.

e. The Civil Affairs officer will supervise the civil financial administration of the occupied territory, insofar as it concerns the military.

f. The Civil Affairs officer will supervise the civil financial administration of the occupied territory, with the exception of the military, insofar as it concerns the military.

g. The Civil Affairs officer will supervise the civil financial administration of the occupied territory, with the exception of the military, insofar as it concerns the military.

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z. The Civil Affairs officer will supervise the civil financial administration of the occupied territory, with the exception of the military, insofar as it concerns the military.

d. The Civil Affairs officer will establish an audit of the financial transactions of the civil government, as may be necessary for the purposes of the military administration.

e. The initial rate of currency exchange in the occupied territory will be as follows:

300	Moroccan francs =	£ One
75	Moroccan francs =	\$ One
300	Algerian francs =	£ One
75	Algerian francs =	\$ One
1 £	B.M.A. note =	\$ 4.00
1 £	B.M.A. note =	300 francs
300	Bank of France francs =	£ One
75	Bank of France francs =	\$ One

f. Local currency will be used wherever possible.

g. (1) If sufficient local currency is not available to meet all requirements, British troops will be paid with a note issued by the British Military Administration, and United States troops will be paid with a specially marked dollar issued by the United States Treasury.

(2) Other local disbursements made by British Military authorities, for which sufficient local currency is not available, will be made with the specially marked dollar.

(3) The validity of the specially marked dollar, and of the note issued by the British Military Administration will be restricted to the territory occupied by the United States and its supporting ally.

13. TAXES, FINES, ASSESSMENTS AND THE LIKE:

a. Taxes, both direct and indirect, will be collected as usual by the local and municipal officers who ordinarily perform that duty, except as may be otherwise directed by competent military authority. All taxes normally paid to the national government, will be paid by Civil Affairs officers, or, failing them, to the officer in charge of the Fiscal Department. Civil Affairs Section of the staff of the Commanding General, or the Officer of Operations, and will be used as far as necessary to defray the expenses of the military and civil governments of the occupied territory. Taxes normally paid to or by the national government, will be used by them for the purposes for which they are levied.

b. Funds collected in the occupied territory, or territories under military control, will be expended directly for the purposes of the military and civil governments of the occupied territory by the military and civil authorities.

(13) The Comp. of the U.S. Stat. Vol. 1, BUL

14. SECURITY:

The operational security of the occupied territory will be under the supervision of the Civil Affairs officer. It is expected that the

Civil Affairs Section will arrange for the cessation of all forms of teaching detrimental to the feeling of friendship between the inhabitants of the occupied area and its supporting ally.

The Local Department of the Civil Affairs Section will handle all matters pertaining to civil law and administration within the controlled area, and will act as the advisory agency to the military command on matters affecting civil law and administration within the controlled area.

b. Supervision of military commissions, provost courts, public prosecutors and the practice of law, including the filing of their reports, is the responsibility of this section.

16. MILITARY TRIBUNALS:

a. In the event that it becomes necessary to institute military government in North Africa, military tribunals will be established by the military governor of each controlled area. The local inhabitants will be notified of the creation of these tribunals by the publication of ordinances or by other appropriate method. The ordinances will state the offenses for which they may be tried by such tribunals, and the punishments which such tribunals may impose.

b. In general, there will be three kinds of military tribunals:
 Military Commissions (Military Court (Br)).
 Superior Provost Courts.
 Inferior Provost Courts (Summary Court (Br)).

c. (1) Military governors may appoint military commissions to try such cases within their respective areas as may be properly brought before them.

(2) Military governors and Civil Affairs officials may appoint Superior Provost Courts and Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective areas as may be properly brought before them.

(3) Commanding officers of tactical units used as organs of military government may appoint Inferior Provost Courts to try such cases within their respective governmental jurisdiction as may be properly brought before them. That authority is delegated to them by the Military Governor of the respective areas.

Commanding officers of tactical units used as organs of military government may appoint a single officer to act as a provost marshal for a city or city or similar area, or as an inferior court.

Property damage or loss caused unlawfully by troops, or represented on the part of the troops of the

The Safety Department and the Public Health Department will co-operate and co-ordinate with the Civil Affairs Section with reference to control of food and beverage dispensing establishments.

ARTICLE III:

a. Every effort will be made to maintain the economic structure of the controlled territory unimpaired.

b. The salaries, wages and pensions, pension rights and benefits and emoluments of all French and native government, territorial, municipal and other sub-divisional districts, and regional officials and employees, and all Army, Navy and Air Force personnel, will be guaranteed by the United States of America, as long as they remain in their present positions carrying on their normal duties in a manner satisfactory to the military governor of the territory or the area occupied, and do nothing by word or deed that can in any way be construed as disrespectful to the United States or its supporting allies, or to their personnel and property.

c. Initially the wage scale prevailing at the time of assuming control, will be maintained for all civilian labor required by the military forces.

d. Initially the prevailing scale for use and hiring of service equipment, trucks, cranes, etc., by the military forces will be retained.

e. If after completion of the first phase of the occupation, it is deemed necessary by the Civil Affairs officer that a revision of wages and rates for services, should be made, the latter may appoint a board consisting of representatives of the military administration and local government and labor groups for that purpose.

f. In general, the payment for labor will be in currency, and not in commodities, nor a combination of currency and commodities.

(1) Commodities required for the economic stability of the territory under control, and procured by the military administration will be warehoused in custody of the Economics Department of the Civil Affairs Section, and a plan of distribution and sale to the inhabitants will be inaugurated by that department.

(2) Preference in the order of purchases of needed commodities, from the stocks mentioned in (1) above, and based on a table of allotments as specified in the instructions will be given. These persons, the military administration, under any and all circumstances, for the military forces.

g. The military administration will provide and supply for the military all the food, clothing, shelter, and other services concerned.

h. The military administration will provide and supply for the military all the food, clothing, shelter, and other services concerned.

i. The military administration will provide and supply for the military all the food, clothing, shelter, and other services concerned.

The present local system of care of the indigent, infirm, aged and infirm and all charitable institutions and organizations will be retained under the supervision of the Welfare Department, Civil Affairs Section.

22. PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER:

The Civil Affairs officer of each of the areas under control will be responsible for the following:

1. Ascertaining the policy of the Task Force Commander.
2. Establishing immediate contact with the United States Civil Administrator of the controlled area.
3. Establishing immediate contact with the principal local Civil Administrative officer.
4. Informing the local Civil Administrative officer of the military government's plan of control, and presentation to him of the Proclamation of control and administration by the United States.
5. Immediate disposition of Civil Affairs personnel.
6. Issuance and posting of proclamation and ordinances (regulations).
7. Routine duties of administrative supervision during the period the territory will be under military control.

23. MISCELLANEOUS:

1. The Public Safety Department will supervise the organization and activity of a Civil Defense unit.
2. Officers, and/or enlisted men assigned to Civil Affairs Sections or administrative units in the headquarters, will be released from such duty or assignment to Civil Affairs duties by the same authority.

BY ORDER OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

V. J. SMITH,
Major General, GSC, Chief of Staff

ORDINANCES 1
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters Theater of Operations

_____, 1942

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The following ordinances are published for the guidance of all concerned. It is the desire of the Army of the United States to impose no more restrictions upon you than necessary to protect your interests and those of its forces. However, police regulations are necessary, so certain of these will be promulgated for welfare of all. Your compliance necessary to attain that object.

1. LOCAL LAWS AND ORDINANCES:

Laws, ordinances and police regulations heretofore in effect will continue except where changes required for military reasons.

2. CIRCULATION:

Persons will be permitted, subject to local laws and police regulations, to move about freely.

3. MEETINGS AND PARADES:

Will be governed by local ordinances and regulations. No derogatory or disrespectful meetings or parades will be permitted.

4. UNIFORMS:

(a) Only member of legally constituted armed forces can wear uniform; police, gendarmerie or those in public duties will wear their respective uniforms.

(b) Wearing of uniforms of organizations affiliated with or sympathetic to Nazis or Fascists is prohibited.

5. FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION:

The possession and use of firearms and ammunition will be subject to strict control.

-2-

6. SANITATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH:

Local regulations will be enforced, together with others published by American forces for protection of own or allied personnel.

7. PROSTITUTION:

Proprietors or agents of houses, or any individual prostitute, will be held strictly responsible and subject to punishment for any cases of venereal diseases contracted by members of armed forces of U. S. or its allies.

8. SCHOOLS:

Will continue to be held freely.

9. CIVIL COURTS:

All existing courts will continue to function.

10. CITY COUNCILS:

All will continue to function freely.

11. FLAGS, NATIONAL ANTHEMS AND UNIFORMS of countries at war or unfriendly to the U.S., its forces or allies:

As a state of war exists between U.S. and Germany, Italy and Japan and their satellites, display of their colors or singing of their anthems is prohibited.

12. COMMUNICATIONS BY MAIL, TELEGRAPH, CABLE, TELEPHONE, RADIO, PIGEON AND OTHERWISE:

(a). Forbidden to send, transmit or knowingly receive by any means information prejudicial to U.S. or its allies.

(b) All communications subject to censorship.

(c) Use of any code or other concealing device prohibited.

(d) Interference with lawful communication by any means is forbidden.

13. WIRELESS TRANSMITTING EQUIPMENT, POSSESSION OF:

Possession by any private person of any radio transmitting equipment forbidden. Any person having such equipment in his possession

commander of the nearest unit of the

BOOKS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

1. Publication is forbidden in any newspaper, magazine, book, or other printed, typed, or written matter, in the interest of Germany, Italy, Japan or any state allied with them, or on behalf of them, or which is hostile, detrimental, or otherwise prejudicial to the interests of the nationals thereof, the members of the armed forces thereof, or tends to promote the interests of the enemy.

2. Publication in this territory or the zone of the enemy, of any newspaper, magazine, book or other printed, typed, or written matter, is forbidden.

3. Any person who publishes or prints, or causes to be published or printed, any newspaper, magazine, book or other printed, typed, or written matter, in this territory, shall, in addition to the punishment provided by law, be liable to the following: (a) If the publication is in the interest of the enemy, or on behalf of the enemy, or which is hostile, detrimental, or otherwise prejudicial to the interests of the nationals thereof, the members of the armed forces thereof, or tends to promote the interests of the enemy, the person shall be liable to the punishment provided by law, and will obtain punishment for the same. (b) If the publication is in the interest of the United States, or on behalf of the United States, or which is friendly, beneficial, or otherwise in the interest of the United States, the person shall be liable to the punishment provided by law, and will obtain punishment for the same.

4. Submission for publication of any newspaper, magazine, book, or other printed, typed, or written matter, into this territory, will immediately on publication or importation, submit to the Office of the Commander of the zone in which this office is located, or of the port or place or at the place where the importation is made, three copies of every newspaper or magazine published or imported by him. He will also submit in like manner, three copies of any book or other matter published or imported by him. Any matter relating or touching upon the present war or the United States, its forces, allies, or their personnel.

5. Penalties: - Whoever, under or with the aid of any other person, publishes, prints, or causes to be published or printed, any newspaper, magazine, book, or other printed, typed, or written matter, in this territory, in violation of this paragraph, shall be liable to the following: (a) If the publication is in the interest of the enemy, or on behalf of the enemy, or which is hostile, detrimental, or otherwise prejudicial to the interests of the nationals thereof, the members of the armed forces thereof, or tends to promote the interests of the enemy, the person shall be liable to the punishment provided by law, and will obtain punishment for the same. (b) If the publication is in the interest of the United States, or on behalf of the United States, or which is friendly, beneficial, or otherwise in the interest of the United States, the person shall be liable to the punishment provided by law, and will obtain punishment for the same.

6. Penalties: - In addition to any other punishment which may lawfully be imposed for any violation of this paragraph, the officer in charge of the affairs in the zone in which the offending publishing or printing office is located, may suspend the publication of the offending newspaper or magazine for a period not exceeding one week in the case of a daily newspaper, or for one issue in the case of a weekly publication, or may close a publishing or printing office for a period not exceeding one week in addition to any other punishment which may lawfully be imposed for any violation of this paragraph. Any person who publishes, prints, or causes to be published or printed, any newspaper, magazine, book, or other printed, typed, or written matter, in this territory, in violation of this paragraph, shall be liable to the following: (a) If the publication is in the interest of the enemy, or on behalf of the enemy, or which is hostile, detrimental, or otherwise prejudicial to the interests of the nationals thereof, the members of the armed forces thereof, or tends to promote the interests of the enemy, the person shall be liable to the punishment provided by law, and will obtain punishment for the same. (b) If the publication is in the interest of the United States, or on behalf of the United States, or which is friendly, beneficial, or otherwise in the interest of the United States, the person shall be liable to the punishment provided by law, and will obtain punishment for the same.

5. Prices. - In continuance of existing regulations, the proprietor or manager of every place of business in which articles are sold at retail will plainly mark every such article with its price; the proprietor or manager of every place where food or drink is offered for sale to be consumed upon the premises will display a bill of fare giving the price of each dish or beverage, or exclusive prices for meals; the proprietor or manager of every hotel, rooming or lodging house will display in its office or lobby, or in its room with the price of each, and, if it serves food or drink, bill of fare such as is required by the preceding clause; he will also post in open room the price of that room; the proprietor or manager of every theater or place of entertainment at which an admission fee is charged, will post the price of admission or a list of prices of the seats at the entrance thereof; the proprietor or driver of every taxicab or public vehicle will post in or on such vehicle and in any waiting room or office which he maintains, the prices at which it may be hired or for which it will transport persons or goods; every person offering his services or those of his employees, animals, machines, apparatus, or equipment to the public will display at his place of business a price list of the services usually performed.

6. Discrimination forbidden. - It is forbidden to charge or collect any prices other than those marked or posted as required by a. above, in particular, any discrimination in price, service, quality, or otherwise, against the United States, its forces, its allies, or their personnel, is forbidden.

7. ARMS, AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES:

A. Arms and Ammunition.

(1) Who may possess:

(a) All persons engaged in legal police functions, when on duty, may carry pistols and ammunition therefor.

(b) Private watchmen and detectives whose duties require them to carry arms may do so when on duty, but only upon issue of a permit by the military police. Request for such a permit will be made by the employer of the person who it is desired shall be armed.

(c) Manufacturers of and dealers in arms and ammunition may carry on their business only upon permit issued by the military police, and in no case will they be permitted to manufacture or keep in stock more than is necessary for normal business. They may make sales only upon permit issued by the military police.

(d) Persons not in possession of legal permit to carry or possess arms, may apply for permit for validation to the nearest military police.

(2) Surrender of arms and ammunition: - All persons in possession of arms and ammunition who are not permitted to carry arms and ammunition to the military police station will be required to surrender to all military police stations or to the nearest military police station, all arms, weapons, or ammunition, and a receipt will be issued.

B. Explosives.

(1) Who may possess:

(a) All persons engaged in legal police functions, when on duty, may carry explosives and ammunition therefor.

signature of
T. J. ...

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ORDINANCE 2
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters Theater of Operations

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

Following ordinances published for guidance of all concerned. It is desire of military to impose no more restrictions upon you than necessary to protect your interests and those of occupying force. However, police regulations are necessary, so certain of these will be promulgated for welfare of all. Compliance with the ordinances will be strictly enforced:

1. LOCAL LAWS AND ORDINANCES:

Will continue in effect except when in conflict with regulations made necessary by military control.

2. CIRCULATION:

Persons will be permitted, subject to local laws or police regulations, to move about freely within the controlled territory. To leave controlled territory a pass from military police office required. Railroad and transportation employees cannot sell tickets to, or carry, persons without military pass outside the controlled territory.

3. MEETINGS, PARADES, SPEECHES, SONGS AND MUSIC:

Will be controlled by local ordinances and regulations. Nothing to be printed or said derogatory or disrespectful to U.S. its allies, their armies or personnel.

4. UNIFORMS:

Personnel of all armed forces, including prisoners of war, will wear their uniforms at all times. Nazi or Fascist organization, or French Legion uniforms forbidden. Police, etc. personnel continue to wear their uniforms and insignia of office.

5. FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION:

In cities, towns and villages every person having firearm or ammunition will register its identification and amount of ammunition with local police officials.

-2-

6. NARCOTICS:

Not to be sold or given to members of controlling force, except on physician's or medical officer's prescription.

7. SANITATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH:

Local regulations to be enforced, together with such as may be published by controlling force for your protection and that of its personnel.

8. PROSTITUTION:

Proprietors or houses strictly responsible for cases of venereal disease originating on their premises among U. S. or allied armed forces. They will be responsible that their inmates be physically examined by police medical examiner at least once every three days.

9. OBSERVATION OF MEETINGS AND PARADES:

Must be previously authorized by military and will be stopped by Provost Marshal if it deviates from its purpose.

10. FLAGS, NATIONAL ANTHEMS AND UNIFORMS OF GERMANY, JAPAN, ITALY OR OTHERS HOSTILE TO U.S. AND ITS ALLIES:

Flag and National Anthem - As state of war exists between U. S. and these countries display of flags or colors prohibited and singing or playing of national anthem of these nations prohibited.

11. COMMUNICATION BY MAIL, TELEGRAPH, CABLE, TELEPHONE, RADIO, PIGEON AND OTHERWISE:**a. General.**

(1) Forbidden communications - Forbidden to send, transmit or knowingly receive by any means information concerning American or allied forces, their location, numbers, morale, arms, equipment, or movements, or identity of units. Same for information hostile, detrimental or disrespectful to U.S., its forces and allied forces, their personnel, or the military administration. If innocently received must be reported forthwith to military police. Forbidden to communicate, directly or indirectly, with Germans, Italians, Japanese, or other hostile or unfriendly government, or any agent, armed forces, or territory under its control.

(2) Censorship - All communications, by whatever means transmitted,

File This

...the communication by the controlling forces.

Section 1. - The use in any communication, or the use of any or any other device concerning the communication, is forbidden.

(4) Injury to persons of communication, or the use of any or any other device concerning the communication, is forbidden.

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... , or other printed matter, such matter is also forbidden.

Submission before publication or importation - Every printer, and every importer of newspapers, magazines, or printed, typed, or written matter into the controlled territory, in publication or importation, submit all matter in any manner touching upon the present war or military occupation, or the military, its allies, armed forces, or their personnel, to the proper authorities in the district in which his publishing or printing office is located, or the port or frontier station through which the importation is made, or such other office as may be designated, and will obtain a license therefor if required for importation.

(5) Export after publication or importation - Every publisher or printer, and every importer of newspapers, magazines, books, or other printed, typed, or written matter, shall, immediately after publication or importation, submit to the nearest consular or other office in which his office is located, or to the port of call at which the aforesaid imported material is landed, a copy of the material as so published, printed, or imported, together with a copy of the original of any manuscript or other material upon which the published matter is based, or printed upon the present war or military operations, the said office, its forces, its allies, or their personnel.

(7) Simulation - The production, distribution, or loan to any other person of any newspaper, magazine, book, or other printed or written publication, with matter in violation of the law, or matter published, printed, or reported in violation of the law, for the purpose of defrauding the Government.

1. Forfeiture of License - In addition to any other sufficient cause for the forfeiture of a license, any violation of this paragraph, by an officer in or out of civil retirement, shall be cause for which the officer's publishing or printing privileges be forfeited, may suspend the publication of the offending newspaper or magazine, for a period not in excess of one week in the case of a daily newspaper, or for the issue of any other publication, or may close a printing or printing office for one week. An violation by any other individual, or on any lawful telephone, for a serious violation or for repeated violations of this paragraph, the offending individual of the individual may be suspended the publication of a newspaper or magazine for a longer period, or indefinitely, or may close a publishing or printing office for a longer period, or indefinitely.

14. NOTES AND:

2. Taking of photographs - The taking of photographs of military installations or activities, except upon a permit issued by the commanding general of the area in which the photograph is to be taken, is prohibited.

b. Developing and printing of photographs - If in possession, or to develop a photograph, or film, or to make a print therefrom, for the exposure of which a permit has been issued. Any person who is in possession of a photograph, or film, for which a permit has not been issued, shall furnish the same to the military police with the address of the person to whom it is to be delivered for development.

...the ... community ...
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4.

Frank is offered for sale to
of the 1914. The price of
The 1914.

On the 10th of April, 1901, the following was received from the
U. S. Fish Commission, Washington, D. C.

1. The first of these is the fact that the majority of the population of the United States is now living in urban areas. This is a result of the process of urbanization, which has been going on since the beginning of the 20th century. The population of the United States has increased from about 100 million in 1900 to over 200 million in 1950, and the majority of this increase has been in urban areas. This has led to a concentration of population in a few large cities, which has in turn led to a number of problems, such as overcrowding, pollution, and traffic congestion.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

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1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

inf.

1. Personalities in July, Aug. and Sept. 1911.

ly, to carry on duty, and

...from whom it is derived and the
manufacturers of and dealers in the same.

may be permitted to manufacture or
for normal current use. This

the military police. [redacted]
[redacted] who for special reasons [redacted]
[redacted] issue of a permit by the [redacted]

superior or employer or
organization under (1
11

10-11-68

100-443887-100

to over 1000 for
4-57-60 Buck

to a tag or label bearing his name, and

only upon lands owned or controlled by the United States, its territories, possessions, or other property under its jurisdiction.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the United States to issue such tags or labels to any person.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the United States to issue such tags or labels to any person.

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"...obtained by agreement of..."

St. Louis and allied forces,

2. Rep. Payment with 100% cash

1914-1915

• *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1990; 263: 1001-1002.

[illegible]

1. 1911-1912

1. The first group of people who are interested in the results of the study are the researchers themselves. They want to know if the study was successful in achieving its goals and if the data collected is reliable and valid.

... ..

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

1950-1951

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...and the fact that the ...

Journal of Management Education 26(9)p. 1078-1090

1. The first of these is the fact that the majority of the population of the United States is now living in urban areas. This is a result of the process of urbanization, which has been going on since the beginning of the 20th century. The population of the United States has increased from about 100 million in 1900 to over 200 million in 1950, and the majority of this increase has been in urban areas. This has led to a concentration of population in a few large cities, which has in turn led to a number of problems, such as overcrowding, pollution, and traffic congestion.

1950-1951, 21-22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853

2. Expenditures - 2000000000

702 - [illegible] [illegible]

1945. From July 10 to 12, 1945.

[illegible]

6. Permanent Personnel:

1. 1. The first step in the process of the

... to ...

direct.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

g. Accommodation: - Quarters for officers, enlisted men and civil personnel, when needed by the Army of the United States for official purposes, will, when practically, be obtained in public buildings or in private buildings or houses by agreement with the owners or occupants. Only when suitable and convenient accommodations cannot be thus obtained, or the cost, at fair price, will resort be had to billeting.

2. By whom demanded: - Demand will be made for bills of exchange on the authority of the commanding general of the army.

6. To whom demand addressed: Demand for bills etc. shall be made upon the mayor or other appropriate civil authority, if possible, or upon owners of the property involved.

Rooms for office
Beds, bedding,
and water

... and water ...

...in case of emergency, in case of the death of the donor, the donor's estate shall be liable for the cost of the funeral and the cost of the transportation of the body to the place of burial.

10-10-68

by agreement, if

[illegible]

is forbidden and will subject the offender to a military tribunal may direct, to:

1. To kidnap, rob, or kill any member of the United States Armed Forces.

2. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

3. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

4. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

5. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

6. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

7. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

8. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

9. To commit any crime or other offense against the United States or its Armed Forces.

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There will be three kinds of military commissions, consisting of:

1. Superior Provost Courts, consisting of three members.

2. Inferior Provost Courts, consisting of three members.

3. Military Courts, consisting of three members.

The jurisdiction of these courts will be as follows:

Superior Provost Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving the death penalty.

Inferior Provost Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving life imprisonment.

Military Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving imprisonment for less than life.

The jurisdiction of these courts will be as follows:

Superior Provost Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving the death penalty.

Inferior Provost Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving life imprisonment.

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Superior Provost Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving the death penalty.

Inferior Provost Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving life imprisonment.

Military Courts will have jurisdiction over all cases involving imprisonment for less than life.

The jurisdiction of these courts will be as follows:

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Forgery or alteration of an iden-
 tity card, permit, pass, or other
 similar paper issued by or addressed
 to the American military authorities
 or their ally, or with which they have
 any official concern

Damage to railroads, roads, canals,
 rivers, or other highways, or to
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1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

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 Clerk of the Court

Advising, consultation, for the purpose of the
completion of any of the above mentioned work.

4. Execution, confirmation and review. The sentence of a Military Commission shall be carried into execution until it shall have been confirmed by the Chief of Staff, appointing the commission or his successor. The sentence shall be carried into execution until it shall have been confirmed by the Chief of Staff, Commander, Theater of Operations. The sentence of a death sentence shall be executed forthwith without waiting, not to be higher authority. The records of trials by military tribunals will be examined by the Chief of Staff or his officer who appointed the tribunal (except the record of Interior Provincial Courts), at the headquarters of the Commanding General, Theater of Operations, with a view to the correction of any irregularities or injustices.

and, if it is not possible to do so, the person or persons to whom the same shall be referred, and the time, which will be set out in the order, and at the place and at the place of the person or persons to whom the same shall be referred, the time.

General, U. S. Army

Copy

GENERAL'S PROCLAMATION

WASHINGTON, November 7 - The War Department tonight released the English translation of a broadcast in French giving the text of a proclamation issued by General Eisenhower. The broadcast was as follows:

Here is a communication from the American General, Eisenhower, Commander in Chief of the forces now disembarking in French North Africa. This is one of the general staff officers who speaks to you. This communication, of the highest importance, is addressed to the French armies on land, sea and air in North Africa:

Frenchmen of North Africa, the forces which I have the honor of commanding come to you as friends to make war against your enemies.

This is a military operation directed against the Italian-German military forces in North Africa. Our only objective is to defeat the enemy and to free France. I need not tell you that we have no designs either on North Africa or on any part of the French Empire. We count on your friendship, and we ask your aid.

I have given formal orders that no offensive action be undertaken against you on condition that for your part you take the same attitude.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, make the following signals:

By day, fly the French tricolor and the American flag, one above the other. I repeat, by day, fly the

- 2 -

French tricolor and the American flag, one above the other or two, (I repeat, two) tricolors, one above the other.

By night, turn on a searchlight and direct it vertically toward the sky. I repeat, by night, turn on a searchlight and direct it vertically toward the sky.

However, for reasons of military security, we are obliged to give you the following orders. Any refusal to follow them will be interpreted as hostile intention on your part. Here are the orders:

"To all naval and merchant marine units: First, stay where you are. Secondly, make no attempt to scuttle your vessels.

"To Coast Guard units: Withdraw from the neighborhood of your cannon and your stations.

"To Aviation Units: Do not take off. All airplanes must remain in their usual places.

"General Orders: In general you must obey all orders given to you by my officers."

We come, I repeat, as friends, not as enemies. We shall not be the first to fire. Follow exactly the orders which I have just given you. Thus you will avoid any possibility of a conflict, which could only be useful to our enemies. We summon you as comrades to the common fight against the invaders of France. The war has entered the phase of liberation.

Copy

APPEAL TO FRENCH PEOPLE

WASHINGTON, November 7 - In connection with current military operations in French North Africa, the President has broadcast by radio to the French people:

My friends, who suffer day and night under the crushing yoke of the Nazis, I speak to you as one who was with your army and navy in France in 1918.

I have held all my life the deepest friendship for the French people - for the entire French people. I retain and cherish the friendship of hundreds of French people in France and outside of France. I know your farms, your villages and your cities. I know your soldiers, professors and workmen. I know what a precious heritage of the French people are your homes, your culture and the principles of democracy in France.

I salute again and reiterate my faith in liberty, equality, and fraternity. No two nations exist which are more united by historic and mutually friendly ties than the people of France and the United States.

Americans, with the assistance of the United Nations, are striving for their own safe future as well as the restoration of the ideals, the liberties, and the democracy of all those who have lived under the tricolor.

We come among you to repulse the cruel invaders who would remove forever your rights of self-government, your rights to religious freedom, and your rights to live your own lives in peace and security.

We come among you solely to defeat and rout your enemies. Have faith in our words. We do not want to cause you any harm.

We assure you that, once the menace of Germany and Italy is removed from you, we shall quit your territory at once.

- 2 -

I am appealing to your realism, to your self-interest and national ideals.

Do not obstruct, I beg of you, this great purpose.

Help us where you are able, my friends, and we shall see again the glorious day when liberty and peace shall reign again on earth.

Vive la France eternelle!

No. 1

PROCLAMATION
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters of Theatre of Operations
_____, 1942

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

In keeping with the ancient and traditional friendship of the Government and people of the United States of America, for French North Africa and its people, the American forces have landed in your country. We come among you as friends, not as conquerors. We want you to receive us as friends.

Our purpose, as the President of the United States of America has proclaimed, is to protect your country from invasion by our common enemies, and to maintain your authority and to secure to your country and its people, the enjoyment of an orderly government, or its choice.

When conditions permit and the necessity for our presence shall have ceased, our troops will be withdrawn.

Your religious institutions and customs will be completely respected.

Your laws and regulations will remain in force, except insofar as they may be inconsistent with a state of war and military necessities, or with the safety of our forces.

The officers and employees of your government and its administrative districts will continue their duties as usual, and co-operate with the forces of the United States, for the security of its inhabitants, and the American troops, and in the maintenance of internal order. You are urged to continue your work, to keep open your churches, mosques, temples, and schools, and to follow as far as possible, the usual habits and customs of your lives and the business of your community.

All governmental officials and employees, including police, both local and state, and all officers and men

-2-

of the Army, Navy and Air Corps, who cooperate with the American military authorities, will continue to receive at the same rate and in the same amounts, all salaries, pensions and benefits that they now enjoy, under the guarantee of the Government of the United States of America.

Your patriotic duty is clear; it is confidently expected that you will cooperate with the American forces and will observe such orders and regulations as your governing authorities, or I, as Commanding General of these forces may issue.

This observance is necessary to assure the safety and tranquillity of your country and yourselves.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding

No. 2

PROCLAMATION
ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

Headquarters of Theater of Operations

_____, 1942

TO THE PEOPLE OF: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

The Army of the United States is in control of the territory of FRENCH NORTH AFRICA and is advancing farther into French North African territory. The purpose of this control is to prevent our common enemies from invading your country, and is an act necessary to the winning of the war by the United States and its allies. It is the policy of the Army of the United States, not to make war on you, the civilian population of your territory; but, on the contrary, to maintain tranquillity and order in that territory. As Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, I have therefore established military control in French North Africa. The establishment and operation of military control, by preserving order, will benefit you. It is to your interest, as well as your duty, to cooperate with and obey it.

During such control, the political ties which have hitherto bound you to the Government of Vichy, or any agency thereof, and your obligations of obedience to, and support of it, are suspended. The authority of the Army of the United States and of the military control established by it, is supreme. You must therefore obey promptly and fully, in letter and in spirit, such orders and ordinances as I, my successors as Commanding General of the Theater of Operations, and subordinate military authorities may issue from time to time. In particular, you must obey the directions of military policemen and personnel on civil affairs duty, who wear a purple arm band bearing the letters "CA". You must refrain from any act or word of hostility or disrespect to the controlling forces.

Your laws and regulations in force at the time of our taking control will remain in force, except insofar as they conflict with a state of war, or with the rights and safety of the controlling forces, or as they may be changed by me or my successors. The executive and judicial officers

-2-

of your government and of its regions, counties and cities, towns and villages, will continue the performance of their duties as usual, subject to supervision and direction by personnel under command of the Army of the United States on civil affairs duty. The officers and employees of the railroads, steamboat lines, bus and truck lines, street railways, electric light and power plants and transmission lines, post offices, telephones, telegraphs, cables, radio stations, waterworks, gas works, and other public utilities within the controlled territory, must continue in the performance of their duties.

You who obey the directions given in this Proclamation and in other orders and ordinances, have nothing to fear from the Army of the United States, and you will be protected by them in your persons, property, family rights, religion, and in the exercise of your peaceful occupations. You who fail to render such obedience or who commit crimes or offenses will be severely punished.

You will continue your usual occupations; your churches, mosques, temples, and schools will remain open.

Ordinances will be issued setting forth in detail what is required of you, and what it is forbidden for you to do.

Your religious rights and institutions will be respected.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding



C O N T E N T S

1. Memorandum, undated, from Naval Attache at Tangier
(Report of Progress in Organizing for Guerilla Warfare)
2. Memorandum, Part III, from King, undated
(List of contacts)
3. Letter for Goodfellow from Coon, August 19, 1942
(Enclosing Report on Interview in Fez, Aug. 11, and Note on Riffian Tribes of Gzennaya)
4. Memorandum for Murphy and Eddy from King, July 29, 1942
(Sentiments of Upper Officials in Rabat)
5. Memorandum for Eddy from King, July 24, 1942
(Fire on Board the Jean Bart)
6. Letter for Donovan from Eddy, July 23, 1942
(Transmitting Reports)
7. Report to ONI, July 11, 1942
(Re Wholesale Arrests in French Morocco)
8. Memorandum for Eddy from Reid, July 1, 1942
(An Immediate Bombing Job for the RAF)
9. Memorandum for Johnson and Eddy from King, July 1, 1942
(Attached are French Air Recognition Signals and Disposition of French Air Force in Morocco)
10. Memorandum "French West Africa and Dependencies"
(Miscellaneous news, including Disposition of Troops)
11. Code Tables
12. Regulations re National Hymn, etc., July 21, 1942
13. Report from King, July 23, 1942
(From Al contact Axis Activities around Melilla)
14. Report, July 23, 1942
(Latest Items of Battle Order)

15. Report, July 24, 1942
(Al Contact Reports Germans Worried about Spanish Royalist Movement)
16. Memorandum for Murphy and Eddy from King, July 23, 1942
(Al Contact Reports on Meeting of S.O.L.)
17. Memorandum for Murphy and Eddy from King, July 23, 1942
(Al Contact Reports on German Activities at Fedal)
18. Letter from Doolittle for Eddy, July 22, 1942
(Enclosing Code)
19. Report, July 21, 1942
(Aviation and Offensive Operations - Simultaneous Experiments)
20. Memorandum, May 12, 1942
(Organization of Resistance Groups)
21. Letter for Eddy from Horn, April 10, 1942
(Procurement and Shipment of Technical Equipment)
22. Memorandum for Goodfellow from Canfield, March 19, 1942
(Summary of Eddy's Letter of March 3 to Donovan)
23. Letter for Donovan from Eddy, March 19, 1942
(Transmitting Plan of Robin Hood)
24. Note 2 - in English - March 13, 1942
(Robin Hood's Plan, prepared by group of French Staff Officers in Algeria)
25. Note 2 - in French - March 13, 1942
(Original French of No. 24 above)
26. Memorandum re Hydro-Electric Dams at El Kansera, Sidi Machou and Kaebah Zidania
27. Memorandum re Nature and Use of Booby Traps and Other Gadgets

28. Letter for Coordinator from Eddy, March 11, 1942
(Explaining Previous Requisition for Supplies)
29. Letter for Coordinator from Eddy, March 11, 1942
(Transmitting Intelligence Report)
30. Intelligence Report re Moroccan Coast Landing Operations
March 10, 1942
31. Memorandum, March 10, 1942
(Defining "North Africa" and Setting Forth Certain Possible Lines of Activity)
32. Letter for Coordinator from Eddy, February 25, 1942
(Report on Miscellaneous Items)
33. Letter for Secretary of State from Murphy, January 21, 1942
(Transmitting Memorandum from King, No. 34 below)
34. Memorandum from King, January 15, 1942
(Setting Forth Military Requirements)

COPY

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Naval Attache

Tangier, Morocco

REPORT OF PROGRESS IN ORGANIZING FOR GUERILLA WARFARE AND
SABOTAGE

(Note: The Americans who have organized these groups on our behalf, identification of persons given fictitious names, and expenses involved, will be made the subject of a separate report sent by separate pouch, for reasons of security).

PART I - TUNISIA.

1 - groups prepared to resist Axis aggression.

A - Tunis

The Leader of the Tunis group is our old Corsican friend Gringo. He has considerable influence and controls men in the railroads, stevedores and customs men and bands of Corsicans in Tunisia.

Another one of the Leaders, who is a good friend of Gringo, controls most of the police force in Tunis. Second only to Gringo in importance, this Leader, Sherlock, is of

-2-

great potential value to us.

The total number of determined men on whom these two Leaders can count is between 1,400 and 1,500. In addition to several hundred policemen, who have the advantage of being armed.

Apart from the police, Gringo's gang has no arms at all and he asks for the following:

2,000 rifles, preferably English Lee-Enfield,
which would simplify the ammunition problem.

200 rounds of ammunition per rifle.

1,000 riot guns and 200 round ammunition each.

5,000 hand grenades.

20 machine guns, with 50,000 rounds.

E - Countryside.

Outside of Tunis there are various smaller groups in the countryside, under the control of the BEAR, who would be able to take Bizerta and hold it for twelve (12) hours if a regiment with arms could be landed. He could even supply trained gun crews and anti-tank guns. With no prospect of any Allied landing his resources, nevertheless, would be

-3-

equally useful for resistance in guerilla warfare.

At Massicault, 300 men led by Martel, are organized with local chiefs and patrol leaders. Massicault is about 30 kilometers southwest of Tunis. This group has arms, sixty (60) trucks and gasoline hidden away.

At Khanguet-Kef-Trout, Canary owns a lead mine and controls a small group prepared to blow roads and bridges. He has sufficient explosives at the lead mines to do quite a bit of this work.

At Rades - group of 80 men under command of retired army officer who can take possession of the munition depot at the port of Rades, as well as the munitions and arms belonging to the Municipality (twenty-five Lebel with cartridges).

At Hammam-Lif - group of ten under orders of X, but not organized.

At Medjez-El-Bab - group of about 800 among which is a town group composed of twelve (12) Europeans (4 non-coms and 8 soldiers) and some natives; Cousin's group composed of 60 natives already organized, among whom are 5 veterans and 2 non-coms (French) material 5 lebel and 4,000 cartridges;

-4-

one group including 3 Europeans and 30 Natives and one group Z, about same strength as Y. 3 groups of Europeans and natives distributed between Medjez-El-Bab and Testour.

1 Group at Montamard.

1 Group at Ksar Tir - native group without Europeans on a native's property.

2 groups at Testour, European and natives who know the location of arms and ammunition depots in the region.

At Oued Zarga - 1 group of between 40 and 50, on the farms of two French colonists.

At Goubellat - 1 group identical with that of Oued Zarga.

At Bou Arada - strong French group of 25 can raise strong native group, as well as a group at El Aroussa.

At Kef - a group can be formed here but so far there is no chief.

At Siliana - two groups of 80 Europeans and natives.

At Gaffour - one group of 40 - 50 Europeans.

At Le Krie - two groups of between 40 and 50 Europeans on the property of a French colonist.

At Beja - one group, the same as Le Krib, but

-5-

nothing in the town itself.

At Kelibia - group of Europeans with native workers, including Forestry and Customs Service men.

At Bizerta - formation of a group being studied. It may be formed among the Colonial Infantry by its former Chief, who is on the spot.

C - Independent Saboteurs

The following group of men has been organized by Hose without any expense having been incurred by ourselves or by the British. Arrangements have been made for Hose to continue in employment under good cover if the Americans should have to leave. They are perfectly willing to cooperate with the United Nations in any way and for any purpose that may be desired. The only worry in their minds is that possibly their families may suffer as a result of their acts. In order to avoid any undue suffering on the part of their families it is suggested that 1,500,000 francs be forwarded for deposit with Hose to take care of them in case of emergency and to cover operating expenses. Below is the list of the group in question:

No. 1 - Piano Player. Of French nationality. Bachelor

-6-

No. 2. - Pianola (W.U). Is married, has three dependents and is of French nationality.

No. 3. - Piano-tuner. Married; has two dependents and is of French nationality. He is in a position to give us information regarding communications in this country.

No. 4. - Assistant Piano-tuner. Married; three children, French nationality. This man is responsible for supplying copies of the Italian Commission's telegrams which have been of considerable use to our friends.

No. 5 - Casey Jones. Married; two dependents; French nationality. Has supplied information regarding communications, roadbeds, bridges, viaducts, et cetera.

No. 6. - Merchant. Married; three children; naturalized French, Maltese origin.

No. 7. - Zero. Married; two children; French origin. Has been useful in supplying movements of supplies through this country to Libya.

No. 8. - Green light. Bachelor, but has three dependents. French nationality. During past 18 months this man has kept this office continually informed regarding all activities

-7-

and investigations of his service.

No. 9. - Piccola. Married; four dependents; French nationality. Has recently assisted in giving information to this office.

No. 10. - Hillbilly. Married; two dependents; French nationality. Has been useful in supplying information regarding railway communications.

No. 11 - Hose. Married; five dependents. British-Maltese. The head of the group, who, by his initiative, has organized a self-supporting organization.

No. 12 - Olive Oil. Married; three dependents, French-Maltese.

No. 13 - Hardware. Married, three dependents; British-Maltese. Furnished information regarding ships' movements and ships' cargoes.

D - Picnoc Groups.

1. Many of the railway workers in Tunisia are Corsican. These are either Royalists or Freemasons in sympathy, but both groups are rabidly anti-Italian and consequently anti-German. They may therefore be counted on under the supervision

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of their leaders to do such work as sabotaging material on the railroads, in the ports, et cetera, also to blow up bridges and tunnels in case of an Italian invasion of Tunisia. Gringo estimates the number of these Corsicans at two hundred (200). They are in various positions, from stationmasters to yard and track foremen, and fairly well distributed throughout the country. S hopes to get a list of various stations, number of men in each and their functions, next week.

2. The Post, Telephone and Telegraph groups come under two leaders - Gringo and Doublet. The former's group are Corsican and number and functions are to be furnished next week. The latter, Doublet, is a Maltese Clerk in the British Consulate who has been doing a magnificent job of organizing on his own. He has two men in the P.T.T. who have about eight other men in their group. The leaders are Frenchmen and are installation section chiefs, for telegraph and wireless. Lately they were in charge of the construction of a telephone line from the Italian Armistice Commission here direct to Tripoli. In setting up the line, they installed means of secretly tapping it for further reference. Another of their men, who

-10-

is to be one of our W/T operators when he gets here, is employed in the wireless set spotting department of the P.T.T. here which makes it very simple to conceal our set.

Doublet's men hold the following Posts:

- 1 - Telephone Supervisor.
- 2 - Telegraph, Chef du Service.
- 3.- Telegraphist.
- 4 - Chief Mechanic, Telephones
- 5 - A business man.
- 6 - Police Inspector
- 7 - Railroad Engineer (not engine driver).
- 8 - Wireless Operator (Government)
- 9 - Ship Chandlre.

3. The group in the port and customs are again Corsican. I have not been able to discover from Gingo just how many they are and what positions they occupy. Judging by the difficulty of obtaining quick and accurate information in the port, I should say that they were few and their positions relatively unimportant. However, most of these men might be counted on to do sabotage work at the right moment.

-11-

4. Just recently a new group got in touch with S. These were three men working as drivers for French trucks taking supplies from Tunis to the Italian border. These men pick up the trucks at Tunis, where they are loaded with supplies, drive them down to a point beyond Gabes, about 63 kilometers from the Italian border (a place called Beer Garden). There Italian drivers take over the trucks and drive them to the frontier. After several hours they return and the French drivers drive them back to Tunis. The trucks are loaded with spare parts, engines, et cetera, for the truck depot at Tunis. These men also drive trucks coming by rail from Algiers or by boat from Italy and Spain. These trucks go into Tripoli and are used there. The group so far consists of the Second Chief Mechanic, one driver with the convoy and one driver here in Tunis. We are trying to work out a telegraphic system of enable them to wire us from Gabes, when the convoy should reach the Italian border, in case the British should want to do a little bombing. We are also trying to work out a system to sabotage the trucks intended for use in Tripoli. The engines are sealed at the depot here and the trucks inspected before they go.

-12-

The Second Mechanic, however, issues oil and fuel on the way. Emery powder is out of the question as it would be too easy to trace it back by analyzing the oil, but he tells me that a little tincture of iodine plays hot with the engines and cannot be traced. Hence my request for two liters.

These shuttle convoys are usually only ten or twelve trucks but when the trucks are intended to go through and stay, the convoys are longer. Lately the Italians have been hiring men at 500 francs a day to drive the trucks straight to the front.. Coco, the driver in Tunis, volunteered to go, but they had already all the men they needed, some 14 or 15 men. Will report more fully on exact position of transfer depot, fuel tanks, et cetera and result of iodine experiment.

We have decided to handle these men through a third party, and on a strictly cash basis.

It is believed a few sticker bombs, 3-hour fuses, and a few incendiary bombs might be useful. Also some dope

-13-

tables, just the knock out type, not K type.

5. A group of Arab refugees from Tripolitania, among whom are two (2) ex-Turkish army officers. These people are burning for revenge on the Italians and possess an organization of contrabandists which, is at present in the highly profitable business of supplying the civil population of Tripoli with Tunisian foodstuffs, is also capable of slipping in agents and arms, and creating trouble in the Italian rear. Any action taken would have to be backed up from outside, but the germs are there and might be fostered if considered useful. As a matter of fact, the French themselves had the idea of utilizing these people when they expected to fight the Italians, and were in the process of organizing the Tripolitain Arabs into a camel crew, each member of which would carry three rifles -- one for himself and two others for friends in Tripolitania when they arrived there.

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PART III.

(STRICTLY SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL).

In order to reduce the risk of this list falling into indiscreet or dangerous hands, I shall give only the "noms de guerre" of my contacts, with numbers. Later I may place a list of corresponding numbers and real names in your hands.

PORT LYAUTEY "Cabby" (1) former District Controller (Commissioner) of Port Lyautey and surrounding district, now owner of an extensive colonist farm at Sidi Slimane, which property is traversed by two important bridges and also contains fields which could be used as emergency landing fields. Controls group of resolute Frenchmen in neighborhood, totaling about 40 men and large number of native laborers for use in emergency. Owing to his former official position, has considerable influence with European and native officials and residents in Port Lyautey, Sidi Slimane and surrounding districts. Has considerable influence at Residency where he has friends of long standing, some of whom are secretly affiliated to Freemasonry. Is a ranking Freemason. Is in charge of "Cheesecake" and his group.

"Cheesecake" (2) Very enthusiastic and energetic official in charge of town and its district. In an emergency would be able to cut communications with coast defences, barracks, etc., block resistance to a considerable extent, and arrange air landings. Would be helpful in arranging clearance through Customs and town of material landed in port. Could mobilize several hundred native laborers and large group of Frenchmen for assistance in an emergency. Owing to his official position, is obliged to maintain great discretion, but has managed to have himself appointed Chief of the Service for Resisting Parachutists, with the right to travel anywhere. "Cheesecake's" group includes most of the Post Office employees, most of the railway station employees, most of the Customs men and port employees at Port Lyautey. In an emergency, his adherents would take care of those employees or officials who were not.

-2-

Both these groups need arms. Will furnish list of requirements later.

"Cheesestraw" (3) Cheesecake's brother-in-law, is a Government official with considerable investigatory rights in the matter of food supplies, Customs, etc., and whose functions call for much travel throughout the country. He has been very useful in supplying military and other information.

Communications between Cabby, Cheesecake and ourselves have hitherto been made through the Seasquid and by direct contact whenever these men come to Casablanca. Another method of communication is being arranged.

In addition to Cabby's and Cheesecake's groups, there is at Port Lyautey a fairly large De Gaullist group who are desirous of linking up with our people. "Fountainpen", (4) a professional man, is in charge of this group. I am considering putting him in touch with Cabby, and arranging for liaison and cooperation between the two leaders, the groups themselves to ignore this junction, and later on, linking up all three with the Rabat groups. These junctions would mean in each case that the leaders only would contact each other, and as far as possible the different groups would ignore each other's existence.

RABAT "Pills" (5) a professional man and landowner, long-established in the country. Owns large property bordering on the sea in the neighborhood of Rabat. Member of the Council of Government and of various other official organizations. Personally known to General Nogues and other Residency officials. Air Pilot. Controls a group of about 30 adherents including a number of officials in Rabat. Group very recently organized and is likely to increase, bar accidents. Works in cooperation with a group of De Gaullists numbering between 100 and 110, headed by "Charlotte" a useful information and liaison worker. This group is endeavoring to train squads of young men for work as guides, control or destruction agents, as indicated in Chapter I (B) of this memorandum.

"Pinkeye's" (7) group at Rabat. This is a group of

-3-

some 200 determined men, ex-officers and Government officials. It was organized by Pinkeye, who is already known to you. As he is more or less of a professional, they should be fairly well trained. They are under the nominal leadership of Commandant J. Pinkeye is the controlling spirit. They were placed at the disposal of R. H. and U.C. but due to the high-handed methods, amounting to insolence, of Raoul, Lelong's adjutant, they refused to be under the orders of Lelong and U.C. and asked to come under American Control.

Both these groups need arms and toys.

CASABLANCA. There are a few remnants of the "M." (General's) (8) group, but nine or ten of them have been arrested in the FORTIN MOULLOT business. The General is in hiding, waiting his chance to get out and all those who are not arrested are lying low for the moment. A list of the chief survivors follows:

"Marquis" (9) Aged about 40, small, energetic, intelligent man. Official doctor of the Municipal Services in charge of the anti-venereal dispensary. Maintains relations with Police Commissaire Bourrel and Inspector Tellier, on fairly good terms with Municipal authorities. Is now in Vichy and may be arrested on his return or at least interrogated in connection with the Fortin Moullot affair. Member of the Legion, but does not frequent it. Catholic tendency. Financial means limited; his car was purchased by the group, leaving him the use of it so as to profit by his doctor's gasoline ration and circulation card which permits him to drive even during air alerts, for the purpose of transporting articles (wireless, etc.) in his car. Needs continued financial assistance as frequently has to neglect clientele in the interests of the group. Very reliable.

G. P. (10) Aged about 55. General practitioner. Ex-Freemason. Opinions fairly well known, but has not been disturbed. Serious, reliable, discreet. Powerful acquaintances in Freemason group. Carries on for Marquis in the latter's absence. Better off financially than Marquis.

"Jitters" (11). Aged 35, reserve lieutenant. Left

-4-

France in attempt to join Free French, very useful worker in group. Intelligent, serious, willing, but nervous. Worked for a year in Naval engineering establishment in Casablanca, now works in vulcanizing establishment. Close friend of Commandant B. of 3rd Bureau, who appears to have encouraged him.

Will be useful once he has recovered his morale which has been badly shaken by the Fortin Moullot affair, during which he has arrested and released. Speaks excellent English.

"Benedict" (12) Aged 25. Pilot officer Air force, demobilized. Engineer of Arts and Crafts school. Worked on board JEAN BART, now engineer in private firm. Had been charged by police to watch the General but never gave the latter away. Recently married. Mlle. G. who was grilled for 18 hours in the Fortin Moullot affair (without giving anything away) and since then has been less useful. Earnest, but lacking in scope.

"Clipping" (13) Between 30 and 35 years of age. Employed at Aviation workshops. Energetic, active, earnest, many contacts and entrees at airfields and workshops. Was useful for information but recently has been spotted and now is under suspicion. Is not too discreet.

"Ampere" (14) Aged 55. Chief telephone fitter at Post Office. Ex-Freemason. Sincere, brave, earnest and discreet, but limited in scope, requires direction, lacks initiative.

"Sparks" (15) Aged 25. Chief electrician at Banque d'Etat. Earnest, reliable, willing but timid. Capable of rendering useful service in the technical office and wireless Bureau.

"Nocour" (16) Young officer of Engineers, aged 22 or 23. Now employed in Food Supply Service. Willing, brave, but extremely indiscreet, too fond of women and drink, always short of money. Useful only for rough stuff, which he is always willing to do.

-5-

Port Group. This is a small select group, too valuable for the information they provide to risk incorporating in another movement or to waste on any petty sabotage. Nevertheless, if it came to a show-down, I believe three of these men would be more capable of pulling off some really constructive destruction than anyone else. They are "Sea Wolf" (17) "Sea Squid" (18) and "Seagoing Prairie Dog" (19). They also have a small but sure group of assistants in the port, and also have with them the only man I trust in Casablanca to do photographic work.

Railroad group. Pinkeye has another group in Casablanca. This is headed by "Quicklunch" (20), proprietor of the railroad station restaurant. It includes some 200 railroad employees and workers, including track men, brake men, engineers, etc., even some of the railway police. These men need arms and toys, but these should only be given them at the last minute, as like most strong-arm squads, they are apt to be impetuous.

Independent De Gaullist group. There are various independent De Gaullist groups in Casablanca which are not under our control but which are willing to cooperate with us. It is my intention to get in contact with these groups through the chiefs of the same movement in Rabat, but not to try to merge them.

Remains of Uncle Charlie's group. Colonel Lelong had collected some 400 people here, according to figures given by him. Many of these were members of our own groups whom he had contacted, also quite a few De Gaullists whom we had not yet touched, but he also collected a lot of hotheads, chatterboxes and jerry-gobblers. I have taken back our own men, and am letting the rest disperse and quiet down, because of the hash and commotion which Colonel Lelong created.

Tweedledum and Tweedledee. This is a very serious group headed by the two brothers Tweedledum and Tweedledee (21 and 22) and mostly made up of able business men like the two brothers, discreet officials and a few high-ranking army officers. They also have certain contacts in the Navy. It is this group that is arranging the importation of arms, etc.,

-6-

also the ones who put in a request for communications material to be landed with the connivance of the Post Office authorities through the Customs at Port Lyautey. They are men who have really a deep-rooted hatred of the Germans for adequate personal reasons, and they even have offered to pay for such material as we can provide. It is difficult to say how many there are in this group, or to give more detailed information in regard to the members or even to give the name of the superior Army officer under whose secret official authority they are working.

Spanish Republican Group. This group is known under various names - FRENTE POPULAR, FRENTE DE LA LIBERTAD or FRENTE NACIONAL PARA LA INDEPENDENCIA DE ESPANA. It is formed of survivors of the Spanish Socialist and Communist Parties who fled to North Africa after the Franquiste victory in Spain. Its aim is the liberation of Spain from Franquiste dictatorship and the destruction of Facism, and it considers cooperation with the United Nations as helpful to that purpose. This group is scattered all over North Africa. They state that while not all Republicans are members of their Party, they can count on general Republican support should need arise. There follow figures given by them:

CONSTANTINE 400 Republicans, of whom 152 belong to the Party, working in Constantine, Bizerte and Tunis.

Algiers 582 Republicans, of whom 135 are members of the Party, working in Algiers, Blida and Boufari.

ORAN 150 Republicans, of whom 61 belong to the Party, working in Sidi Bel Abbes and Oran.

CASABLANCA 190 Republicans, of whom 60 belong to the Party and work in Casablanca, Meknes, Fez and Rabat.

COLOMB BECHAR 1,500 Republicans, of whom 352 belong to the Party (mostly working on the Transsaharian).

BOU ARFA 1,300 Republicans, of whom 310 belong to the Party (mostly working on the Transsaharian).

Over and above this number 90 are reported to be in

-7-

prison in Oran, 100 in prison in Algiers, and 22 in prison in Port Lyautey and Casablanca.

(The "Republicans" mentioned above are Spanish Republican refugees, most of whom came here from France in 1940 after serving in the French forces. Apart from these there is of course a very large local Spanish population of pro-Republican sympathies).

400 of the "Republicans" listed above are reported to be returning voluntarily to Spain, where the FRENTE POPULAR is being secretly rebuilt. Their local leader has asked for those remaining in Morocco identity cards for key men to work in Casablanca, and a Spanish passport for one man who is to ensure liaison between North African groups and Spain. These men are pretty hard material; they would be useful for strong-arm or sabotage work if the need arose. In the meantime, they appear to be doing mostly anti-Fascist propaganda.

Serious Army group. There is a group of serious Army men headed by our old friend the Footslogger (23) who is now a major. This is an extremely able and discreet crowd. They more or less broke off contact after the unfortunate Gunner (24) affair, but my friend the Penguin (25) tells me that they are about ripe to make contact again through a trustworthy civilian "Blindfold" (26). Before the contact can be re-established, however, it would be necessary for me to restore their confidence by getting the Penguin out. Footslogger commands a battalion of Tirailleurs Marocains in a coastal sector and has more or less guaranteed their cooperation if any landing parties took place in that sector, provided we give him 48 hours' notice. This group must be handled with discretion but it is really one of the worthwhile nuclei in Morocco.

The Penguin is arranging to put me in contact with another group in the Aviation. These are not in contact with any other group in North Africa, but are in key positions at the airfield here and should occasion arise could be depended on to play hob with the whole installation. Naturally we should have some toys ready to give them. The chief of this group, the man who will be my contact after Penguin leaves, will be called "Spanner" (27).

-8-

Other groups. Last of all, there is a small efficient group of the remnants of the old French S. R. It will be recalled that according to the terms of the Armistice in 1940, the French military and naval intelligence services were disbanded. Some of these men left France and came to Morocco where they formed a secret intelligence service. Some of them actually managed things so as to come out in the service of and with the authority of the Vichy government and they have been working here for us since then under that cover. The head of the Surete here is one of them the "Hedgehog" (28). He is obliged to steer a somewhat strait and narrow course although his sympathies are with us. The prime movers in this group are "Meccano" (29) "Pinkeys" (7) "Pump" (30), and a man they call the "Patron" (31). Besides this, they naturally have various underlings in the Police and Surete at their disposal but have to use them with due discretion.

They have men in Rabat, Casablanca, Saffi, Agadir, Marrakesh, Meknes and Fez, and probably elsewhere. They also have the Police Commissaire of the Port of Casablanca and various members of the Port Police at their disposal. These men are probably the finest suicide group for the purpose of information and communication should we have to get out of Morocco. Only yesterday they came to see me and asked if I could provide them with wireless emission and receiving sets and radio receiving sets. It seems to me that it is this group that would really constitute the link between North Africa and the United Nations should we have to leave. They are old hands in the game, very loath to tip their hand, but once you have their confidence they will go all out. It has taken me 14 months to arrive at the point where they have decided to talk to me directly. Heretofore it has been through a trusted chief and liaison man and one head of a service but who is not a chief of the group.

Some time in the near future I expect to have a list of toys, chocolates and other things which they would like to have for resistance in case of emergency.

These men are working for bare expenses and they ask

-9-

but one thing, that when the day of victory comes their services will be acknowledged by the fighting French and Allied nations. In doing the work which they have done and are still doing they are taking risks as great as any man in the front line, but they also know that if the tide turns in our favor, de Gaulle will be mobbed by men who have done nothing and who will claim to have performed miracles.

/s/ David W. King,
Vice Consul

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**LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

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**LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**



COPY

July 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Mr. Murphy and Colonel Eddy from Vice Consul King.

Sentiments of upper officials
in Rabat

Members of "Pills" group report as follows:

In general, all officials of superior rank in Rabat are ostensibly "collaborationist" in their attitude. Before the Russian resistance became a certainty, most of them appeared to be more or less convinced that "collaboration" was their only hope. At present, many of the same group openly admit pro-British or at least anti-German sentiments but do not translate their sentiments into action. The general impression is that, while hoping for an Allied victory they intend to maintain their present attitude until their hopes are realized or at least until the United Nations land forces in Morocco.

Exceptions to these are the Director of "Ravitaillement" (Sausac des Forges) and some of his staff; Bourcelin, Procurer at the Court of First Instance at Rabat; Gault, Director of Health Services; the Director of Industrial Production and his assistant, Du Vivier and Kiesle) and most of the Cabinet Diplomatique. All of these are known to be pro-United Nations.

On the other side, M. Tron, Director of Finances and protege of Camille Chautemps, is reputed to be pro-German while M. Sanviti, Justice of the Peace at Rabat, is a member of the S.O.L. and openly professes his pro-German sentiments.

A fairly large number of physicians are on the pro-German side and active in promoting the S.O.L. With two or three exception, the lawyers are lukewarm, while the staff of the Department of Education and teaching staff in the various colleges are too timid to express any but orthodox pro-Petain sentiments.

/s/ E. W. King.

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Members of "Pills" group report as follows:

In general, all officials of superior rank in Rabat are ostensibly "collaborationist" in their attitude. Before the Russian resistance became a certainty, most of them appeared to be more or less convinced that "collaboration" was their only hope. At present, many of the same group openly admit pro-British or at least anti-German sentiments but do not translate their sentiments into action. The general impression is that, while hoping for an Allied victory they intend to maintain their present attitude until their hopes are realized or at least until the United Nations land forces in Morocco.

Exceptions to these are the Director of "Ravitaillement" (Saussac des Forges) and some of his staff; Bourcelin, Procurer at the Court of First Instance at Rabat; Gault, Director of Health Services; the Director of Industrial Production and his assistant, Du Vivier and Kiesle) and most of the Cabinet Diplomatique. All of these are known to be pro-United Nations.

On the other side, M. Tron, Director of Finances and protege of Camille Chautemps, is reputed to be pro-German while M. Sanviti, Justice of the Peace At Rabat, is a member of the S.O.L. and openly professes his pro-German sentiments.

A fairly large number of physicians are on the pro-German side and active in promoting the S.O.L. With two or three exceptions, the lawyers are lukewarm, while the staff of the Department of Education and teaching staff in the various colleges are too timid to express any but orthodox pro-Petain sentiments.

/s/ D/ W. King.

4

COPY

July 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Colonel W. A. Eddy, from Vice Consul King

Fire on Board the Jean Bart

An Al contact reports that there was a fire on board the Jean Bart during the night of Monday and/or Tuesday. The fire broke out in the ammunition magazines. One man was killed, several wounded. It was necessary to flood the magazines, and today another Al contact reports that the anti-aircraft ammunition is being taken off the Jean Bart and loaded on to trucks. The causes of the fire are unknown, but are attributed to negligence, not sabotage. An enquiry is being made - in the utmost secrecy.

On July 23rd, at 7 p.m., the destroyer Malin (X 82) sister ship of Le Terrible, came in from Dakar and is berthed at berth N (see port sketches).

Near the Jean Bart the Navy are unpacking 160 new submarine batteries which have arrived from France.

s/s D. W. King.

COPY

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Naval Attache

July 23rd, 1942 Tangier, Morocco

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services
24th and E Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I have the honor to enclose the following for the
information of your Intelligence Section:

- Enclosures
- (a) - Copy of report to ONI regarding whole-sale arrests in French Morocco, committed by mistake last week.
 - (b) - An immediate bombing job for the RAF, from Vice Consul Reid, Casablanca, July 1st.
 - (c) - Regional Air Commands, French Air Force, from Vice Consul King, dated July 1st.
 - (d) - Copy of recognition signals of French aircraft, Tunisia, already sent to Washington by Consul Doolittle, dated July 6th.
 - (e) - Disposition of French Air Force, Morocco by Vice Consul King, July 1st.
 - (f) - Report on the Conference on Minerals in French North Africa, held May 24-25th, 1942 from British Sources.
- 6

-2-

- (g) - Political intelligence from southern Morocco, secured by Vice Consul Pendar, from contacts among French officers.
- (h) - Copy of intelligence report to ONI, concerning recruiting for the Legion Tricolore, by Vice Consul King, dated July 23rd.
- (i) - Copy of questionnaire required of recruits for the SOL, July 21st, 1942.
- (j) - Report of Progress, Organization of Sabotage groups in French Morocco, June 22nd, 1942.
- (k) - Report on conditions in France, secured by Vice Consul King, from a French officer from the Intelligence service just returned to Morocco, dated June 26th, 1942.
- (l) - New regulations regarding the Spanish national anthem, et cetera, making the Falange hymn and salute obligatory.

Respectfully submitted

/s/ W. A. Eddy,
Lt. Colonel, USMC (Ret)

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Garini 141-42
(Extract NEW SOURCE each year, 1 & 1-40, 9-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. _____
(to correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide)
Make separate report for each main title.

From U. S. Naval Attache at TANGIER Date July 11, 1944
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference: Vine Consul W. S. Reid.
(Three-ly, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source **Personal Observation and Informant Evaluation** (As official, personal observation, in interviews, press, conversation with -blindly when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject **FRENCH MOBO** **Amablancas, Rabat** **Arrest of Pro-Amr.**
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF. -- (More careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

Wholesale Activities in French Morocco (Casablanca, Meknes, and Rabat) of French Officers and Civilians for Pro-American Activities.

French Secret Service agent reported that on June 28th, three hundred and seventy (370) people were arrested in Casablanca, Rabat and Meknes, being accused of having formed a secret organization which menaced the "security of the French state".

Nearly all classes of people were affected by the arrest order. There were officers of the aviation section, of the Navy and Army, as well as the manager of a large stationary store situated in Casablanca known as "Forti-Moullot". This last named is accused of being the instigator of the plot.

The object of this organization was to direct propaganda for the American cause in French Morocco and at the same time to sabotage the French national defense program in the event of an American intervention in the Protectorate. It appears that arrangements were made to pass along important information to key American agents or representatives, who would remain in the interior and have access to means of communicating information to their Government.

It appears that treachery on the part of an employee of the firm of Fortin-Moullot, a Jewish woman, brought this plot to the attention of the police. This woman was on intimate terms with a member of the German Armistice Commission and disclosed to him the existence of this organization and the German commission subsequently went to Rabat to put in an official complaint and demanded an investigation.

The French Police padlocked the store and made a raid throughout the building from cellar to roof. They found tracts, dynamite cartridges and weapons concealed in the basement of the store and then again they invaded the homes of some of the suspected members and found weapons concealed on the premises. Some confessions of guilt were obtained by third degree methods, resulting in injuring one man so badly that he required medical treatment. This

Education by Organization

[illegible]

... which this particular copy of this report
... and none of other copies of this report. In

[illegible]

- 2 -

TR. 141-42.

U.S. Naval Attache, Tangier, Morocco.

7/11/42

man's name is M. Severyn, a Casablanca merchant.

The chief of the political section of national security in Casablanca, Commissioner Beurel, has been dismissed from office on orders from Rabat, demoted three ranks because it was proved he was voicing pro-American sentiments to his subordinates, and at the same time it was proven that he issued order to his subordinates to keep an eye on Germans in his precinct instead of obeying his orders which were to follow all activities of American consular officers.

"Strong-Armed Squad" Being Organized for French Morocco.

The "Partie Populaire Francaise" a Doriot organization and usually designated as the "P.P.F." have just organized and armed six hundred (600) members whose duty is to intervene in the case of any political demonstrations or sympathies which may break out in the future in French Morocco, at the same time to act as key men at strategic points in the event of an American invasion of this territory.

At the same time while this organization is developing, the French "Legion des Combattants" is selecting a nucleus of a tough and rugged element in this organization to form similar strong-armed squads to support the units of the "P.P.F." organization. In other words, both of the organizations above mentioned will soon boast of having strong-armed squads available for duty similar to the original cast of the German early "Sturm Truppen" units that were formed in Bavaria.

Recently units of the Strong-armed squad of the "P.P.F." went into action at the Casablanca railroad station on the return of a Frenchman by the name of M. O'Neil and former manager of the Shell Oil Company in Casablanca. This man was arrested a year and a half ago because of pro-British and De Gaulist activities. He was convicted and sentenced to a long term of hard labor. His case was appealed and he was called to Vichy. His father having been a retired French Admiral, pressure was brought to give this man a suspended sentence. When he returned to Casablanca three weeks ago an armed squad belonging to the "P.P.F." organization met him at the station gates and cried: "Death to this traitor" and the intervention of local police with drawn revolvers protected M. O'Neil from the danger which surrounded him.

W. A. EDDY,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC (Ret).

B

Casablanca, July 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL EDDY

Subject: An immediate bombing job for the R.A.F.

A contact whom I would rate A-2 is a French officer in the service of anti-aircraft defenses and has just returned from a five-weeks' stay in the Bordeaux region of Occupied France and has submitted the following information taken directly from his own notes of the terrain covered by him.

At a distance of 40 kilometers east of Rochefort, map marked A, gives a detailed location of the "Hispano-Suiza" factories and also to the south the map indicates the adjoining airfield, school of pilot formations and the German "Werft" factories. The letter "D" on the map face represents Comessa powder factory which was formerly situated at Metz and was moved here at the time of the Armistice. The D.C.A. battery emplacements are marked on the map by criss-cross in red crayon.

This officer pointed out in the adjoining small town of Cognac there are five very important subterranean hangars made of concrete. They have an opening of 60 to 70 meters in each case. They actually contain the following equipment, Messerschmidts 109s and Focke Wulfs, Junkers 87 and Heinkles III. The Hispano-Suiza factory above referred to is operated by the Germans. They construct aeroplane motors and special motors for "Sturm-Boote" which are known as invasion boats.

The second map marked B, points out the positions of submarine bases and navy yards lying along the east bank of the Gironde River. The submarine base is carved out of a rock strata which forms the bank of the Gironde River on its eastern side. The Navy yards are a few hundred meters south of the submarine base. These naval bases are also exploited by the Germans and they are using them for repair work and assembling of submarines.

Set-up of "Lehrregiment" no. 2 of Brandenburg.

I was informed by an officer of the French Secret Service that at the end of 1941 the "Lehrregiment" was located between Wiesbaden and Frankfurt. The "Lehrregiment" No. 2 is composed of trained parachutists and is a depot brigade. The "Lehrregiment" No. 1 of East Prussia know as "Lehrregiment" is a depot brigade of continual training and is composed of two battalions and their two to three months' training. The "Lehrregiment" No. 2 they are a depot brigade. The "Lehrregiment" No. 1 which is a depot brigade. The "Lehrregiment" No. 2 is actually in the composition of this depot brigade known as "Lehrregiment No. 1". I was told that many of these highly trained parachutists have been sent to Spain in recent weeks in civilian attire to take up positions in that country pending such time when a move would

8

- 2 -

be ordered to occupy Spain itself. I was told that this is the identical plan that was used when Holland was invaded and occupied. This officer stated that one should consider the Wehrregiment depot brigade of East Prussia as a clearing house for graduates trained and skilled in the use of the most modern parachute attack work, and that from this depot trained units are sent out to do an invasion job in whatever territory may come next in the Nazi program.

W. Stafford Reid

W. Stafford Reid
Vice Consul

WSR/ad

July 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

for Colonel Charles JOHNSON and Colonel W. A. EDLEY
from Vice Consul KING.

I enclose herewith two lists which were copied from actual documents. Please treat these as strictly confidential as they might be traced back to my source of supply. The first is a list of Regional Air Commands in France, North Africa, West Africa and Indo-China. In the lists of the various groups in this paper you will notice that certain ones have no "stationnement" or "dépôt de rattachement". In these cases, the groups mentioned are merely theoretical and there are no actual planes to correspond. In the second paper are the orders for the Air bases in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in case of alarm, danger or actual invasion. This also was copied from actual orders and should be treated discreetly.

David W. King
David W. King.

A.1. Report from Official Log
Swk

COMMANDEMENT DE REGION AERIENNE

No.	Affectation	Stationnement	Dépôt de Rattachement	Tableau d'effectifs	
				Nombre du T.E.	
	1ere Région Aérienne	Aix en Provence	Orange	21	
	2e Région Aérienne	Toulouse	Toulouse	22	

COMMANDEMENT SUPERIEUR DE L'AIR

Afrique du Nord	Alger	Blida	23
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COMMANDEMENT DE L'AIR

Algerie	Alger	Blida	24
Tunisie	Tunis	Blida	24
Maroc	Rabat	Blida	24
A.O.F.	Dakar	Toulouse	151
Madagascar	Tananarive	Toulouse	165
Côte Française des Somalis	Djibouti	Toulouse	175
Indochine	Hanoi	Toulouse	180

COMMANDEMENT DE SECTEUR DE DEFENSE AERIENNE

D. Sud.	Aix en Provence	Orange
---------	-----------------	--------

COMMANDEMENT DE DEFENSE AERIENNE SANS SECTEUR

1. Sud-Est. Secteur	Istres	Orange
2. Sud-Ouest Secteur	Montpellier	Orange
3. Sud		

COMMANDEMENT

1) Tous Secteur		
2) Est		
3) Air Tunisie	Tunis	Blida
4) Air Maroc	Rabat	Blida
5) Air Algerie	Alger	Blida

COMMANDEMENT

2

No. : Affectation : Stationnement : Dépôt de Rattachement

COMMANDEMENT DE GROUPEMENT DE BOMBARDEMENT

1	Air A.O.F.	Thiès	Toulouse
2	" " "	Bamako	Toulouse
3 (a)	Air Algérie	Oran	Blida
4			
5			
6	Sous-Secteur Sud-Est	Istres	Orange
7			
8(a)	Air Tunisie	Tunis	Blida
9			
10			
11(a)	Air Maroc	Marrakesh	Blida
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18	Sous Secteur Sud Ouest	Lézignan	Orange
Sans No.	Air Algérie	Blida	Blida
" "	Air Maroc	Meknes	Blida

COMMANDEMENT DE GROUPEMENT DE TRANSPORT

15	Air A.F.N.	Alger	Blida
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COMMANDEMENT DE GROUPE D'ESCADRILLES DE CHASSE BIPLACE

Sous Secteur Sud Est	Nîmes	Orange
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GRUPPE DE CHASSE MONOPLACE

No.	Affectation	Stationnement	Dépôt de : Rattachement :	No. de T.N.
I/1	Groupeement Chasse 22	Lyon	Orange	41
II/1	" " "	Le Luc	Orange	41
III/1	" " "	--	--	Non-existent
I/2	2e Région Aérienne	Chateauroux	Toulouse	41
II/2	--	--	--	Non-existent
III/2	--	--	--	Non-existent
I/3	--	--	--	Non-existent
II/3	Groupeement Chasse 26	Alger-Maison Blanche	Blida	41
III/3	Groupeement Mixte 3	Oran	Blida	41
I/4	Air A. O.F.	Ouakam	Toulouse	153
II/4				
III/4				
I/5	Groupe Mixte 25	Rabat	Blida	41
II/5	" " "	Casablanca	"	41
III/5	--	--	--	-- (Non-existent)
I/6	--	--	--	-- (Non-existent)
II/6	Air A. O. F.	Thiès	Toulouse	153
III/6	Groupe Chasse 26	Alger-Maison Blanche	Blida	41
I/7	--	--	--	Non-existent
II/7	Groupe Chasse 24	Sidi Ahmed	Blida	41
III/7	--	--	--	Non-existent
I/8	Sous Secteur Sud Ouest	Montpellier	Orange	41
II/8	Groupe Chasse 22	Marignan	Orange	41
III/8	--	--	--	Non-existent
I/9	--	--	--	Non-existent
II/9	2e Région Aérienne	Toulon	Toulouse	41
III/9	Groupe Chasse 21	Hyères	Orange	41

ESCADRILLES

ESCADRILLES DE CHASSE BIPLACE

No.	Affectation	Stationnement	Depôt de : Rattachement	No. de T. E.
I/13	Groupe d'escad- rilles de chasse lourde	Nîmes	Orange	42
II/13	--	--	--	Non-existent
III/13	Groupe d'escad- rilles de chasse lourde	Nîmes (a)	Orange	42
		(a) Now attached to Gabès in Tunisia.		

GROUPE DE BOMBARDEMENT MOYEN B4 ou B5

I/11	Groupement Mixte 3	Oran	Blida	45
II/11	--	--	--	Non-existent
I/12	Groupement de Bom- bardement 6	Istres	Orange	45
II/12	--	--	--	--
I/19	Groupement de Blida	Blida	Blida	46
II/19	--	--	--	Non-existent
I/23	Groupement Mixte II	Marrakesh	Blida	45
II/23	Groupement de Meknes	Meknes	Blida	45
I/25	Groupement Mixte 8	Tunis	Blida	45
II/25	Groupement Mixte 8	Tunis	Blida	45
I/31	Groupement Bombarde- ment 6	Istres	Orange	45
II/31	--	--	--	Non-existent
I/32	Groupement Bombarde- ment Mixte 25	Casablanca	Blida	46
II/32	Groupement Bombardement Mixte II	Agadir	Blida	46
I/34	--	--	--	Non-existent
II/34	--	--	--	" "
I/38	Groupement de Bombarde- ment 6	Istres	Orange	45
II/38	Groupement de Bombardement 6	Istres	Orange	45
I/39	---	---	---	Non-existent
I/41	---	---	---	" "
II/41	Groupement 1	Blida	Blida	
I/42	Groupement de ment 2	Toulouse	Toulouse	154
II/42	Groupement de 1	Toulouse	Toulouse	154
II/43	Groupement de Bombardement 2	Toulouse	Toulouse	154

GROUPE

GROUPE DE BOMBARDEMENT D'ASSAUT (B2)

No.	Affectation	Stationnement	Dépôt de Rattachement	No. de T. I.
I/51	Groupe de Bombardement 18	Lézignan	Orange	47
II/51	--	--	--	Non-existant
I/54	Groupe de Bombardement 18	Lézignan	Orange	47

GROUPE DE BOMBARDEMENT B 3. (semi-piqué)

II/63	Groupe de Bombardement 1	Thiès	Toulouse	155
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GROUPE DE RECONNAISSANCE, R 3 et R 4.

I/14	Sous Secteur S/O	Perpignan	Orange	43
II/14	" " S/E	Avignon	Orange	43
I/22	Groupe Mixte 25	Rabat	Blida	44
II/22	Sous Secteur S/O	Montpellier	Orange	43
I/33	--	--	--	Non-existant
II/33	Groupe Mixte 8	Tunis	Blida	43
I/35	--	--	--	Non-existant
I/36	Groupe Mixte 26	Setif	Blida	43
II/36	---	--	--	Non-existant
II/39	--	--	--	Non-existant
I/52	Groupe Mixte 11	Marrakesh	Blida	43
II/52	Groupe Mixte 3	Oran	Blida	43

GROUPE

GROUPE ASRIE. A.F.C. O.N. 1

No.	Affectation	Stationnement	Depôt de : Rattachement :	No. de T. E.
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41	Air Indochine	Toug	Toulouse	181
42	Air Indochine	Bian Hoa Cal Lai	Toulouse	182

GROUPE DE TRANSPORT

I/15	Groupement Trans- port 15	Rabat-Salé	Blida	50
II/15/	" " 15	Blida	Blida	51
III/15	" " 15	Oujda	Blida	51

BATTERIE DU 25 C.A.

11	Secteur Sud	Le Luc	Orange	53
12	Secteur Sud	Nîmes	"	53
13	" "	Avignon	"	53
14	" "	Montpellier	"	53
15	" "	Perpignan L.	"	53
16	" "	Lezignan	"	53

SECTION DE DEFENSE ET DE SECURITE

31	Air Tunisie	Sidi Ahmed	Blida	54
32	" "	El Aouina	Blida	54
33	" "	Sfax	"	54
34	" "	Gabes	"	
	Air A. O. F.	(5 sections)	Toulouse	156

COMPAGNIES

COMPAGNIES D'INFANTERIE DE L'AIR

No.	Affectation	Stationnement	Depôt de Rattachement	No. de T. E.
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1	Air A. F. N.	Alger-Maison Blanche	Blida	52
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COMPAGNIES DE PIARES

71	1ere Région Aérienne	Nîmes	Orange	63
72	2e Région Aérienne	Agen	Toulouse	63
73	Air Algérie	Blida	Blida	64
74	Air Tunisie	Tunis	Blida	64
75	Air Maroc	Meknes	Blida	62

DEPOT DE MUNITIONS

1er Regiment Aerien	Lamanou	Orange	90
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*transféré à l'air
par l'aviation*

à l'aviation

1er 12 1942

FRENCH WEST AFRICA AND DEPENDENCIES

At the present time the formation of two regiments of automotive drawn artillery is being pushed to the maximum. For several months passed two master saddlers have been assigned especially to Dakar, the base of these two regiments, with the object of adapting and putting into service the materiel which has come from France and is destined for these formations. At Bobodionlasso (Ivory Coast) there is being formed a motorized brigade. The materiel which has come and is still coming from France is being received and put into service with by Commandant Hervé, formerly at Marrakech, and who is charged with the automotive and artillery section.

Several groups of that brigade are already at Zinder. Certain ones are destined for Agades. Extract from a letter of first class gunner (Radio) ? F. Verdu, of the staff of the group of Zinder. I have just learned a piece of news which will, no doubt, surprise you. I am assigned to Agades, a little town situated 500 kms. from Zinder, in the direction of the north, that is to say of Lybia, and I must leave at the end of the month, or beginning of July.

Letter of June 1, 1942

From the letter in question it seems that the brigade is destined for Lybia and that it is intended for an attack on the bases of Fezzan.

MOROCCO

As a result of a report from the troops it has been confirmed that the ... at Vichy (Moroccan sharp shooters, Spanish ... / ... of the Colonial artillery of Morocco, of the ... and Tunis, the German

-2-

Battalions of the Foreign Legion) have been distributed along the coast in a state of readiness for action.

The Spanish Battalions of the Foreign Legion, a few artillery groups of the 64th R.A.A. and of the Regiment of the Colonial Artillery of Morocco, suspected of de Gaullist sympathies have been sent to work on the roads far into the interior.

Besides the fact that those regiments which have been placed in a state of readiness for action extend from Attir to Port Lyautey, (2) , the officers of all armaments, suspected of sympathy with de Gaulle (particularly in the goum) have been automatically retired.

There is to be noted an active propaganda for recruiting of natives for Germany. The recruiting officers at Marrakech are: Si Mohammed Ould Drus, Joseph Nateraz (called Pépé the Maltese). There is likewise intense smuggling in arms through Ifni destined for the Sahara and the region of Marrakech, organized by two Germans, Hans Keller and Vazari, aids of Axel Vialle and of Germain.

As regards requisitions of wheat, barley, dried vegetables, and fish, cattle, sheep and horses, they have increased at a great rate, being under the direct control of the civilian and military authorities.

The "Comte de Paris", who came on a visit to Marrakech on June 22, 1941, gave a speech in one of the factories of the city.

The "Comte de Paris" was accompanied by a number of agents, coming from Vengier, and by a number of agents of the German Armistice.

- 1 -

Besides the tracts, Morri Albert and Koltz Maurice were in possession of a plan for passing the Spanish Moroccan frontier and means for reaching Tangier.

Since the month of June 1942, all ~~other~~ ships of the French squadron in Morocco, with the exception of convoy vessels and submarines assigned to the escort of convoys, received orders to hold themselves in readiness to sail. Aircraft and patrol hydroplanes have their war equipment on board.

Upon confirmation it appears that in the garrison of Marrakech-Agadir -Confirms 90% of the officers have agreed to sign an engagement (undertaking) not to bear arms against Germany and to defend the empire against any aggressor (Anglo-Saxon understood).

Permanence

J

ADDITIONAL TABLES
COVERING JULY 25 - AUGUST 10, 1942

		25 juillet 1942									
Heures GMT		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
de 0 H à 1 H		411	428	212	348	295	607	659	662	889	054
1 - 2		514	350	830	839	209	234	509	970	023	902
2 - 3		074	877	597	169	683	017	565	507	719	208
3 - 4		957	917	528	401	783	560	857	473	773	366
4 - 5		874	434	098	086	210	117	828	307	388	822
5 - 6		672	788	339	834	524	590	543	166	493	749
6 - 7		247	351	239	522	248	465	344	492	340	867
7 - 8		285	950	571	771	362	553	363	544	690	647
8 - 9		503	184	077	761	168	766	733	180	770	981
9-10		276	078	329	475	753	710	931	055	642	195
10-11		429	367	368	925	688	214	806	577	742	643
11-12		133	678	053	044	708	564	767	725	537	197
12-13		334	487	292	101	580	609	153	213	170	706
13-14		890	901	287	521	490	701	573	393	452	979
14-15		371	386	920	913	316	592	131	026	768	665
15-16		330	513	617	909	790	684	093	011	832	139
16-17		751	379	625	963	357	076	567	266	058	270
17-18		155	533	022	341	569	146	724	460	182	064
18-19		812	045	789	051	692	193	671	655	966	278
19-20		092	549	786	155	039	095	192	576	807	343
20-21		689	475	104	105	730	387	757	974	163	488
21-22		530	621	048	403	125	071	019	079	423	324
22-23	23	609	854	637	502	035	651	898	641	435	505
23-24						255	233	585	929	225	802 325

26 juillet 1942

Heures GMT

0 h à 1 h

1-2

2-3

3-4

4-5

5-6

6-7

7-8

8-9

9-10

10-11

11-12

12-13

13-14

14-15

15-16

16-17

17-18

18-19

19-20

20-21

21-22

22-23

23-24

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	601	068	118	304	681	612	918	653	419	167
1-2	863	610	430	421	140	253	774	961	151	868
2-3	085	919	703	650	518	754	545	029	903	479
3-4	891	424	679	272	016	939	352	046	851	129
4-5	837	157	606	632	591	982	402	427	769	836
5-6	279	451	622	299	228	664	332	416	626	342
6-7	315	510	899	797	865	141	791	489	374	150
7-8	599	448	956	171	069	256	574	477	273	259
8-9	732	589	716	498	211	381	527	525	227	258
9-10	586	455	442	302	431	781	550	638	581	202
10-11	955	041	217	243	206	161	327	987	847	611
11-12	835	548	933	189	980	718	123	364	130	232
12-13	317	288	286	453	321	969	396	723	501	024
13-14	094	743	034	916	941	712	347	312	741	345
14-15	804	082	301	983	517	223	083	928	145	284
15-16	391	756	099	831	420	338	313	296	778	265
16-17	458	930	504	977	346	799	895	696	535	056
17-18	515	595	572	269	924	726	201	894	615	496
18-19	798	907	207887	323	126	634	383	951	566	
19-20	714	644	425	866	237	262	042	973	945	494
20-21	699	704	114	728	896	472	122	333	108	923
21-22	952	742	310	785	848	147	111	762	605	013
22-23	884	306	882	447	468	252	476	065	685	936
23-24				188	291	356	355	474	881	947

27 juillet 1942

Heures GMT

0 h à 1 h

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	448	685	836	626	129	896	653	147	781	065
1-2	805	136	291	510	3	60	534	479	769	949 364
2-3	466	123	222	656	976	382	063	359	508	895
3-4	383	7	96464	731	468	385	455	579	851	956
4-5	760	028	681	257	454	612	969	114	504	235
5-6	029	327	873	335	337	059	572	946	268	809
6-7	529	398	470	451	220	848	450	270	183	416
7-8	143	764	568	108	223	264	712	068	126	716
8-9	906	546	987	374	871	891	967	201	099	639
9-10	881	216	353	410	380	477	252	960	160	932
10-11	396	094	294	280	945	302	942	456	677	723
11-12	888	555	972	638	254	041	016	973	320	165
12-13	526	740	738	581	687	515	623	739	837	746
13-14	852	531	648	803	545	356	118	267	726	072
14-15	879	317	308	940	850	720	273	275	489	277
15-16	336	481	849	965	271	829	377	594	352	116
16-17	903	596	605	886	892	779	061	772	591	863
17-18	961	908	861	640	603	525	282	631	601	633
18-19	172	088	031	338	124	480	787	441	912	102
19-20	754	835	817	052	370	548	018	474	755	394
20-21	157	878	826	227	774	842	715	152	459	323
21-22 22	799	173	424	288	261	283	727	226	161	798
22-23	497	743	841	702	714	082	718	301	674	279
23-24	527	127	111	780	478	666	228	281	038	865

28 juillet 1942

Heures GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	540	349	057	168	266	170	218	240	4	67 248
1-2	749	670	898	036	435	564	682	556	457	362
2-3	966	026	105	763	488	771	680	187	191	576
3-4	492	131	125	392	146	514	598	915	859	071
4-5	757	767	617	520	233	957	067	649	149	255
5-6	560	733	386	693	909	830	190	015	091	403
6-7	490	348	784	142	077	509	319	512	120	768
7-8	522	339	138	643	904	340	239	158	833	055
8-9	786	113	507	393	180	166	776	444	484	913
9-10	367	408	112	153	210	964	758	669	794	943
10-11	384	440	877	086	316	736	241	630	854	175
11-12	958	432	064	503	334	818	305	311	156	814
12-13	523	249	655	511	628	469	290	433	058	856
13-14	244	867	724	618	022	066	934	801	037	186
14-15	418	413	730	537	901	106	524	047	483	765
15-16	412	646	552	475	184	911	822	176	144	844
16-17	329	289	309	678	672	864	452	832	667	164
17-18	421	389	629	635	465	365	641	577	405	559
18-19	054	318	231	657	423	181	925	573	486	062
19-20	607	407	326	734	671	570	533	790	808	713
20-21	839	663	246	810	567	363	092	789	614	876
21-22	874	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674
22-23	744	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674
23-24	744	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674	674

29 juillet 1942

Heures GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	204	472	151	937	527	167	427	262	347	419
1-2	615	299	119	237	430	632	207	361	046	421
2-3	346	711	27	2	535	624	188	923	321	589 939
3-4	696	296	578	189	174	217	778	024	304	263
4-5	815	551	259	122	042	699	634	134	458	243
5-6	709	198	376	253	141	595	034	284	721	145
6-7	446	952	355	5	36	517	447	115	868	936 550
7-8	251	406	919	293	333	777	933	941	232	982
8-9	516	775	033	043	741	954	664	083	286	593
9-10	928	566	661	722	476	245	983	930	785	870
10-11	847	893	196	703	442	735	574	491	162	947
11-12	443	399	096	905	150	482	391	554	916	797
12-13	211	695	882	212	404	838	897	342	425	611
13-14	650	918	242	654	884	111	951	303	819	265
14-15	127	431	485	608	729	049	793	315	547	907
15-16	845	705	104	762	704	582	013	140	084	697
16-17	924	025	759	073	501	921	984	075	588	171
17-18	494	312	962	562	298	602	955	840	894	085
18-19	259	402	154	069	599	378	306	645	453	948
19-20							420	518	224	732
20-21							056	791	728	498
21-22							027	202	679	436
22-23							395	644	375	977
23-24							375	109	586	110

30 juillet

HEURES GMT

0 h à 1 h

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	981	414	139	439	971	802	834	372	619	471
1-2	344	542	761	597	499	565	107	828	783	373
2-3	609	953	571	788	587	401	238	093	307	820
3-4	101	132	917	133	297	770	445	621	011	752
4-5	683	205	692	331	938	213	135	558	701	745
5-6	208	846	035	824	813	708	922	417	247	616
6-7	690	686	079	437	823	292	169	944	513	538
7-8	182	415	278	411	358	27	098	539	163	613
8-9	569	747	195	691	719	325	017	737	388	717
9-10	330	7	07209	557	078	019	473	975	229	397
10-11	585	449	027	959	673	357	544	462	185	698
11-12	502	121	563	880	885	051	058	197	409	706
12-13	584	821	230	652	021	637	684	647	541	642
13-14	689	910	328	422	461	495	580	970	095	528
14-15	379	354	438	773	215	032	795	592	553	806
15-16	428	688	627	857	521	053	782	710	044	753
16-17	843	155	519	234	039	351	274	117	625	341
17-18	914	530	935	434	929	807	014	350	371	812
18-19	968	636	855	225	193	974	811	659	702	963
19-20	369	178	869	387	023	651	148	543	978	604
20-21	260	853	179	920	662	048	660	902	927	089
21-22	219	389	199	203	295	744	549	493	575	890
22-23	192	725	925	390	766	751	675	931	620	074
23-24					221	668	368	827	194	

31 juillet

HEURES GMT

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	872	148	015	178	914	968	668	014	691	675
1-2	414	630	113	107	415	985	444	512	520	187
2-3	660	876	978	445	811	693	135	438	297	194
3-4	149	238	747	686	765	484	810	437	953	824
4-5	311	676	844	614	541	506	833	132	486	801
5-6	164	859	717	142	538	106	440	62	7	938 944
6-7	462	433	619	794	635	915	205	734	820	128
7-8	426	322	407	649	246	736	745	825	469	372
8-9	934	707	539	657	244	808	176	523	557	511
9-10	120	397	748	057	911	326	669	231	744	542
10-11	570	540	926	843	408	616	922	066	047	636
11-12	860	467	417	613	221	680	904	776	959	943
12-13	091	449	289	646	846	218	369	813	432	229
13-14	199	390	827	027	309	240	158	752	618	373
14-15	290	349	418	186	241	682	409	628	927	652
15-16	436	737	563	864	036	097	818	910	405	138
16-17	318	439	274	037	314	658	137	328	587	392
17-18	179	389	463	437	964 28	413	020	663	880	958
18-19	975	121	305	159	986	629	175	758	667	598
19-20	181	191	869	750	215	558	422	559	471	249
20-21	461	782	365	856	971	855	067	331	575	230
21-22	713	203	021	483	795	853	144	935	784	702
22-23	821	499	062	219	814	673	260	823	556	354
23-24	514	319	835	358	190	032	185	763	519	

ler août 1942

HEURES GMT

0 h à 1 h

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10-11

11-12

12-13

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22-23

23-...

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	031	547	965	049	235	819	399	012	395	870
1-2	948	777	695	267	377	726	382	119	817	224
2-3	645	937	532	697	715	061	456	526	640	110
3-4	875	204	562	588	459	850	960	849	263	109
4-5	466	838	298	277	102	755	603	294	174	858
5-6	596	404	793	394	579	018	841	470	711	555
6-7	216	222	075	441	976	261	481	361	608	984
7-8	892	254	648	283	878	173	165	134	154	654
8-9	666	803	478	886	033	410	116	359	862	443
9-10	196	888	038	406	485	529	661	360	897	694
10-11	104	949	772	677	516	508	084	779	624	088
11-12	845	746	370	450	039	198	582	871	551	738
12-13	303	063	861	353	623	482	594	568	602	320
13-14	236	534	172	740	271	059	942	721	705	380
14-15	087	136	531	908	972	656	335	073	293	842
15-16	816	275	103	264	804	764	124	250	815	226
16-17	962	268	583	554	160	308	491	242	378	932
17-18	115	028	921	893	805	883	043	212	152	385
18-19	739	906	759	561	398	967	375	946	052	464
19-20	257	133	725	593	760	536	775	337	826	280
20-21	546	829	096	954	143	251	674	282	480	370
21-22	740	687	852	578	879	270	497	792	780	729
22-23	67	67	67	446	127	220	162	281	633	081
23-...	67	67	67	446	127	220	162	281	633	081

2 août 1942

Heures GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	852	489	364	201	517	599	443	288	109	346
1-2	905	685	341	217	280	743	816	257	213	912
2-3	959	894	195	331	942	156	967	052	918	031
3-4	689	122	411	330	976	112	759	775	982	208
4-5	039	425	795	344	706	617	268	817	453	434
5-6	234	548	642	820	388	244	659	547	644	148
6-7	530	804	229	473	701	663	874	185	705	812
7-8	058	803	445	824	863	665	635	205	946	541
8-9	055	236	752	132	391	096	423	686	671	944
9-10	844	339	130	703	951	336	487	717	790	684
10-11	483	940	697	545	126	826	614	616	943	078
11-12	510	576	937	141	924	785	764	806	056	692
12-13	301	240	216	316	704	799	212	811	342	932
13-14	468	435	183	153	094	472	071	079	046	729
14-15	114	776	103	877	694	282	556	139	304	026
15-16	306	524	908	305	174	765	067	802	631	628
16-17	699	277	760	290	841	248	763	969	362	386
17-18	633	124	579	682	179	658	482	069	768	655
18-19	385	674	755	570	502	158	531	378	859	949
19-20	796	780	394	913	350	266	815	792	564	602
20-21	204	731	666	814	878	218	281	977	036	294
21-22	061	...	...	...	...	...	886	572	828	245
22-23	165	...	...	...	...	...	888	840	177	308
23-24	524	...	...	...	...	...	...	317	639	235

3 addt

HOURS GMT

0 h à 1 h

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	399	929	672	212	016	105	927	750	934	739
1-2	283	074	831	971	711	324	715	870	066	383
2-3	480	367	928	488	310	921	405	532	471	032
3-4	292	818	019	214	668	649	265	111	338	022
4-5	667	741	586	134	860	718	653	161	657	116
5-6	167	781	931	432	855	409	395	613	490	589
6-7	962	224	965	910	939	681	950	485	585	369
7-8	196	470	514	904	380	093	279	073	464	092
8-9	021	120	594	150	409	433	945	798	137	643
9-10	192	832	327	930	065	186	376	181	143	262
10-11	230	319	393	722	377	460	654	582	634	926
11-12	696	561	723	550	554	612	829	767	206	522
12-13	446	048	578	465	081	430	690	436	085	053
13-14	438	320	581	549	972	794	176	539	985	276
14-15	168	424	778	669	441	095	562	162	915	125
15-16	182	725	191	884	727	267	954	293	961	275
16-17	142	064	439	766	789	772	847	512	983	861
17-18	043	615	467	337	721	745	708	540	076	761
18-19	709	044	359	118	619	933	227	241	264	825
19-20	353	922	964	693	361	396	698	466	835	975
20-21	253	869	226	187	664	645	948	448	108	749
21-22	887	274	896	018	953	087	068	978	854	233
22-23	773	738	687	017	889	178	575	620	464	215
23-24	330	963	322	146	151	429	592	237	119	906

4 août 1942

HEURES GMT

On à 1 h

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	733	958	677	173	649	021	857	209	846	101
1-2	128	196	656	683	360	594	901	172	746	170
2-3	832	773	491	383	260	838	523	955	793	590
3-4	022	821	390	726	214	271	150	099	450	979
4-5	413	827	032	887	766	582	903	269	353	505
5-6	465	295	328	835	968	134	272	712	890	192
6-7	231	627	880	110	986	738	171	327	931	045
7-8	206	533	610	897	221	037	274	253	985	092
8-9	550	285	455	043	368	630	662	419	433	097
9-10	845	322	716	143	549	340	178	432	825	570
10-11	772	460	672	337	409	393	718	190	643	076
11-12	011	496	747	879	938	264	980	392	421	343
12-13	024	696	637	028	609	497	262	767	068	230
13-14	928	223	108	115	164	186	083	503	586	963
14-15	638	601	634	757	808	484	396	794	975	978
15-16	016	612	831	142	926	830	527	015	276	415
16-17	451	983	681	745	436	933	227	144	051	019
17-18	936	728	118	513	389	312	202	085	673	652
18-19	446	722	087	896	698	723	025	430	182	506
19-20	687	293	927	930	770	961	226	283	910	575
20-21	557	292	522	480	788	749	984	588	121	856
21-22	438	093	309	162	401	514	399	965	647	915
22-23	215	053	289	578	463	904	267	906	095	964
23-24				361	233	168	645	275	539	125

5 août 1942

HEURES GMT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
h à 1 h	556	282	391	153	752	524	624	412	131	113
1-2	046	551	633	398	154	559	288	695	149	754
2-3	697	674	819	270	987	872	816	447	461	417
3-4	755	062	326	568	544	885	692	648	626	919
4-5	475	342	169	782	881	678	212	807	437	286
5-6	543	235	595	418	823	914	472	219	502	157
6-7	625	486	160	420	916	525	658	494	174	456
7-8	370	103	646	898	511	364	878	917	704	232
8-9	784	124	740	710	565	341	913	042	057	082
9-10	287	769	183	308	858	795	538	039	563	422
10-11	519	373	240	199	775	774	623	812	765	839
11-12	048	133	510	159	244	175	047	918	435	956
12-13	842	148	796	250	824	894	966	052	255	603
13-14	579	547	075	597	339	689	660	617	973	762
14-15	731	759	363	478	234	628	952	932	147	325
15-16	165	665	751	481	969	031	397	949	077	166
16-17	303	094	805	882	056	213	804	886	891	542
17-18	493	476	584	810	686	517	828	158	713	806
18-19	535	453	330	977	817	473	378	366	596	943
19-20	193	268	229	117	663	537	944	593	850	112
20-21	035	863	188	629	132	902	717	912	859	703
21-22	249	729	498	895	216	651	826	156	981	803
22-23	960	705				388	924	925	365	
23-24	487	811				545	694	546	063	

6 août 1942

HEURES GMT

0 h à 1 h

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11-12

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22-23

23-24

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 h à 1 h	849	315	440	369	589	606	518	332	866	333
1-2	779	354	426	428	653	939	140	296	348	298
2-3	620	027	577	569	574	321	211	860	667	870
3-4	974	462	106	855	650	381	265	742	876	116
4-5	691	561	534	089	622	923	868	422	676	809
5-6	725	375	444	613	224	605	741	038	921	074
6-7	688	073	066	553	033	424	416	284	319	668
7-8	748	871	509	970	254	836	352	167	818	357
8-9	950	359	138	922	379	847	256	581	320	098
9-10	734	470	869	587	243	781	302	427	382	585
10-11	715	619	834	238	431	041	777	865	377	297
11-12	466	471	7	08	312	791	104	018	889	532
12-13	246	261	813	945	151	892	406	504	875	690
13-14	750	441	351	065	145	084	376	237	529	225
14-15	407	485	467	355	566	972	380	111	554	180
15-16	957	721	833	338	971	583	251	615	242	367
16-17	669	361	405	034	323	787	954	778	873	735
17-18	711	279	181	507	848	739	962	081	220	454
18-19	012	657	146	023	709	161	540	621	409	730
19-20	526	536	120	044	798	137	488	429	324	064
20-21	884	883	241	163	102	867	191	490	789	093
21-22	310	059	032	197	404	403	395	552	314	736
22-23				024	439	854	727	187	105	864
23-24					520	562	464	512	176	

7 aout 1942

SECURITY

O n n 1 h

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
0 n n 1 h	217	054	139	408	358	920	317	281	036	737
1-2	443	756	706	608	822	141	907	294	776	528
2-3	670	499	195	753	372	130	350	661	335	198
3-4	666	459	425	402	273	940	394	862	801	909
4-5	699	521	058	123	078	771	908	743	075	155
5-6	611	853	248	911	671	555	445	434	371	258
6-7	263	311	179	580	257	714	602	946	720	345
7-8	049	790	290	088	280	347	362	035	207	384
8-9	607	967	114	785	331	598	616	071	452	135
9-10	374	516	474	841	893	751	266	682	122	210
10-11	815	410	477	888	203	252	245	277	055	560
11-12	501	307	318	7	683	67	642	386	679	301
12-13	707	614	305	304	558	530	802	189	495	573
13-14	334	482	760	096	013	935	531	744	127	644
14-15	349	840	937	126	184	783	346	442	604	205
15-16	086	218	026	236	072	061	185	067	239	820
16-17	948	758	423	201	228	055	344	792	259	548
17-18	194	636	780	109	107	336	851	541	799	576
18-19	458	702	204	208	639	844	515	631	306	468
19-20	797	567	905	976	572	177	091	951	877	899
20-21	786	947	764	136	069	591	837	685	329	316
21-22	641	732	411	843	982	814	278	959	852	029
22-23	079	719	599	492	942	449	479	414	4	89
23-24	763	109	701	385	874	291	356	724	659	684

8 août 1942

FIGURES GMT

0 h à 1 h

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	719	917	732	228	544	494	458	957	474	259
1-2	042	372	797	851	678	345	516	198	219	129
2-3	987	318	914	374	607	909	154	478	885	194
3-4	525	054	155	477	418	822	623	618	358	117
4-5	258	159	199	881	475	135	805	408	384	807
5-6	273	334	193	535	573	762	303	646	629	872
6-7	442	786	744	941	047	420	740	247	370	925
7-8	756	366	782	608	584	189	371	598	160	365
8-9	593	641	625	481	751	498	495	131	075	412
9-10	398	511	823	325	493	049	920	784	063	347
10-11	250	249	035	461	893	568	663	113	774	895
11-12	551	203	916	563	720	680	263	758	611	899
12-13	907	349	252	543	072	898	515	210	801	387
13-14	397	166	882	753	152	966	188	184	546	636
14-15	580	567	952	702	457	537	291	559	270	449
15-16	422	810	763	560	149	287	837	175	335	565
16-17	437	373	232	410	057	724	363	675	858	414
17-18	597	307	626	595	571	560	326	147	542	538
18-19	311	839	402	207	169	077	127	714	499	981
19-20	452	713	299	891	417	239	648	842	754	558
20-21	911	048	286	919	902	737	459	555	679	255
21-22	596	853	082	107	519	710	456	819	157	901
22-23	640	51	356	479	521	604	956	695	013	771
23-24					508	528	447	948	973	086

9 août 1942

HEURES GMT

O H à 1 H

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
533	923	343	047	497	676	880	7799	211	809	
284	045	856	728	455	518	444	355	50	9	096
733	083	677	610	038	101	875	747	332	102	
903	986	938	056	333	890	787	845	027	833	
857	015	389	821	382	099	507	757	688	834	
097	419	202	4	51	038	627	209	144	970	261
980	590	037	440	2406231	260	421	846	407		
716	513	484	866	321	601	897	190	172	462	
958	328	163	352	431	746	621	170	272	849	
173	392	736	033	569	712	504	450	968	979	
879	609	632	748	197	171	416	901	298	838	
360	011	536	730	566	368	836	115	296	491	
496	164	734	225	813	285	864	673	315	128	
223	221	770	867	37	5	051	145	083	534	269
936	974	309	788	622	426	034	110	256	630	
606	104	742	028	87	3	791	295	351	892	726
574	254	427	289	865	216	6	05	140	463	243
041	650	379	557	735	526	691	357	637	023	
587	428	238	413	302	552	323	529	390	5	05
883	106	827	652	871	348	059	220	570	271	
012	876	024	121	577	955	014	848	415	340	
808	180	527	553	251	503	583	312	5	06	808
089	314	002	207	403	025	777	957	588	222	
				508						
				409	401	381	138	313	354	

10 addt 1942

HEURES GMT

O h à 1 H	
	136 752 679 013 524 305 815 113 408 519
1-2	966 423 737 280 039 183 054 663 481 543
2-3	796 805 720 410 969 169 147 075 498 258
3-4	797 143 878 478 806 917 563 189 443 661
4-5	905 453 308 457 785 250 447 479 521 714
5-6	228 886 579 602 301 287 816 069 572 437
6-7	660 112 397 598 604 158 689 948 959 047
7-8	759 388 918 257 877 617 193 528 029 244
8-9	616 644 943 607 783 318 571 210 362 234
9-10	374 371 199 894 707 208 651 820 977 486
10-11	072 872 731 213 703 278 156 799 863 475
11-12	442 595 596 729 803 122 166 245 036 476
12-13	205 510 648 960 035 203 077 273 345 769
13-14	682 560 559 434 568 114 474 412 495 754
14-15	530 573 179 753 046 384 330 398 331 232
15-16	699 304 614 414 422 801 804 674 058 762
16-17	126 086 349 946 175 071 538 317 633 255
17-18	758 288 458 822 626 248 902 207 159 052
18-19	516 819 639 266 807 756 912 127 15 3 624
19-20	671 697 837 366 692 565 350 635 160 525
20-21	790 740 235 776 916 597 8131 204 133 775
21-22	751 882 817 584 139 307 094 782
22-23	201 850 580 411 899 342 459 560 920 240
23-24	515 773 596 346 135 588 611 828 555 342

From HARRISCOM, July 21, 1942

REGULATIONS REGARDING THE NATIONAL HYMN, NATIONAL SONGS, AND SALUTES

Madrid, 20. The "Boletin Oficial del Estado" (Official Gazette) will tomorrow publish a Decree from the Presidency of the Government, consolidating the existing regulations respecting the National Hymn, National Songs, and Salutes. In future it is provided:

Article No. 1. The National Hymn will be the one up to April 14, 1931, known as "Marcha Granadera" to be called "National Hymn" and played at official functions with the solemnity, deference, and respect required by the love of the Mother-Country.

Article No. 2. The National Songs to be received with the consideration, respect and high esteem afforded to them during the Glorious Campaign, will be the hymns "Falange Espanola", "Oriamendi" and "La Legion". At the official functions where they may be played, they will be listened to standing in homage to the Mother-Country and in remembrance of the glorious Spaniards who fell in the Crusade.

Article No. 3. The national salute will be the right arm extended forward in front of the forehead with outstretched, open hand at a height above that of the head.

Article No. 4. During official functions, when the National Flag is carried through the streets, the National Hymn and National Songs will be sung and the people will assume the

position

- 2 -

position of salute.

Article No. 5. Military personnel will salute with the customary military salute.

Article No. 6. During the playing of the National Hymn and National Songs and trooping of the National Flag at acts of a National or popular character attended by the military and civilians, the military will salute with the national salute.

Article No. 7. At individual acts among the military, or at collective acts among the service, of an exclusively military character, the military salute will continue to be used as heretofore, except as provided for to the contrary in the next article.

Article No. 8. Generals, chiefs, officers, and sub-officers, when commanding unarmed forces at displays and ceremonies, will make the national salute. The persons before whom they parade will reply with the same salute, even though belonging to the military.

Article No. 9. The salute to be made by all Army, Navy, and Airforce personnel, when bareheaded, will be the national salute.

Article No. 10. The salute to be made by all chiefs, officers, sub-officers and individuals belonging to the "Milicias de Falange Hispanola Tradicionalista y de la J. O.N.S." will be in all cases the national salute.

July 23, 1942

David W. King, our Consul at Casablanca, reports from a contact that he considers A-1:

German specialists are working on the construction of a submarine base in the island called Isla de Peregil (or Perekhil) west of Punta Leone on the Spanish Moroccan coast west of Ceuta.

The Italians have installed a vice-consulate at Melilla with two military attaches, Commandantes Mondini and Morconi, who are in close contact with Commandante Menor, Chief of Spanish Intelligence Service at Melilla.

Until recently there were two native employees named Monbarek at the Riff Hotel in Tangier. The proprietor dismissed them and they were immediately engaged by the German Consulate. The proprietor of the hotel is said to be anti-German.

A high ranking official of the Japanese Legation in Lisbon, Omdaria Shigeyoshi, recently came from Lisbon to Tangier. He was in Casablanca on the 14th of July, went next day to Marrakesh, where he had a long conference in the Mamounia Hotel with Major Boltze, and returned to Tangier.

13

-2-

on the 16th.

The following members of the German Air
Commission in Algiers are said to have volunteered for ser-
vice at the Russian front: Hans Schwartzmann, Hans (or
Henz) Kehr, and Willy Maitl. Sonnentol, stationed in Mor-
occo, is said also to have volunteered and to be leaving
shortly for the Army.

-2-

on the 16th.

The following members of the German Armistice Commission in Algiers are said to have volunteered for service at the Russian front: Hans Schwartzmann, Hans (or Henz) Kehr, and Willy Maitl. Sonnentol, stationed in Morocco, is said also to have volunteered and to be leaving shortly for the Army.

July 23, 1942

Latest Items of Battle Order

Two battalions of the 6th Regiment of Tirailleurs Marocaine have been moved from Casablanca to the Fedala district:

1 is stationed at Pont-Blondin

1 is stationed in Fedala itself, in sheds.

One platoon of the third Spahis from Meknes has been moved to the woods northeast of Fedala, near the railroad. (This platoon should include about 50 men)

There are also some elements of artillery, making a total of 1,800 men in the Fedala district.

The bombardment group of Rabat is at Sale. The pursuit group is still at Rabat but out of the 30 planes only 20 can fly. They are working on the aviation field at Sale and have built a fourth hangar.

July 24, 1942

Through certain A-1 contacts it is reported that the Germans are extremely worried about a Spanish Royalist movement in Spanish Morocco. Officers are Royalists, soldiers communists, and both elements are against Franco. The Germans consider that this might be the beginning and place for a second front in Africa and/or Europe. If this movement gets under way they would have to intervene through the Pyrenees and Spanish Morocco.

15

COPY

July 1942

MEMORANDUM

For Mr. Murphy and Colonel W. A. Eddy, from Vice Consul King.

An Al contact reports as follows:

At a recent meeting of a section of the S.O.L. (Service d'Ordre de la Legion) in Rabat, the man sent to address them was very much embarrassed because he was obliged to explain to the meeting that the Germans had never promised to liberate prisoners in exchange for workmen. He said that Laval had merely stated that he hoped that the flow of French workers to Germany might persuade the Germans to liberate some prisoners. In any case, he went on to explain, if the Germans did liberate French prisoners, it would be on the basis of 4 prisoners for 10 workmen.

The leader of the section thereupon rose and resigned his leadership and membership in the Legion. He was followed up in his resignation by 17 out of the 53 members of the section. The next day, however, they received what amounted to an order from General Fougere, Chief of the S.O.L., to withdraw their resignations, and the leader was instructed to make a speech saying that he had not understood the matter fully when he resigned.

There is also a certain growing feeling in the Legion that the commanders of the S.O.L. should be the first ones to volunteer for service in the Legion Tricolore on the Russian front. Up to the time of writing, there has been no rally rush on the part of the S.O.L. to form themselves into a spearhead to point out the road to glory.

Another contact, Al confirms the foregoing but tells of three members of the S.O.L. in Rabat.

Dr. LeLoutre (one of the S.O.L. commanders)
Dr. Paget
Dr. Marney.

-2-

who have actually volunteered to join the Legion Tricolore. It may be added that these men are confronted with a certain amount of personal and domestic troubles, but even so, it is doubted whether they will get any further than the station.

David W. King

COPY

July 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Mr. Murphy and Colonel Eddy, from Vice Consul King

An AI contact (official) reports that the canning factory Sefan at Fedala is canning corned beef in 300-gramme cans sent by the Germans. The cans bear no indication of origin, merely the words "Boeuf Assaisonne - 300 grammes" marked in red on the can. This stuff is shipped to France from Casablanca, not Fedala.

The cold storage depot at Casablanca is full of mutton carcasses (10,000) and has asked the Fedala cold storage depot to take some of them. Meanwhile brokers are busy buying up meat throughout Morocco for refrigeration purposes. These carcasses are destined for shipment to France.

Apparently the canning at Fedala is not progressing altogether efficiently, as my contact saw the tins mentioned above when a foreman brought in a batch of them to the manager, pointing out that the meat had gone bad and that the tins were ready to burst. Let us hope for the worst and pray for ptomaine.

s/ David W. King

17

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Tunis, Tunisia
July 22, 1942

American Naval Attache,
American Legation,
Tangier, Morocco.

Sir:

Reference is made to the code and explanations in French, of meteorological broadcasts of North Africa sent to your office with copy of despatch No. 250 dated June 17, 1942.

There are enclosed two copies of supplementary code for the month of August 1942. It will be noted that the figures in the horizontal code are changed four times a day. The first column after the date represents the hour and the first line, for example, is used between midnight and 5:59 A.M. G.M.T., the second line serves from 6:00 A.M. until 11:59 A.M., etc.

A change has been made in the usual indicator groups at the beginning and end of the message (see Paragraph I "Formes des Messages" of despatch No. 250). Instead of beginning with three groups of 5 X's each, the message now begins with one group of 5 X's, a second with one X three numbers and X, and the third with a group of 5 X's.

The figures in the middle group are made up as follows:

The first figure represents the number of the group in the horizontal code chosen for starting. The last two figures represent the number chosen from the vertical code for starting. For example:

On August 1, the third group of horizontal is taken, and the ninth number in the vertical code.

This.

2

This would give X 309 X. For coding and decoding purposes, therefore, these lines begin 25862 and 7668917 respectively. One begins with these figures, proceeds to end of line and then starts back at the beginning of the line.

Very truly yours,

H. A. Doolittle
American Consul

Enclosures:

2 copies of code as stated

VERTICAL CODE

AUGUST

1	67564	46576	68917	21314	51686
2	76857	56747	46573	36574	34253
3	67463	36576-	57696	47515	57685
4	56453	67654	54322	47555	46573
5	65768	68796	45463	36472	26475
6	54635	36475	57686	57463	35243
7	67586	57685	46355	36574	37586
8	65342	26574	47586	57686	46573
9	78878	78786	78756	46575	57674
10	54635	36574	26574	36452	26574
11	78695	46574	47583	26574	35462
12	67564	47581	35342	26574	46352
13	76876	77875	64557	49129	27465
14	56453	36472	26475	46372	26581
15	76586	57684	35462	27465	57685
16	54635	36574	47586	46573	36462
17	54321	97847	67564	74657	35761
18	67654	87465	46574	35243	35462
19	76542	75666	46311	21855	15761
20	19871	87165	51312	21415	51687
21	54756	57686-	46573	36472	27564
22	76675	46573	36574	35242	26475
23	61912	91475	47583	36477	57684

-2-

AUGUST

24	67515	57684	48518	57683	26453
25	67564	35342	26574	35462	26574
26	62493	36475	57681	46574	45362
27	54885	27486	57611	68717	46573
28	67581	46475	35342	26475	57465
29	64532	26574	47581	68709	34756
30	65746	46573	26473	26574	26472
31	56524	36574	47586	67686	67678

HORIZONTAL CODE AUGUST 1942

1	0	89104	46573	26332	47595	55462
	6	57646	25463	26574	27414	57596
	12	81090	57688 -	68797	46453	51029
	17	54639	23574	26473	26475	51606
2	0	67109	47564	35462	26475	57616
	6	61050	58686	67685	26473	26575
	12	67853	54940	26473	25354	46575
	17	56454	25494	50603	50606	57685
3	0	78181	68796	26473	26505	45463
	6	65453	26574	57686	57616	56454
	12	67810	46352	27585	59607	57585
	17	54342	27565	57696	57616	68576
4	0	69010	09846	47505	67583	26477
	6	56453	26575	46574	48494	57606
	12	67586	46452	26475	51066	58616
	17	54342	27516	47505	92024	47583
5	0	58106	57615	45352	29040	51606
	6	43522	28050	41506	26374	26390
	12	78100	80174	47574	25803	47585
	17	67465	30353	57616	57686	41055
6	0	78190	78475	26362	21059	46575
	6	53622	41050	58676	46577	46272
	12	67190	47577	59066	57682	41055

-2-

	17	58352	21046	50607	50607	30406
7	0	78102	47516	47583	69028	47563
	6	59483	27516	48586	51066	47266
	12	68109	35453	27515	51096	56463
	17	65433	26455	50607	57616	56466
8	0	69040	57616	56463	27386	50607
	6	54823	47577	51066	50600	70685
	12	76564	71055	46352	26574	40506
	17	61506	46475	46366	27515	49050
9	0	47515	57382	27495	47514	24590
	6	71090	53422	67435	35463	21040
	12	75616	46563	35462	26466	59150
	17	54243	41050	58696	46474	35442
10	0	81040	53615	46372	26477	51066
	6	56263	47516	47586	41050	57386
	12	67101	67109	46352	26475	51067
	17	46563	26477	37516	47586	46263
11	0	67586	46362	41050	57684	35463
	6	78190	35402	48166	57901	24353
	12	59090	46575	59067	58192	30406
	17-	76465	25352	46595	41050	57686
12	0	54636	26475	51607	46595	35452
	6	67586	46575	41506	57686	56464

-4-

	17	49050	57615	25490	49585	89798
18	0	41059	56263	41059	46572	41029
	6	58108	67190	26574	51617	49120
	12	69102	45362	26591	57612	89212
	17	46572	21506	50607	51607	98282
19	0	67514	45243	41059	81212	46573
	6	56462	21405	50607	70802	59020
	12	71605	47582	50499	51477	45352
	17	46572	51607	46563	26573	58616
20	0	71605	26473	36646	41514	51516
	6	51612	41516	51614	41214	59600
	12	59607	40507	20507	20506	36473
	17	69102	47511	51614	21475	46573
21	0	91040	51614	27514	46352	41055
	6	64757	68586	46463	27514	46463
	12	81403	21405	57685	45352	41009
	17	57614	35352	40586	47595	51211
22	0	71506	66453	27514	41059	46572
	6	46514	35253	41506	46573	21055
	12	56253	51500	61797	51617	41576
	17	61203	46572	46362	41503	27514

-5-

23	0	67514	26472	41506	98273	48572
	6	81514	26473	27516	49186	41516
	12	58615	41516	51607	28959	47562
	17	61203	46574	27151	58617	814548
24	0	81514	41513	21516	68514	46453
	6	57615	26475	58617	41516	47722
	12	81506	46473	26475	51617	57589
	17	75141	26473	27516	59617	60502
25	0	67151	46573	47515	58615	26352
	6	65342	41505	59607	78132	41576
	12	76542	41516	57685	46352	41900
	17	81046	47586	46352	27516	49105
26	0	76452	47564	51607	47563	26475
	6	78511	47588	61503	27583	46473
	12	53433	41059	57685	46362	51505
	17	71605	57564	46577	51607	35342
27	0	81415	57466	41516	51612	49505
	6	90405	65746	46572	41596	59204
	12	77656	46511	61517	26375	47562
	17	77656	46511	61517	26375	47562
	17	76401	51607	46452	47564	41506

-6-

28	0	81405	46572	41506	46450	57564
	6	64535	21415	58676	47577	58869
	12	75756	46574	28415	46352	36454
	17	76810	59616	51617	47277	41516
29	0	81605	46573	26514	51607	46577
	6	64756	35243	41506	57686	57685
	12	64775	57615	41588	67576	46362
	17	76453	21506	57684	46362	41516
30	0	90465	54620	41506	47277	41514
	6	65743	41506	57615	46253	41312
	12	81605	46253	41516	51617	49589
	17	91415	26473	41577	51616	48473
31	0	76453	21405	65744	51511	71717
	6	81504	35452	46572	46513	51516
	12	65145	51687	68516	56663	21405
	17	71504	26413	57576	41506	46572

AVIATION AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS -SIMULTANEOUS EXPERIMENTS-

1. Every important offensive operation of the kind that the Allies can undertake for the creation of a "second front" places the command in a dilemma: either to start the affair at the beginning on a large scale and expose oneself to a catastrophe in case of a set-back, or to set on foot only a limited operation with the idea of increasing it in case of success, and thus give warning to the defenders who would finally repel well enough attempts which, if launched simultaneously, would have succeeded. The choice is particularly delicate when one disposes only of troops not yet accustomed to war, and of a command which also needs some previous experience in order to perfect itself.

There is set forth below a principle for directing the operation which is applicable to the greater part of the operations conceivable and which offers the security of previous experimentation without giving the defense time to adapt itself. One should not, truly speaking, qualify the method of previous experiments; it is the case of actually continuing the experiment which will permit the stopping, developing, or transforming the operation undertaken according to the results.

2. When one has enormous means such as those that America and Great Britain will be able to throw against their

(E)

their adversaries on the Western front, any offensives could succeed. There is no strategical plan so naive or undertaken by tactical methods so poor, that one could not anticipate success from the moment that it is new. One can hardly expect an acknowledgment of lack of intellectual power on the part of the Allied Command such as not to be able to provide something new when any scenario or gag writer succeeds in providing it for the cinema public.

All the great German offensives of 1914-18, (however different had been the beliefs of their authors) at their beginnings, and have even obtained the desired results (Serbia, Rumania, Russia) with the exception of those which set on foot against the French-British front and that of Italy. All embodied the same new idea. Why did the initial success of the latter transform itself into a setback? For the simple reason that their authors, insufficiently confident in the virtue of the novelty found themselves so surprised by the importance of initial success that they did not know how to exploit it, or they attempted it much too late. Von Moltke, from Charleroi to the Marne, was incapable of directing the armies which advanced much too fast for his commanding abilities. The success of the first days of the offensive against Verdun surprised Falkenhayn and the subordinate commanders to the point that it allowed the French command to react at a point where, a few days earlier, there only were lines of communication and posts without garrison. Caporetto was a similar case. The German command a success of an extent so disproportionate to that weak strength which was set aside for it and it was not until much later, and too late, that it occurred to it to launch an offensive from

- 5 -

the Trentin which it should logically have completed. All the offensives of 1918 of Ludendorff on the western front had the same characteristics of an un hoped success in the first few days, such as a break in the Franco-English pivot at the beginning of the operation against Amiens, of the depth of the break-through on the Chemin-des-Dames and of a later exploitation much too late on the flanks of the pocket.

One will recall simply from this enumeration that in all the German operations, which had at least one new idea each time, either strategical or tactical, such as the wing manoeuvre of Schlieffen, the attempt at "bleeding" the French army under the shower of the Falkenhayn's artillery, of the break-through of the Ludendorff type, the novel idea resulted in that which the most optimistic people could have hoped for. But the results obtained were only very insufficiently exploited.

The conduct of the operations, on the Allied side, confirms this conclusion, since the only new idea, that offensives successively reduplicated, each one being limited to the only beneficial opening phase at the beginning, had fully succeeded in 1918. If all the Allied offensives from August 1914 to the end of 1917 failed, it was because it was truly impossible to find in any of them the least shadow of a new idea.

The great superiority of German command in the war of 1939, over that of 1914, was precisely this intensive exploitation of the initial success without an interval or pause. Success during the greater part of the time in Poland, Norway, on the western front and in the Balkans, had certainly

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- 4 -

surpassed the hopes of the German command. But the latter had never given his adversary the time to recover, and only in the U. K. S. S. that it found its equal.

The success of any new idea in military art is a very comforting conclusion for the future Anglo-American undertakings if the commands of the two countries at least wish to do their adversaries the honor of the new idea, which the Germans or Japanese abundantly lavished upon it during the time of their success.

3. Through being used, every new military idea becomes old and the adversary ends by finding a defense for it.

However, well organized were the offensives of the Ludendorff, the French command in the end found a defensive to counter it on the second line, which stopped the last one of these that of Champagne in July 1918. By succeeding in making break-throughs by means of armored divisions and assault squadrons, the German command of 1941-42 in the end saw the latter changed into battles of the type of Moscow of Voronezh. By repeatedly ^{ing} in one archipelago after another new embarkations each time successfully, the Japanese command were finally stopped at Iwo Jima or at Midway. This is the sign that they must look for something else.

If the offensive succeeds in the beginning and ends by encountering a defense in the end, it is of the highest interest for the prudent command to determine, in as exact a manner as possible, the length of time during which the new ideas keep their efficiency.

- 5 -

On looking over the events, one is led to some optimism.

First of all each of the interested parties must make his own individual experiments. Even though an offensive of the type of Ludendorf might be tried successively against the Russians, Italians, English and French, without anyone doubting that he would be able to parry it, without having to change his methods, the breaking of the Polish front and the subsequent dislocation of the Polish armies taught nothing to the French command. The same adventure in France taught nothing to the Russian command. Unfortunately, this resource lacks in military action towards Germany whose Allies one has no interest to undertake to reduce one at a time.

But each command is itself a long time in understanding. Ludendorf took two years to understand the menace of the tank, the Franco-British army of 1918 took four months to find a defense for the attack of the Ludendorf type. It required several months for the St. Nazaire affair, in order that the German command of 1942 to decide for a defense on the western front, which would leave but little hope of success for future attempts of the commandos.

Maybe it would be careless to always count on this kind of lapse of time. In any case it is easy to have an idea of the minimum period of maturity of a new idea: it is that which is required for the reports, of the discussion of the chances of success, of the setting, of the distribution and putting into effect of operations which should counter the new attacking method. Whatever may be the consideration of the chiefs and of those who execute orders in all cases, the

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German military command, by its own means, is just as incapable as others of a rapid reply to a new means of attack; it will require at least a few days before understanding and means before reacting.

5. The great use of aviation as a means of transport opens in this connection possibilities, which up to the present have not been made use of. The airplane permits of experimentation on a small scale with a new method of attack, and to extend it, within a few days or even hours, to dimensions of an operation on a grand scale, alone capable in itself of deciding a war.

As a matter of fact, these possibilities are not entirely new and the speed of transportation by land and sea, motorized columns and speedy ships, have already brought to light important ones. But the airplane, by its very speed, and by that other just as important factor, which is its operating range, lends itself much better than the tank or the vedette to operations of this type.

The speed of transportation by air permits, within theaters of operations as extensive as Europe or Africa, to set down, in two or three hours, an expeditionary force in Norway or on the Basque coast in Tripolitania or the French Sudan, and expect report of the results obtained in a couple of hours, renewing the same operation five or six times in 24 hours. Not even to be amount sets the limit for the repetitions realizable, nothing prevents one from having several air expeditions simultaneously, all taking off on an order given within the hour and setting for them at the same instant by radio one or two of the three objectives for which they were not prepared.

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The present range of operation of transport by air (since this is only progress recently attained, the possibilities of which the materiel of 1939 was not adapted to) increases the distances of the expeditions leaving from the same base of departure. From any field in the British Isles one may just as well deliver troops in Norway as on the Basque coast, especially if one takes into consideration refueling in Scotland or in Cornwall; from Tobruk one may just as well set on foot an operation by air against the Rommel at Tobruk, against Tripolitania or against the French Sudan.

The most essential character of air land operations is to deposit the expeditionary force on the desired objective itself and not at a distance at which it must cover at the expense of overcoming the reaction of the defending forces. If one wishes to occupy Holland, one would not have to cross hundreds of kilometers of flooded territory but to land directly in the suburbs of Rotterdam. For all operations where the immediate success is not absolutely certain, this property may be put to profit by the quick setting up of a line of communications or of retreats: one should land not only on the final point of the expedition but also on the road which will serve to supply it or use it for its withdrawal. These landing points should be successive, or better still, successive and in rapid succession, so as to be able to interrupt or divert it should the need arise.

None of the possibilities which have just been set forth have been taken advantage of by the German command during the war. The speed of transport and the extreme rapidity of execution of their action by the landed troops has not been

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used for the development of the operation according to the results obtained. Range of operation of undertakings has always been limited and finally the creation of lines of communication and of retreat which is an essential factor for the security of such undertakings and of the exploitations of the first successes has never been attempted. The German command has depended quite strongly on the certainty of the successes depending upon the slowness of the adversary's understanding and counter-movements on the part of the adversary but at the same time has limited to undertakings which cannot be considered as other than as the earliest steps in this field of air landings.

The opening phase of the Norwegian affair where landings were limited to the principal ports was thoroughly justified; one could count on the capitulation of the Norwegian Government without it being necessary to cover the Norwegian mountains with hundreds of thousand of parachutists. But, once the resistance of Norway made itself felt and the Franco-British landings were being openly prepared, it is not understood why air landings was not made use of for building lines of communication from Oslo toward the North Coast instead of the slow driving back of Norwegian resistance toward the North.

The landings at Middelthun, widening the break in the German front in May 1940 was the operation which was planned which was being considering. They were planned because the German front had given away before launching the main attack, one is aware vaguely of the desire of constituting ^{an} interrupted lines from Middelthun to the north of the Somme; finally to the spectator accustomed

to

- 9 -

be the speed of the progress of offensives of 1914-18, appeared like the very pattern of "Blitzkrieg". Could anyone have done better?

Certainly, and even while directing the operation with as much care as the German command did. The success of the break-through by means of tanks as that of the air landings was certain; nevertheless, they were obliged to confirm it and only follow it up after these first successes. But this could have been done much faster. The goal aimed at was the formation of the Southern hold of the fortifications which was intended to close upon the armies of Belgium by the occupation of the ports at Boulogne, Calais, and as far as Dunkirk. The occupation of these centers could have been obtained successively by air landings in less than 24 hours, once the break-through by tanks was assured.

The downfall met with serious resistance in view of the fact that the column of tanks sent from Abbeville toward Boulogne. After many days of waiting further found there two British battalions with an abundant anti-tank artillery which they had had time to expedite from England. The result would have been entirely different: it was the surrounding of the British expeditionary force and not that of driving it into the sea at Dunkirk, and it would have been a few days later, England falling before the German parachutists.

6. There will be examined below several possible applications of the air landings in different operations, of which certain ones have been the object of previous studies.

The first is the occupation of French Africa and Tripolitania operating from bases of departure from Gibraltar

to

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to Malta, passing by way of British Gambia and Nigeria... However positive one might be of the success of an operation by means of air landings over all the interior of territory struck at by dividing the defense forces into three parts; Dakar, Morocco and Egypt it is prudent to undertake such an operation according to a schedule which will assure the at every juncture the line of communication and retreat of the fighting troops.

This may be arrived at by launching the landing forces in a form of "columns" occupying successively the zone which is assigned to them and which may be limited or diverted if something should occur. Each element of the column is set down in the position which he must keep, he is passed by the elements of the column which has to occupy points further away. The whole group then becomes organized itself on the ground in a line which later the heavy materiel and supplies transported by plane would follow and which might in case of need serve as a line of retreat with the assistance moreover of air transport for evacuation if the latter should become necessary for evacuation. The order of departure of the elements of the expedition should be the same as that of the advancement for the column of short length, this would represent a reversed order for the column of long length. For example, to separate Algeria from Morocco by occupying the line of Fort Nemours, Oryda, Bou Arfa, Colomb-Béchar, one could send from Gibraltar, in such order, a series of detachments which would have as their destinations these different centers. But, if one wished to launch from Nigeria,

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a point in the same direction by way of Mamey, Gao, Naggan, Adeny, Sidi del Abbis, it would be preferable to have leave first the detachments which have the most distant destination quite susceptible of being recalled if those whose destinations are nearer who have left later and landed earlier (?), should encounter difficulties.

The occupation of the Iberian Peninsula would be directed along the same lines. There again it would seem advantageous to partition off the force of the defense by laying hands on the principal routes of penetration, in such a way as to rapidly occupy the center of the peninsula and the provinces where one would expect to find the least opposition (Catalogne and the Basque country) and to wait on the defensive side for a theoretical counter-attack by the forces which one has not considered useful (or prudent) to reduce at first.

These penetration routes would be occupied by successive air landings following one after another at intervals in a single night. One would not undertake, for example, to send up the classical way of penetration, in the valley of the Tagus, a motorized column, which would have been landed at Lisbon; one would, on the contrary, set down successively in the entire valley detachments from Lisbon to Toledo. If one encountered no resistance one could push the latter forward to Madrid; if one should be stopped, one would make an abrupt limit to penetration the point where the halt took place, and turn it aside toward other objectives, elements which were susceptible of being isolated.

The expeditions of the "commando" type taken at short distances (neutral frontiers of Switzerland, Sweden, Unoccupied

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could equally be directed advantageously along the same lines. The simplest conception consists in landing, at an immediate vicinity of the neutral frontier chosen, a detachment of troops which would organize itself on the defensive and would send out several "raids" for the purposes of destruction in their surrounding country. The result realized from the expedition, its security, and the distance toward which its destruction could be extended might be augmented by slicing them up into several parts.

One would begin by landing near the neutral frontier chosen, that part of the forces which one would consider necessary for handling it. If it does not meet with any serious opposition, an hour later, for example, one could land the first men of the "raids" in the way chosen about every fifteen kilometers. They will continue to prolong in the same way to about 50 or 100 kms the raids which are most successful. Economizing, therefore, on these raids half of the route to travel. They will only have to carry out the destruction and then to retreat, in the center of an occupied zone, instead of the risky operation which consists of destroying by crossing an alarmed country.

Finally, the operation, which consisted of a partial or complete occupation of Germany by stopping in the West on the Siegfried line and by pushing itself slowly Eastward after the complete destruction, may be directed in the same way. It is different operations which proceed in this way that it can achieve, depending on the reaction found, either to a complete and definitive occupation or just simple destruction raids. The first landing, will be partly made in Denmark.

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and partly in the neighborhood of the Swiss frontier, these forces will not have to take the task of marching toward the interior of Germany but simply to organize a base with a field for flying, for gathering and reembarking again in case of an attack, the largest number possible of engaged forces. The penetration into Germany will be made, leaving from these bases by successive air disembarkments in different directions. They will advance there where they will meet with the least resistance and will organize themselves in such a way as to repulse any counter-attacks. The attempts of these groups which meet with serious opposition will be transformed into simple destruction raids.

COPY

May 12, 1942

ORGANIZATION OF RESISTANCE GROUPS

RADES - Group of 80 men under command of retired army officer who can take possession of the munition depot at the port of Rades as well as the munitions and arms belonging to the Municipality (twenty-five Lebel with cartridges)

HAMMAM-LIF - Group of ten under orders of X, but not organized.

MEDJEZ-EL-BAB - Group of about 800 among which is a town group composed of twelve Europeans (4 non-coms and 8 soldiers) and some natives; Cousin's group composed of 60 natives already organized among whom are 5 veterans and 2 non-coms (French) material 5 Lebel and 4000 cartridges; one group Y including 3 Europeans and 30 natives and one group Z about same strength as Y. 3 Groups of Europeans and natives distributed between Medjez-El-Bab and Testour.

1 group at Montamard

1 group at Ksar Tir - native group without Europeans on a native's property.

2 Groups at Testour European and natives who know the location of arms and munition depots in the region.

OUED ZARGA - 1 group of between 40 and 50 on the farms of two French colonists.

GOUBELLAT - 1 group identical with that of Oued Zarga.

BOU ARADA - Strong French group of 25 can raise strong native group as well as a group at El Aroussa.

KEF - A group can be formed here but so far there is no chief.

SILIANA - Two groups of 80 Europeans and natives.

GAFFOUR - One group of 40 -50 Europeans.

-2-

- LE KRIB - Two groups of between 40 and 50 Europeans on the property of a French colonist.
- BAJA - One group, the same as Le Krib, but nothing in the town itself.
- TABARKA - Group to be formed shortly.
- KELIBIA - Group of Europeans with native workers including Forestry and Customs Service men.
- BIZERTA - Formation of a group being studied. It may be formed among the colonial infantry by its former chief who is on the spot.

NOTE: All these groups would be under the control of the "Bear" who also says that he can take Bizerta alone and hold it for twelve hours providing we can land 5,000 marines and 2000 anti-tank guns with ammunition. He can supply gun crews for these guns, his reason for the last demand is that he would expect immediate tank drive from the South. He will let us know caliber of guns required next week. Although he did not specify aeroplanes, he probably takes it for granted that we would send sufficient planes and anti-aircraft guns to protect such a landing.

(for noms-de-plume see attached list)

C
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April 10, 1942

Colonel W. A. Eddy

Personal and Confidential

Dear Colonel:

There are a number of matters which it is believed that we should advise you in reference to the order for communications equipment for North Africa which you forwarded through to us first by telegram and later by letters. The telegram was badly mutilated and the letters gave us more information. The outstanding point is that the list was evidently prepared by an individual who of course did not know American standards and possibly was not himself a technical man. For this reason we had to use our own judgment as to what type of American apparatus would best fit the requirement although we did not know just how the apparatus was to be used.

As an example, in the case of dry cell batteries the voltage specified are not American standard and we are therefore substituting American batteries which will give somewhere near the voltage required, in all cases slightly over, because it would take a year to build them to their standard if we could get the permission. Practically all of this equipment is on the highly restricted list and consists of material which is badly needed by the military forces.

Your last letter dated March 25 and addressed to Colonel Donovan included a list of material in which some changes were noted. It was particularly noted that considerable change from the original list was made in the question of "Accumulateurs type Cadmium-nickel". This required that we call for new bids. We are substituting the Edison nickel-iron battery because that is the only

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one made here on this type. The only difference is that the electrolyte is slightly different from that used in the French batteries but the electrolyte will be shipped along with the batteries so there will be no difficulty there. I note that in the last revised list you forwarded on March 25 the quantity of dry batteries was reduced. This appears more reasonable to us. I note one change in your list of batteries. It formerly called for 80 volts - OAO50 while your latest list designated that as 80 volts - OAO15. This makes it the same battery as the list immediately below which was rated at 80 volts - OAO20. We have corrected our list so we hope this is not a typographical error.

In the case of the vacuum tubes ordered, we can obtain most of them with the exception of the types 11-C-5, 11-F-6, 11-J-7, and the PH 60 and the so-called TM types. These latter are absolutely unknown here and we have no way of substituting other tubes because undoubtedly the bases would be different even if we knew the tube characteristics.

The specifications for radio transmitters in some cases is very vague, particularly the 500 watt and the 200 watt transmitters. We wired you for further information but the replies were also somewhat vague although I am taking it for granted that these two types of transmitters will be used for both telephone and telegraph and will be for short waves only. We may have to substitute a 100 watt transmitter for the 200 watt size because it will take months to have such transmitters constructed, even by substitution there is considerable delay in delivery of this type of equipment. In the case of "Ondulateurs" in which you specify Creed, these are not manufactured in the United States and we have been unable to get information from England so we will substitute an American type that performs the same function.

There is some confusion here in the case of "Postes de TSE de campagne emetteurs recepteurs d'une portee de 10 Kms. couvrant la gamme des 5 Km". We interpret this to mean that you want a field transmitter-receiver that would cover 10 kilometers on 5 meters. There is no such set in existence but we are substituting somewhat different

which will do about half that distance on somewhat different wave length. In this item also they ask for 10 sets of spare "lamps". This is unreasonable because the tubes last a long while so we are sending along the usual U.S. Army spare parts which will probably be about 3 tubes.

We are concentrating only on items which are marked "10 Command" because this in itself is a tremendous order and will come to about a million dollars in value. The other items can be taken up later and are of course duplicates of the first shipment although in larger quantity.

Some of the equipment will not be exactly according to your specifications, either in weight or size, but we have had to make this sacrifice in order to get any equipment at all. It seemed unreasonable to worry about dimensions and weights in standardized equipment which could not be changed in any case to meet such standards, as an example vacuum tubes. Also some apparatus, such as "Tele-imprimeurs" must have motors designed for the power available and these depend upon synchronized operation. You answered my telegram and we will take care of that.

The big problem is in getting deliveries. There is none of this apparatus on the shelf and everything must be built on order and that involves all kinds of priority questions, scarcity of certain materials, bottlenecks in parts, etc. but please feel assured we are using every means at our disposal to obtain the best deliveries possible. Additional information will be forwarded you in this regard.

I thought it best to write this letter so that you could get a picture of how we were working and the problems which came up. In the event of future orders it is very desirable whenever requisitions are made up on technical equipment that an expert in that particular line give all the information possible so that we can find a substitute which will fit the need. As an instance, every voltage and power requirement on the batteries in your list was not American standard. Therefore we had to use our own judgment and unless we have a fair amount of information as to the uses to which this apparatus is to be put we might make serious mistakes. You state in your letter that

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you have "one longe-range set (Mark III here with me)". This means nothing to us unless we know that "Mark III" is U. S. Navy, Army, or perhaps it might even be British or other designation. In every case where we are sending you apparatus it will be equipment that is not experimental, but simple and well proven equipment. This is being done because we realize the rough use it will probably receive.

Sincerely,

C. W. Horn
Technical Adviser

P. S. We are accepting your last list included in the letter of March 25 as the correct list. We noted the changes in the specifications on batteries, both storage and dry cells, as well as the change in quantities. We hope that these changes are not typographical errors and any reference to your order should be based on this last list as being the correct one.

CWH

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: F. Canfield
 To: Colonel Goodfellow
 SUBJECT: Summary of Colonel Eddy's letter of March 3, 1942 to Colonel Donovan.

1. Reference Telegrams 9 to 12 Inclusive

Explanation given that these telegrams are a preliminary requisition for delivery in the very near future. The original full French text for requisitions is enclosed.

French leaders (referred to in Murphy's Despatch No. 1131 attached, and having his full confidence as well as Eddy's) offer to pay for first shipment and are prepared to arrange with naval officers to transfer the cargo at sea to French vessel, but Eddy suggests other means to be used. He can arrange for reception and distribution of material at any time it can be delivered.

2. Consul Doolittle's Letter from Tunis

Eddy requests immediate telegraphic reply:

- a) Whether Colonel Donovan approves encouraging Tunisian Palace Revolution as outlined in Doolittle's letter and;
- b) If no, whether \$20,000 or \$30,000 could be promised for the undertaking.

Letter of Consul Doolittle dated February 25th to Colonel Eddy proposes:

- a) To influence by bribery a number of members of the family of the Bey (aged 84 years) to unseat the present pro-French prime minister by family pressure on the Bey, and to replace him by one known to be pro-American and pro-British;
- b) If this is successful, to influence the Bey to demand at least a week for consideration of decrees before signing and either to withhold signature or to introduce changes in the laws to safeguard interests of Tunisian people, thereby preventing supplies now being poured out of local Arab producers from going to Libya.

C
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Y

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Naval Attache'

Tangier, Morocco.

March 19, 1942

Dear Colonel Donovan,

Here is the war-plan of Robin Hood, which he and his chief of staff talked over with me in Casablanca March 14. Strictly speaking I have authority only to transmit the page headed "Cas II".

I don't want to cross-up Murphy from whom the State Department will hear directly. This is just for your information.

Note the final page - evidence of a counter-organization to deliver N. Africa to the Axis. We need speed. Time is short.

Respectfully,

/s/ W. A. Eddy

SECRET

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*This was prepared by
a Prop. 2 French Staff
officer in Algiers* March 13, 1942
Page 2

In a preceding note we indicated, together with priorities and delivery dates, the needs of the Army to be satisfied during the first month in equipment, supplies and specialists in the event that French North Africa should re-take its freedom of action and the struggle on the side of the Allies.

We had also indicated that this hypothesis could not be envisaged unless the following conditions were fulfilled:

- a) Preliminary destruction or at least fixation of the Axis armored forces in Libya.
- b) Initiative or at least consent of a leader of high rank and unquestioned authority (General Weygand) taking advantage of the favorable political circumstances.
- c) Action launched at the favorable moment in taking the initiative to forestall the enemy and avoid and defeat his reactions.
- d) Aero-naval supremacy of the Allies in the Mediterranean not mentioned but tacitly assumed.

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These conditions being met, it was admitted that the liberating operation in North Africa could be executed with very weak military support from the outside, estimated at:

1 to 2 armored divisions in Morocco, depending upon reinforcements which the Spaniards or the Germans could have brought into their Moroccan zone at the moment of the operation;

100 anti-aircraft artillery batteries;

Air reinforcements (enumerated elsewhere).

" " " " "

The unfavorable evolution of the situation necessitates the revision of these estimates.

In Libya the Axis forces, considerably reinforced, have the initiative; they preserve great freedom of action and maintain communications with Italy.

In the Mediterranean, the Allies have lost aero-naval supremacy; they have suffered reverses in Cyrenaica and serious defeats in the Far East.

These reverses, exploited by propaganda, disturb the people and the Army; they arouse caution in the leaders.

-2-

who would have the courage to face the risks of a liberating action in North Africa. The least one can say is that opinion is not presently favorable to an action of this kind which would be considered a veritable adventure.

This state of mind and the political situation which it engenders oblige us to plan for an important increase in the initial outside support, this support having in effect to make it possible:

On the one hand to set up a favorable command and to reassure opinion by a massive display of force;

On the other hand to defeat Axis reactions and to take the place momentarily of French forces whose modernization risks being delayed by the necessary cleaning out of the Communists.

In view of the present situation, we shall examine the following points:

- A - preliminary conditions to be fulfilled;
- B - intervention forces for which to plan in French North Africa;

C - general methods of intervention;

D - use of intervention forces and initial French possibilities.

-4-

A. The Preliminary Conditions to be fulfilled by the Allies:

a) To fix absolutely by an action starting from Egypt, Axis forces in Libya so that they cannot even temporarily detach armored forces to French North Africa. Fixation is a minimum which must end at the earliest in destruction.

b) To recapture aero-naval supremacy in the Western Mediterranean even assuming a hostile intervention of the French navy.

c) To have available a reserve of forces and tonnage as well as equipment to guard against the unexpected and to act with certainty.

d) To be ready to furnish French North Africa in the requested time limits the technicians, equipment and supplies indicated in Note No. 1.

B. Intervention Forces for which to plan in French North Africa:

The necessary land forces can be estimated as follows:

7 motorized divisions

5 armored brigades (700 to 800 tanks)

120 anti-aircraft batteries (half of small calibre for defense of the landing zones.

Corresponding services.

-5-

These forces should be provided with necessary supplies for a month.

Ammunition

Fuel

Food supplies (wheat, canned goods, sugar, tea, coffee)

Spare parts

Camp tents

Sanitary and medical supplies (vaccines, anaesthetics, bandages, surgical supplies)

Coal (see Note No. 1)

Details concerning air forces for which to plan will be given elsewhere later.

However, to insure the covering of the landings, requirements can be estimated immediately at about 500 pursuit planes, that is, approximately 100 for each landing zone.

These air forces should also have available on the ground means of supply and servicing (personnel and equipment) landed at the air bases by transport planes arriving at the same time as the combat planes.

Anti-aircraft defense of the bases should also be

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provided by 5 to 10 batteries for each base, i.e., approximately 100 batteries.

C. General Methods of Intervention:

One should be guided by the following general ideas:

a) The preliminary conditions being fulfilled, take deliberately the initiative, in liaison with favorable French elements; absolutely avoid being put in the position of having to take counter-action. Intervention planned as a counter-action would lead infallibly to a defeat. If the Axis takes the initiative it will benefit from being the first on a strategic checkerboard which will be favorable to it.

b) Act simultaneously, massively and by surprise to avoid any adverse reaction liable to compromise the initial landings which are the most difficult.

c) Assure at the outset, and without fighting, for the American forces of intervention, the possession of vital centers of the country, of indispensable naval and air bases and good ports provided with sufficient port installations.

d) Follow up at the earliest the forces landed with the sending of the means (personnel and material) necessary for the re-arming of the French troops (Note No. 1) and of

the supplies likely to influence public opinion (cotton goods, fuel, tea, sugar, coffee, coal....)

The vital centers, indispensable naval bases and ports include essentially:

The Casablanca zone, Fedala, Rabat.

The Oran zone with Mers el Kebir.

The Algiers zone.

The zone-Tunis, la Goulette, Bizerta.

There could be added as of secondary necessity:

Moroccan Atlantic ports, Mogador, Safi, Mazagan.

In Algeria, Mostagenem and Bone.

The following bases at least should also be available:

Morocco, Rabat, Casablanca, Meknes, Fes, Kasbah
Tadla, Marrakech.

Algeria, la Senia (Oran), Lartigue*, Maison Blanche
(Algiers), and eventually Blida.

Tunisia, El Aouina (Tunis), Souk el Arba.

The initial distribution of forces and their landing zones could be planned as follows:

* State Department has agreed to cable the Consulate in Algiers for identification.

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Morocco

3 divisions

2 armored brigades

40 anti-aircraft batteries

Landings in the Casablanca-Fesala region and, depending upon the enemy reactions, in the southern ports of Mazagan, Safi and Mogador.

Algeria

3 divisions

2 armored brigades

40 anti-aircraft batteries

Landings:

a) Oran, Mers el Kebir, beach at Arzew

2 divisions

1 armored brigade

20 anti-aircraft batteries

b) Algiers (port and bay)

1 division

1 armored brigade

20 anti-aircraft batteries

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Tunisia

1 Division

1 armored brigade

40 anti-aircraft batteries.

Landings in the region Bizerta-La Goulette-Tunia. Eventually they could be carried back to Bone, Philippeville, in case of too lively enemy reaction.

The general scheme of landing should be the following: a) Simultaneous landings executed at daybreak in all the ports. b) With a view to preventing any unfortunate reaction on the part of defense forces guarding the ports, patriots take control of the zones in question during the night before the landing. This preliminary action is most important; but it is fitting to note the difficulty of its preparation and execution because of the moral collapse caused by the recent allied reverses and the incessant propaganda of Vichy.

As a corollary, a few details of execution are noted: a) Transports called upon to make the first landing must include a mixed cargo (infantry, tanks, anti-aircraft). As

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soon as the landed infantry and tank effectives are sufficient to support the patriots and remove any possibility of an immediate threat from within, one proceeds with the massive landing of anti-aircraft and its installation.

b) Close liaison should be assured between the patriots and the intervention troops:

Before landing, by wireless, radio sets not entering into the existing networks;

After landing, by exchanged liaison personnel.

c) The landing force must dispose of the necessary personnel to assure service of the port in order to relieve any momentary faltering of the French personnel and to establish in each landing zone a naval base (direction and services).

D. Use of Intervention Forces and First French Possibilities:

The intervention forces will be utilized to oppose the various reactions until such time as the French forces in French North Africa may be at least partially transformed and reconstituted.

Intervention forces could be engaged:

On the one hand in Tripolitania to combine their action with British forces operating in Cyrenaica;

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On the other hand in Spanish Morocco to assure a preventive seizure of this territory. The Moroccan operation could be aided from the outset, without previous transformation or reforming, by regular and supplementary French troops acting in the mountain zone.

As for the French troops, their immediate possibilities are limited except for the action in the mountainous region of Spanish Morocco, above mentioned. A serious mistake would in effect be committed by throwing into battle troops of the Armistice army in their present state, that is to say, without any modern equipment. The result would be the destruction without appreciable effect of personnel of a quality difficult to replace under present circumstances.

Subsequent possibilities of French North Africa can be estimated as follows in so far as concerns the Army:

A first echelon of forces could comprise,

2 armored divisions	}	equipped with 12-1500 tanks.
6 motorized divisions		

The preparation of this echelon would probably be completed toward the 5th or 6th week if the technicians and

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equipment indicated in Note No. 1 are furnished according to the requested conditions.

A second echelon of forces of the same size as the first could be put on foot toward the 3rd month (certain elements much sooner beginning with the second month) on condition that the corresponding supplies of equipment were assured in the desired time (these requirements do not figure in Note No. 1).

It results from the foregoing that in a short period of time there could be thus available a mass of 4 armored divisions and 12 motorized divisions to act abroad either in France or in another theater of operations.

The mobilization effort in North Africa will subsequently continue to be pursued, without its appearing probable that the battle corps thus constituted can be increased.

Resources in European personnel are in effect limited and account must be taken:

On the one hand of the necessity of keeping the necessary reserves in manpower to feed the troops engaged in operations;

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On the other hand of the necessity of leaving in North Africa a minimum of Frenchmen to maintain the economic activity of the country and to secure order.

NOTE 2

Dans une note precedente, nous avons indique, avec l'ordre d'urgence et les delais de livraison, les besoins de l'armee de terre a satisfaire pendant le premier mois en materiel, approvisionnement et specialistes, au cas ou l'A.F.N. reprendrait sa liberte d'action et la lutte aux cotes des Allies.

Nous avons encore expose que cette hypothese ne pouvait etre envisagee que si les conditions suivantes etaient remplies

- a) Destruction préalable, ou au minimum, l'ixation des forces blindées de l'axe en Lybie.
- b) Initiative ou au moins, consentement d'un chef de grade élevé et d'une autorité indiscutée (General Weygand) profitant de circonstances politiques favorables.
- c) Action déclanchée au moment convenable, en prenant l'initiative pour devancer l'ennemi et ne soustraire puis faire échec a ses réactions.
- d) Maîtrise aéronavale des Allies en Méditerranée, non indiquée parécqu admise implicitement.

Ces conditions étant acquises, on admettait que l'opération libératrice de l'Afrique du Nord pouvait être exécutée avec un appui militaire extérieur très faible, évalué à :

- 1 à 2 divisions blindées au Maroc, selon les renforcements que les Espagnols ou les Allemands auraient pu réaliser dans leur zone Marocaine au moment de l'opération.
- une centaine de batteries d'Artillerie de D.C.A.
- des renforcements aériens chiffrés par ailleurs.

L'évolution défavorable de la situation oblige à réviser ces estimations.

En Lybie les forces de l'Axe considérablement renforcées ont l'initiative; elles conservent une grande liberté d'action et maintiennent leurs communications avec l'Italie.

En Mediterranee, les Allies ont perdu la maitrise aerona-
 velle; ils ont subi des insucces en Cyrenaque et de graves revers
 en Extreme Orient.

Ces insucces, exploites par la propagande inquietent les
 populations et l'armee; ils incitent a la prudence les chefs
 qui auraient le courage d'affronter les risques d'une actions
 liberatrice en Afrique du Nord. Le moins qu'on puisse dire c'est
 que l'opinion n'est pas actuellement favorable a une action de
 cette nature qui seroit consideree comme une veritable aventure.

Cet etat d'esprit et la situation politique qu'il engendre,
 obligent a envisager une augmentation importante de l'appui
 exterieur initial a prévoir, cet appui devant en effet permettre:

- d'une part d'asseoir un commandement favorable et de rassurer
 l'opinion par la manifestation d'une force massive,
- d'autre part, de faire echec aux reactions de l'Axe et de sub-
 stituer momentanement aux forces francaises dont la modernisation
 risque d'etre retardee par l'epuration necessaire du commandement.

Considerant la situation actuelle, nous examinerons les
 points suivants:

- conditions prealables a remplir:
- forces d'intervention a prévoir en A.F.N. Francaise
- modalites generales d'intervention
- emploi des forces d'intervention et possibilites initiales
 francaises.

A - Les conditions prealables a remplir par les Allies sont enon-
ces ci-apres:

a) Fixer absolument par une action partant d'Egypte les forces
 de l'Axe en Lybie afin qu'elles ne puissent, meme temporairement
 detacher des forces blindées en A.N. Francaise. La fixation est
 un minimum qui doit aboutir au plus tot a la destruction.

b) Ressaisir la maitrise aero-navale en Mediterranee Occi-
dentale meme dans l'hypothese d'une intervention hostile de la
marine francaise.

c) Disposer d'une reserve de forces et de tonnage, en plus des moyens d'intervention pour parer aux imprevus et agir avec certitude.

d) Etre en mesure de fournir a l'A.F.N., dans les delais demandes les techniciens, le materiel et les approvisionnements indiqués dans la note No. 1.

B - Forces d'intervention a prévoir en Afrique du Nord Française

Les forces terrestres necessaires peuvent etre estimees comme suit:

- 7 divisions motorisees.
- 5 brigades blindées (7 a 800 chars)
- 120 batteries de D.C.A. (moitie de petit calibre) pour la defense des zones de débarquement.
- services correspondants.

Ces forces devraient etre pourvues des approvisionnements necessaires pour un mois.

Munitions

- Carburant
- Vivres (Farine, conserves, sucre, the, cafe)
- Recharges et volant de materiel
- Tentos de campement.
- Materiel sanitaire et medicaments (vaccins, anesthésiques, pansements, materiel chirurgical)
- charbon (voir note No. 1)

Les forces aeriennes a prévoir seront precises ultérieurement par ailleurs.

Pour assurer la couverture des débarquements on peut cependant des maintenant evaluer les besoins a environ 500 avions de chasse, soit approximativement 100 par zone de débarquement.

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Ces forces aeriennes devraient en outre disposer au sol de moyens de ravitaillement et d'entretien (personnel et materiel) mis en place sur les bases aeriennes par avions de transports arrivant en meme temps que les avions de combat.

La defense antiaerienne des bases devrait aussi etre prevue a raison de 5 a 10 batteries par base, soit 100 batteries environ.

C - Modalites generales d'intervention:

On devrait s'inspirer des idees generales suivantes:

a) Les conditions prealables etant remplies, prendre delibere-
ment l'initiative, en liaison avec les elements francais favo-
rables: eviter absolument de se laisser acculer a la riposte.
L'intervention conue comme riposte conduirait infailliblement a
un echec. Si l'Ax prend l'initiative il benefiera de la pri-
maute dans l'action sur un echiquier strategique qui lui sera
favorable.

b) operer simultanement, massivement et par surprise pour
eviter toute reaction adverse susceptible de compromettre les
engagements initiaux qui sont les plus difficiles.

c) avant l'emblee - et sans combat - aux forces ameri-
caines d'intervention la possession des centres vitaux du pays
au niveau naval et aeriennes indispensables et des bons ports
pourvus d'installations portuaires suffisantes.

d) immmediatement au plus tot les forces mises a terre par
l'envoi de moyens (personnel et materiel) necessaires au rearme-
ment des troupes francaises (note No. 1) et des approvisionne-
ments susceptibles d'influencer l'opinion publique (cotonnade,
carburant, the, sucre, cafe, charbon)

Les centres vitaux, bases navales et ports indispensables
comprendront essentiellement:

- la zone Casablanca, Fedala, Rabat
- l'agglomeration Oranaise avec Mers El Kebir.
- l'Agglomeration d'Alger.
- le groupe Tunis, la Goulette, Bizerte.

On pourrait ajouter en deuxieme urgence:

- les ports Marocains de l'Atlantique, Mogador, Safi, Mazagan.
- en Algerie, Mostaganem et Bone.

Il conviendrait également de disposer au minimum des bases aériennes suivantes:

- Maroc, Rabat, Casablanca, Meknes, Fez, Kasbah budia, Marrakech.
- Algérie, la Senia, Lartigue, Maison Blanche, Blida, éventuellement.
- Tunisie, El Aouina, Souk-el Arba.

La Répartition initiale des forces et leurs zones de débarquement pourraient être prévues comme suit:

Maroc

3 Divisions
2 Brigades blindées
40 Batteries de D.C.A.

Debarquements région Casablanca-Pédala et, suivant les réaction ennemies, dans les ports au Sud, Mazagan, Safi, Mogador.

Algérie

3 Divisions
2 Brigades blindées
40 Batteries de D.C.A.

Debarquements

a) Oran, Mers el Kabir, plage d'Atzew,
2 divisions, 1 Brigade blindée,
20 batteries DCA

b) Alger (port et baie) 1 division,
1 Brigade blindée et 20 batteries DCA

Tunisie

1 Division
1 Brigade blindée
40 batteries DCA

Debarquement région Bizerte-Lagoulette-Tunis. Eventuellement pourraient être reportés partiellement sur Bone, Philippeville, en cas trop vive réaction ennemie.

Le mécanisme général du débarquement devrait être le suivant:

a) débarquements exécutés au lever du jour simultanément dans tous les ports.

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b) en vue d'empêcher toute réaction balourdissime des forces de surveillance et de défense des ports, les patriotes prennent le contrôle des zones visées, au cours de la nuit précédant le débarquement. Cette action préliminaire est capitale; mais il convient de noter la difficulté de sa préparation et de son exécution en raison de l'affaiblissement moral causé par les récentes échecs alliés et la propagande incessante de Vichy.

Accessoirement, sont rappelés quelques points particuliers d'exécution:

a) les transports appelés à débarquer en tête, doivent comporter un chargement mixte (infanterie, blindés, D.C.A.). Des que les effectifs d'infanterie et de blindés débarqués sont suffisants pour appuyer les patriotes et écarter toute possibilité de menace intérieure immédiate, il est procédé au débarquement massif de la D.C.A. et à sa mise en place.

b) il convient d'assurer une liaison étroite entre les patriotes et les troupes d'intervention.

- avant débarquement, par T.S.F., postes Radios n'entrant pas dans les réseaux existants.

- après débarquement, par personnel de liaison échange.

c) le corps de débarquement doit disposer du personnel nécessaire pour assurer le service du port pour pallier à toute défaillance momentanée du personnel français et constituer, dans chaque zone de débarquement, une base maritime (direction et services)

Emploi des forces d'intervention et premières possibilités françaises:

Les forces d'intervention seront utilisées pour s'opposer aux diverses réactions jusqu'à ce que les forces françaises d'A.F.N. soient au moins partiellement transformées et reconstituées.

Les forces d'intervention pourraient être engagées,

- d'une part, en Tripolitaine pour combiner leur action avec les forces Britanniques opérant en Cyrénaïque.

- d'autre part au Maroc Espagnol, pour assurer une mainmise préventive sur ce territoire. L'opération Marocaine pourrait être aidée dès la première heure, sans transformation ou reconstitution préalable, par des troupes régulières et supplémentaires françaises agissant dans la zone montagneuse.

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Quant aux troupes francaises, leurs possibilites immediates sont limitees, sauf pour l'action en region montagneuse au Maroc Espagnol indiquee plus haut. On commettrait, en effet, une faute grave en jetant dans la bataille les troupes de l'armee de l'armistice dans leur etat actuel, c'est a dire depourvues de tout materiel moderne. On ferait detruire sans rendement appreciable un personnel de qualite difficilement remplaçable dans les conjectures presentes.

Les possibilites ulterieures de l'Afrique du Nord peuvent etre evaluees comme suit en ce qui concerne l'Armee de terre

- Un premier echelon de forces pourrait comprendre,

2 divisions blindées	} armant 12 a 1500 chars
6 divisions motorisées	

La preparation de cet echelon s'est vraisemblablement achevee vers la cinquieme ou la sixieme semaine si les techniciens et le materiel indiques dans la note No. 1 sont fournis dans les conditions demandees.

Un deuxieme echelon de forces de la meme importance que le premier pourrait etre mis sur pied vers le troisieme mois (certains elements pourraient etre mis plus tot a partir du deuxieme mois) sous reserve que les fournitures correspondantes de materiel seraient assurees a temps voulu (cet besoin ne figurent pas dans la note No. 1)

Il resulte de ces indications que dans un court delai on pourrait ainsi disposer d'une masse de 4 divisions blindées et 6 divisions motorisées pour agir a l'exterieur soit en France soit sur un autre theatre d'operations.

L'effort de mobilisation en Afrique du Nord sera encore poursuivi ulterieurement, mais sans qu'il paraisse vraisemblablement possible d'accroitre le corps de bataille ainsi constitue.

Les ressources en personnel europeen sont en effet limitees et on doit tenir compte,

d'une part de la necessite de conserver les ressources necessaires pour alimenter en personnel les troupes en operations

d'autre part de l'obligation de laisser en Afrique du Nord un minimum de Francais pour maintenir l'activite economique et garantir l'ordre dans le pays.

Independent of the armament in Notes 1 and 2, it is indispensable to take into consideration the question of natives. For this, funds are absolutely necessary. The whole plan could not be worked if the Sultan, Chief Caid, and regional Beys, etc. are not on our side. If we don't buy them through the French, the Germans will. They have already spent large sums in this direction.

The sum necessary is one million dollars (\$1,000,000.00) to be paid down to assure their neutrality. Further sums to secure and reward their collaboration will be needed later.

This must be done before the Germans make the first move. It must be done equally whether one contemplates Note 1, or Note 2. It must be done now.

(Note: the above, on this page, was dictated and approved by Robin Hood, his Chief of State, and his adjutant, March 14, and taken down by me in English.

CAS II

Armement qui doit être à Gibraltar pour arriver
en A.N. dans des délais très courts, en cas d'attaque
ennemie.

20,000 mitraillettes avec 3,000 cartouches par mitraillette

2,000 fusils - mitrailleurs avec 15,000 cartouches par F.M.

2,000 mitrailleuses avec 50,000 cartouches par Mit.

20,000 equipments

500,000 grenades

RENSEIGNEMENTSource: ABSOLUMENT SURE

Le P.P.F. dans la Metropole travaille en liaison étroite avec les autorités occupantes.

Le Chef pour la Fr nce libre est le nomme Queyrat ancien avocat a Casablanca, expulsé par ordre du General WEYGAND. Il est en meme temps directeur du journal L'EMANCIPATION NATIONALE.

Pour la Zone occupee FOSSATI a pris une place importante avec le nomme ARRIGHI.

La liaison avec les Allemands est assuree a Vichy par le Commissaire de la GESTAPO GEISLER, qui avait effectue une mission a ORAN.

Le P.P.F. en liaison avec GEISLER, prepare en A. du Nord un veritable coup d'Etat qui lui permettra de livrer l'Afrique Francaise a l'armee allemande.

Les Listes de fonctionnaires suspects sont preparees. Pour l'Algerie, tous les hauts fonctionnaires du gouvernement General seront remplacés par des hommes sûrs, comme ARRIGHI et FOSSATI.

Pour le Maroc les precautions sont les memes et QUEYRAT aurait également un poste important.

Le gouvernement et le Marechal seraient tenus a l'ecart de cette manœuvre pour se trouver devant le fait accompli. Les dirigeants comptent sur l'apathie des officiers superieurs et de l'armee en general, pour, grace a quelques complicités, pouvoir réussir sans rencontrer de resistances serieuses, au besoin l'aide des autorités occupantes se feraient plus pressante.

P.P.F. - Parti Doriot

At an luncheon held at Port Lysser, last month, General NOGUES is reported to have remarked that the weakness of Moroccan defenses was their dependence on electricity. If the 3 big hydro-electric dams at EL KANSERA, SIDI MACHOU and KASBAH ZIDANIA were destroyed then most coastal towns and the electrified railways would be out of action and the water supplies would be cut off.

Extracted from Intelligence Report, Gibraltar.


Hydro-electric dams are in themselves not sabotageable but can only be put out of action by bombardment or by demolition squads.

Very considerable interference with the electrical system, however, can be achieved by the destruction of the transformers in power stations and, so far as the railways are concerned, complete interference if, in addition, the railway electric sub power stations are also sabotaged.

Sidi Machou is probably not suitable for sabotage as access to the station is extremely difficult. El Kansera and Kasbah Zidania, however, probably are suitable for sabotage, though undoubtedly difficult, if a few determined men armed with steel bars, jemies or tyre levers (explosives are not required) could obtain access to the transformer chambers in the power stations while the transformers are working and sabotage them in the following manner:-

Transformers are more easily wrecked without explosive than with it, provided that they are working. This can easily be ascertained by (a) the heat they are giving off, and (b) a bluish light usually to be seen above them.

In appearance they are like large radiators, in the form of a box shape, with tubes all around the



this height may be anything, but in a small station will be about six (6) feet.

Ground level

The tubes are the cooling system, and if a steel bar - a jemmy or tyre lever - is used to wreck them loose enough for the liquid (oil) to escape, while the Transformer is working, it will generate sufficient heat within itself irreparably to ruin it in a very short time.

We have the following particulars already available:-

El Kansera Power Station.

1. Situated on the Oued Beth about 17 miles South of Sidi Slimane.
2. In general this plant is capable of supplying power for the railway and for the peak loads in the Port Lyautry - Meknes-Fes area. One 60 kv. line leads to Sidi Slimane substation on the main grid, and another may lead direct to Meknes, 22 kv. line presumably provide local distribution.
3. It is a hydro station drawing its water from a dam across the Oued Beth in the El Kansera gorge. The reservoir thus formed is also used for irrigation.
4. Details.

Head of water: 138 feet.
Installed capacity: 11,200 kw.

Turbo-alternators: 2 vertical 5,660 Kw. (7,000 KVA) running at 300 r.p.m. and generating 3 phase A.C. at 5.5kv. and 50 cycles.

Transformers

An outside transformer station adjoins the power house and includes:

- 2 of 3,000 KVA capacity, 5.5/60 kv.
- 2 of 1,200 KVA capacity 60/62 kv.

5. Vulnerable Points.

- (a) Transformers.
- (b) Turbo Alternators.

The transformers should be a fairly easy target for sabotage, as the plant appears to be in wide country.

Kasba Zidania Power Station.

1. Situated on the Oum Er R'Bia about 13 miles S.W. of Kasba Tadla.
2. This plant supplies central Morocco generally, and also covers peak loads on the railway and phosphate workings in the Kourigna-Boujad district.
3. A hydro plant, it utilises overflow water from an irrigation canal which leaves the Er R'Bia at Kasba Tadla. The water is drawn from the canal through a single large pressure pipe.
4. Details. Head of water: 117 feet.
Installed capacity: 7,200 kw.

Turbo Alternators: 2 horizontal with shaft generators of 3,600 kw. (4,500 KVA) running at 500 r.p.m. and generating 3-phase A.C. at 5.5 kv and 50 cycles.

Transformers: The outdoor substation has 2 transformers of 4,450 KVA, 5.5/60 kv. and probably some smaller ones.

Kasba Zidania Power Station (continued)

5. Vulnerable Points.

- (a) Transformers
- (b) Alternators
- (c) Pipeline (short).

The plant seem to lie in desolate country, and sabotage of the transformers and pipeline should be fairly easy. The latter however may be fairly easy to repair unless materials are not available.

Before attempting either of the above operations, preliminary reconnaissances should be carried out by the saboteurs themselves in order -

1. To observe frequency of holidays, change of guards, number of people on night duty, roads in area, nearness of road to actual enclosure, number of transformers working during various periods of the night etc.

.. Methods of access to the transformer chambers.

It must be emphasized that the sabotage of the transformers at both the foregoing Stations would only result in a partial dislocation of electrical services. It would, however, be complete if the following railway electric sub power stations were also sabotaged:

Sidi el Aidi; Petit Jach; Casablanca; Benguerir;
 Marrakech; Sidi Slimane; Kouribga; Louis Gentil;
 Sidi; Oujda; Fez; Marrakech; N'Fis.

Sabotage of the sub power stations would best be done by explosives. A suitcase could contain sufficient and, the power stations are small, one determined man with a suitcase of explosives who gained access to the transformer chamber and left the suitcase there could irreparably ruin that station.

Accordingly, a band of between 20-25 men could dislocate the greater part, if not the entire, electrical

system of Morocco if, say, each took on the El Kansera and Kasba Zidania power stations and, of the remainder, each man took on a particular sub station. It would be advisable that each man to whom a particular station was allotted should make preliminary reconnaissances of it first on the lines recommended for el Kansera and Kasba Zidania stations.

Pipeline at Kasba Zidania Power Station.

Further damage could be done to this station by the destruction of the pipeline but before any advice could be tendered on this the following particulars are required:-

Diameter.

Construction (concrete, metal, etc ?)

Lengths of sections.

Plan of route taken, showing where the pipe is readily accessible or overland.

1. BOOBY TRAPS:

There are two kinds available:

- (a) Pressure switch
- (b) Pull switch.

(1) PRESSURE SWITCHES consist of a barrel and platform--over-all length 4". Into the top of the barrel is inserted a T-shaped stud. With this imposition the over-all height is 1".

It will be seen that the stud has a cutting edge. This must be placed through the hole in the barrel in such a way that the cutting edge is across, repeat across, the wire which can be observed through the hole. In one end of the barrel can be seen the open end of a percussion cap. Into this is inserted and crimped any length desirable or necessary of instantaneous fuse.

To the far end of the instantaneous fuse will be affixed a detonator, which is inserted into the required quantity of explosive.

The action of the whole is that pressure upon the stud (approximately 30 lbs. pressure is required) will sever the wire. This in turn will set off the percussion cap, thereby firing the explosive.

Suggested Uses: (a) The pressure switch may be placed under a rug or door mat, or any place where the proposed victim is likely to stand or step. The length of instantaneous fuse may be sufficient that the explosion can be concealed below the rug or mat in question.

(b) Between the seat and the floor in a car.

(c) Under the seat of an easy chair.

Note: Here the base plate of the pressure switch should be rested upon a book or similar firm surface.

2. PULL SWITCHES:

These consist of a barrel with percussion cap at one end, as in the case of pressure switches, and at the other end a wire hook. Round the barrel will be found two short lengths of soft wire. These are for attaching the pull switch to some stable object--i.e. the leg of a table or chair, a tree, etc. To the wire hook should be attached a length of wire (or string may be used), and the action is that a sudden jerk or kick against the wire or string will exert a pull upon the steel hook and set the pull switch in action.

- 2 -

Suggested Uses: (a) Attach the pull switch by a nail under a desk, and the wire or string to the leg of a chair pushed under the desk.

(b) Attach the pull switch inside a lavatory cistern, and the wire or string to the chain.

(c) Attach the pull switch inside a room, and the wire or string to the handle of the door (opening outward. (N.B. -- exit yourself through the window.)

(d) The pull switch may be attached to a tree on the side of the road or path, and the wire stretched across 8" from the ground, to catch either the wheel of a passing car or the foot of a pedestrian. If used against traffic use heavy gauge wire, and in no circumstances use string.

General Note: In the case of both switches, removal of the safety pin is the last thing to be done. The fuse must be crimped firmly, i.e., not too tightly nor too loosely, into the percussion cap.

3. M.L. FLARES:

Any M.L. Flare can be ignited instantaneously as follows:

Ignore the fuse with ordinary end but tear off the cover of the fuse with the large rounded end, thus exposing a circle of dull black material. Strike this on a safety (repeat safety) match box and the Flare will ignite in six seconds burning for approximately three minutes.

Delayed action of M.L. Flares only occurs if pencils are used. The time delays for pencils can be ascertained from the coloured band around the pencil. The delays are as follows:

Black	10 minutes	4 yellow rings	15 hours
1 red ring	30 minutes	5 blue rings	25 hours
2 white rings	2 hours	No rings at all	10 minutes
3 green rings	5 hours		

To attach a pencil, all that is required is to cut off with a square cut (emphasize square cut) the tarred end of the other fuse (i.e.--not the fuse with the large rounded end) and insert this into the open end of the pencil, crimping the end of the pencil lightly round the fuse. Squeeze the copper tube at the other end of the pencil and remove the safety pin. Note-- the copper end must be squeezed and not bent.

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4. LIMPETS:

A Limpet consists of a bowl-shaped metal case. Into this is packed gelignite.

The packing of this requires great care and skill and it would not be safe for anyone to do this without personal instruction from an expert. It would probably be courting disaster for anyone to attempt to do this from written instructions, -- e.g. hot sealing wax is required to seal the detonators in place.

Into the limpet two time pencils are inserted. The limpet itself has magnets which will clamp the limpet on to the side of a metal ship, and when the time delay (according to the type of pencil inserted) has elapsed, the limpet will blow a considerable hole in the side of a ship.

5. TRAIN TOY:

The complete toy consists of a 1-lb slab of gun cotton which is attached to the railway line in an upright position. Care must be taken that the space between the slab of gun cotton and the center part of the rail is well packed with wet sand, clay or some similar semi-solid substance.

The lettering which will be observed on the slab of gun cotton should face outwards. In the hole in the center of the gun cotton slab will be inserted a primer. Into the small hole in the center of the primer will be inserted a detonator, into which is crimped a length (not less than three yards) of instantaneous fuse. The fuse will be led away in the direction from which the train is approaching. The other end of the fuse will then be crimped into a fog signal.

The fog signal will be found to possess two wire clips for attaching the fog signal to the line. This will be found insufficient, and it is therefore advisable to use in addition to the clips some string or wire to make a firm job of it.

General Notes: The lead-off from the fog signal must be on the outside of the line, to avoid cutting of the fuse by the flange of the wheel. The gun cotton slab on the inside of the line and the fuse must, therefore, be looped underneath the line leaving one end on the outside and one end on the inside.

Since fog signals are affected by damp conditions, it is advisable to place two, or even three, close together to ensure

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one at least going off. If the slabs of gun cotton from both are placed together and touching, the explosion from either will detonate the other.

6. "R" TABLETS:

These are small white cachou-type tablets and should be dissolved in a small quantity of warm water before administering to an ordinary drink. They may be placed direct into a hot drink, such as coffee, tea, etc. The dose is two tablets.

The effect will be noticed after half an hour, and the patient will be unconscious for two hours or a little more.

7. "L" TABLETS:

These are lethal and contain a high proportion of prussic acid and cannot, therefore, be administered without the patient's knowledge. If taken they are fatal within 30 seconds.

8. DEKERS, DECKERETTES AND RAZZIES.

These are the "incendiary leaves" as used by the R.A.F. In appearance they are small square pieces of celluloid material kept in a bottle of water. When exposed to the sun or air they become incendiaries when dry.

Useful particularly against grain crops and other easily inflammable material, but the disadvantage is that the time in which they take effect cannot be controlled as it depends entirely upon the atmospheric conditions.

They could also be put into envelopes and posted.

They must not be stored out of water.

9. P.R. 5's:

These are small incendiaries, the size approximately of a packet of 10 cigarettes, which have a small incendiary effect according to the colour on them, as follows:--

Black	10 minutes	4 yellow rings	15 hours
1 red ring	30 minutes	5 blue rings	25 hours
2 white rings	2 hours	No rings at all	10 minutes
3 green rings	5 hours		

All that is required is for the small exposed tube in the middle of them to be broken. This tube is exposed by removing the wooden peg to be found under the strip of coloured adhesive tape and is broken by pushing a coin on to the copper tube then revealed. It will then take effect after the scheduled time has elapsed.

Another use to which it can be put is for posting as a small parcel in a letter box, or for pushing through people's letter boxes or through windows of offices to destroy mail and documents etc., or thrown into the back of a food lorry.

They are quite fun.

10. ABRASIVE TABLETS:

These are small tablets for dropping into the petrol tanks of vehicles--thereby ruining the engine. They are not, however, recommended as (a) we have very few of them and (b) a better and more immediate effect can be produced by the judicious use of a handful of sand or (if it can be found and spared) sugar.

11. TYAULES.

These are small incendiaries consisting of small celluloid sacks, approximately 4" in length, containing a mixture of petrol and oil. Into one end is built a safety match composition and one-half of the case is coated with chemical substance to give a better flame than would be obtained from the burning of the petrol and oil alone.

The action of the tyaule is extremely simple, all that is necessary to ignite it being the striking action with a safety match box. The resultant flame is fierce for one minute and the petrol and oil mixture then burns quietly for a further five minutes.

Tyaules in themselves are difficult to ignite by a time device and are, therefore, useful chiefly for immediate purposes e.g., striking and throwing through an open window, striking and dropping into a letter box, etc. They are, however, very useful when used in conjunction with M.L. Flares, no form of ignition being necessary other than strapping any quantity of them alongside the M.L. Flare, the Flare, of course, having the necessary time device attached to it.

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YLEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco

11 March, 1942.

The Coordinator of Information.
24th and "E" Streets, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

Personal attention of Colonel Donovan and Colonel Solborg.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I have just received your telegram No. 8, which disturbs me greatly. The statement that the requisition contained in my telegrams 10 to 12 is on a scale much larger than contemplated by future operations point to a serious misunderstanding. This requisition, and others which will follow, are for the purpose of supplying a well organized and ably-led movement in Morocco and Algeria. I have met with the leaders of both regions who have been in consultation with each other all this week. I assure you the requisition is calculated to provide for operations which they plan, operations to coincide with an allied expedition, or equally, to resist Axis aggression from whatever direction that might come. Your telegrams Nos. 6 and 7 were reported to the leaders, who were much relieved at this prospect that their basic needs would be supplied shortly by you. Your telegram No. 8 would seem to reopen the question of whether we are prepared at all to supply this organization on which we must depend for effective inter-allied cooperation of a military nature for successful resistance to enemy aggression.

It will be apparent therefore, that we are not now dealing with small cargoes for local sabotage planned by us. This is also going forward, and arrangements for such supplies can be carried out entirely between Tangier and Gibraltar where the toys are stored.

To return to the more pressing and extremely critical problem of supporting the French organization, it is my conviction that failure on our part to give this support will be fatal to our own plans to keep Morocco and North Africa strong enough to resist enemy aggression. We will not find such leaders elsewhere and we dare not lose them now. Mr. Chambers

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will tell Colonel Solborg, orally, the details of the reception parties which I would not think of putting in writing. I have just talked with Mr. Murphy who is in full accord with the plans, and who has complete confidence in the leaders. Please note that these requisitions are being made quite independently of any possible American expedition. The supplies are needed, and will be used, no matter who invades North Africa. The organization will resist with or without our supplies; their plans are complete for action against Axis attack through Algeria or Spanish Morocco, or from any other direction. They only ask for our material help immediately to make this resistance effective. They are taking all the risk, they will receive, distribute, and use the supplies, every step being taken with the threat of execution as traitors if they are uncovered. The least we can do is to help supply them on their own terms which are generous and gallant.

I am sending a copy to Colonel Solborg in Lisbon, to whom I shall also send by the next pouch, copy of the forthcoming plan to be transmitted to me in a few days after the joint conferences are concluded between the leaders in Algeria and the leaders in French Morocco. The influence and power of the men committed to this plan will also be indicated orally by Mr. Chambers to Colonel Solborg. Incidentally, by happy coincidence, Lieutenant Chambers came to Tangier as courier this week, making it possible for me to send back by him the most confidential details.

For communication with Colonel Solborg, I have at present only the Coinform strip code which I share with Raichle. Until instructed otherwise I shall consider that code the one to use if necessary. I hope nothing has happened to prevent Raichle's early assignment as diplomatic courier in North Africa to train our W/T operators of the four sets already placed at Tangier, Casablanca, Oran, and Tunis.

Respectfully submitted -

W. A. EDDY

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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NAVAL ATTACHE

Tangier, Morocco

11 March, 1942

The Coordinator of Information
24th and "E" Streets
Washington, D. C.

I enclose copy of Intelligence Report sent today to the Navy Department covering general considerations which should govern landing operations on the coast of French Morocco. This summary was prepared at my request by Vice Consul David W. King of Casablanca who has studied the problem of beaches intensively for a number of months.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. Eddy

Issued by the Intelligence Division
Office of Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 12-42

604

From Naval Attache at Tangier, Morocco Date 10 March 1942

Reference Vice Consul King

Source: ~~Personal Observation~~ Evaluation A

Subject: Moroccan Coast; Landing Operations ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~

The following summary was prepared by Vice Consul King who has been in the Casablanca area for the past year. The detailed data referred to will be forwarded as soon as it is received.

1. BEACHES

- (a) Natural dangers. Storms, ground swell, reefs and bars.
 - (b) Communications, roads, etc., from the beach head.
- Distance to strategic centers.

11. PORTS

- (a) Capacity and equipment
- (b) Strategic positions.
- (c) Defenses.

1. The operation of landing a large number of men and material on a beach on the Moroccan coast is a very uncertain and hazardous one. In the first place, gales or squalls are frequent and difficult to forecast (see detailed data). There are not many places free from the line of reefs which parallel the coast and there is an almost unpredictable natural handicap known as "La Houle" or "Raz de Maree" - an ocean ground swell.

These swells break on the coast for several days at a time, one wave after another. They are not caused by local storms or weather conditions; it is almost impossible to predict their arrival and once they begin it would be impossible to, (a) load lighters or shallow draft

(c) A Welcome by Moors

Apart from aspirations for a measure of self-government the allegiance of Moors is primarily swayed by a display of force and a repletion of the stomach.

There are, in addition, certain individual personalities to be considered and safeguarded, namely, e.g. Glaoui, the ex-Sultan, the Mendoub, the Mokri.

If a Combined Policy on the foregoing lines were put into operation it only remains to consider to what extent S.O.E. come into the picture and how far they have got.

I should perhaps, as a preliminary regarding the possibilities of S.O.E. and S.O.E.'s present position, explain the present set-up established with the Americans for joint working in North Africa.

It is common knowledge that Eddy has come out to Tangier as Naval Attache charged with the joint supervision of U.S. S.I.S. and U.S. S.O.E. functions.

He had under him Raichle stationed in Gibraltar to carry out joint U.S. S.I.S. and S.O.E. activities from that particular spot. As a result of recommendations from the latest information it appears that Raichle will now be transferred from Gibraltar to the post of permanent U.S. pouch carrier with headquarters at Tangier, but travelling to Casablanca, Algeria and Tunis. It may be mentioned that during his stay in Gibraltar Raichle has had a final course of instruction in W/T Operations and in the use of toys and one of his functions during the course of his journeys as U.S. pouch carrier will be to instruct others in W/T and toys.

Apart from the position of Raichle and as a result of discussions with Eddy, the set-up for North Africa for the purpose of effecting the best possible joint venture between the British and the U.S. has been agreed as follows:-

(a) The center of all Operations shall be Tangier.

(b) In Tangier, bearing in mind Eddy's U.S. S.I.S. duties, there has been established an I group consisting of:-

Eddy or his representative Bentley
or his representative Ellis or his
representative Greenleaves.

It is the intention that the I group shall meet daily, place into the whirlpool of intelligentzia everything they know, this will be followed by a smash-and-grab raid, and anything got out of the whirlpool by any individual will be disseminated in various directions direct and without delay.

(c) There will also be established an O. group consisting of:

S.I.S. or his representative
S.O.E. or his representative.
Eddy or his representative.

As its title implies, this O. Group which will meet as frequently as is necessary, will deal solely with Operations. "Operations" covers every multitude of sins and comprises, for example, a Priority Board for the spacing of W/T sets, methods of carrying out individual Operations, and a discussion of what may be described as Long Term Policy.

It is obvious that, for the purpose of the efficient fulfilment of the obligations of the O Group, communications are essential. Apart from W/T communications, obviously so long as the Americans Vice-Consuls are allowed to be present, they form the most effective courier link. To Eddy has been assigned the exclusive service of King and he and Raichle will form the courier service between Tangier, Casablanca, Algeria and Tunis, able to give personal instruction in a variety of matters. Eddy himself is able to travel as well and can perform the same functions having also received W/T instruction and instruction in the use of toys.

The position of Tunis is a peculiar one. From the point

of view of sea and possible air communications, association with Malta is far easier than an association with another place in the Western Mediterranean Basin. From the point of view, however, of visual contact, the Western Mediterranean Basin alone affords any opportunity of this.

Up to the present time, Tunis has been sometimes subject to the domination of Gibraltar, later transferred to the domination of Malta, which, in turn, has been super-dominated by Cairo. The position at the moment appears to be that it forms a sort of No Man's Land between Cairo and Gibraltar.

If Tunis is regarded as of importance it seems apparent that there must be close contact between Cairo and Gibraltar, and it is equally apparent if time is of any importance that we must pin our faith to the U.S. Consul Dovan. The latter expresses his willingness to play 100% provided he is in effect the king-pin in Tunis. It should not be difficult to sell him the idea, that he is the king-pin in Tunis subject to control by the Tangier O. Group, and it seems to me essential that Tunis should in the future be run from the Western part of the Mediterranean and not from the Eastern. The practical method of doing this would appear to me to be this: London repeating to Cairo communications with Gibraltar or Tangier who do the needful in Tunis, or Cairo repeating to London communications with Malta, Malta communicates with Gibraltar or Tangier, who do the needful. Emphatically I add that, from the point of view of personal complication, if from no other, I should prefer some other arrangement were it possible, since I see great difficulties regarding the temperamental clashing of Childs, Bentley and Dovan, not to mention others.

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MEMORANDUM

10th March, 1942.

By the expression North Africa I include Tangier, Spanish Morocco, French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Although each in its way has separate problems which must be considered, it is equally in my opinion impossible to separate any one from the other and it is equally fatal to attempt to deal with Tunisia from the Middle East without reference to what I may call the Western Mediterranean basin.

The position throughout the Western Mediterranean basin has reached the point when it is quite impossible to make progress, which axiomatically implies going backwards, unless it is known what policy is desired in that particular area.

There undoubtedly are in the Western Mediterranean basin sphere a number of divergent trends, particularly between the Spanish, the French and the Moors. There are also the Jews and the miscellaneous collection of Anti Franco Spaniards, violently pro-Allied Norwegians, Poles and other nations.

I feel that, apart from the possibility of carrying out isolated but important acts destined to deny to the enemy specified assets or supplies, a proper and effective S.O.E. policy can only be formulated in relation to a general combined Policy in North Africa adopted both by the Americans and the British.

We know quite well certain fundamental facts underlying the various trends of French, Spanish, Moorish and miscellaneous opinions in North Africa. Both the U.S.A. and Great Britain from a strategical point of view want to deny North Africa and its products to Germany. Equally we want to keep the Straits open to our shipping which means a neutral Iberian Peninsular.

How can our object be made to coincide with a state of willingness on the part of the French, Spanish and Moorish peoples to help us. I suggest by action in which the Americans would be the leaders to secure.

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- (a) A United French Nation in North Africa and there-
after French assistance.
- (b) Spanish assistance in Spanish Morocco.
- (c) A welcome by the Moors.

Dealing with each of these in turn:-

- (a) A United French Nation in North Africa and there-
after French assistance.

We obviously want the French to resist German occupation or alternatively to assist an Allied occupation. Neither can be effected unless the French are united which at the moment, they are not, and unless they are given the necessary impedimenta in arms and food.

So far as the French population is concerned the whole population divides itself into four; pro-Vichy, anti-Vichy and anti-De Gaulle, pro-De Gaulle and floating. The situation is exactly similar to the situation in England before a General Election. A certain number of misguided persons adhere themselves resolutely to the utterances of the respective leaders of the three established parties but there is always a floating vote which, for some reason or other, at the last moment makes up its mind to cast the weight of its opinion either behind the Zinoviev Letter, Safety First, the allegation "We can conquer unemployment", or finally "Steel rails in place of Wooden".

Of the stable parties there can be no doubt but that the pro-De Gaulle quantity could be fitted into one General Omnibus. The Vichy party comprise the fonctionnaires and those who depend for their living upon the benevolence of the Vichy Government, and those who by force of circumstances, or perhaps by chance of circumstances, derive in the present unsettled state an income exceeding their needs. The anti-Vichy are in grave difficulties. Many render lip-service to Pétain so that they may endure less discomfort by being at large than by being incarcerated. Equally they are split into small groups each of which distrusts all the others. Any one group may prove effective for isolated acts of sabotage but they will not present any formidable front either against an Axis invasion or in favour of an Allied intervention.

The steps to be taken seem to me to be:-

- (a) To ascertain the anti-Vichy elements.
- (b) To procure a leader.

(c) To deliver supplies both of arms and food in exchange for the following guarantees:

- (1) Resistance to Germany.
- (2) A welcome to the Allies.
- (3) A measure of evolution in the Government of Moors by Moors themselves.
- (4) An agreed measure of Spanish expansion in Morocco.

Any bargain on the foregoing lines can only be arranged by the Americans and only finally arranged when an Expeditionary Force sufficient in size to stay put can be landed in North Africa prior to any German occupation.

(b) Spanish Assistance in Spanish Morocco.

(c) A welcome by the Moors.

Dealing with each of these in turn:

(a) A United French Nation in North Africa and thereafter French assistance.

We obviously want the French to resist German occupation or alternatively to assist an Allied occupation. Neither can be effected unless the French are united which at the moment, they are not, and unless they are given the necessary impedimenta in arms and food.

So far as the French population is concerned the whole population divides itself into four; pro-Vichy, anti-Vichy and anti-De Gaulle, pro-DeGaulle and floating. The situation is exactly similar to the situation in England before a General election. A certain number of misguided persons adhere themselves resolutely to the utterances of the respective leaders of the three established parties but there is always a floating vote which, for some reason or other, at the last moment makes up its mind to cast the weight of its opinion either behind the Zinoviev Letter, Safety First, the allegation "We can conquer unemployment" or finally "Steel rails in place of Wooden."

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The steps to be taken seem to me to be:-

- (a) To ascertain the anti-Vichy elements
- (b) To procure a leader.
- (c) To deliver supplies both of arms and goods in exchange for the following guarantees:
 - (1) Resistance to Germany
 - (2) A welcome to the Allies.
 - (3) A measure of evolution in the Government of Moors by Moors themselves.
 - (4) An agreed measure of Spanish expansion in Morocco.

Any bargain on the foregoing lines can only be arranged by the Americans and only finally arranged when an Expeditionary Force sufficient in size to stay put can be landed in North Africa prior to any German occupation.

(b) Spanish Assistance in Spanish Morocco.

If French North Africa is to be occupied by either side and thereafter to become a battlefield the Ports and Aerodromes of Tangier must be denied to the enemy. Can a bargain be made with Spain to Help us in exchange for a bargain with the French to increase the area of Tangier?

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Naval Attache

Tangier, Morocco.
25 February, 1942.

Coordinator of Information
27th and "E" Streets.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

1. I enclose under separate cover copy of Annuaire de Statistique Generale de la zone francaise du Maroc 1938, together with a memorandum on the railroads of French Morocco prepared most kindly by Mr. H. Earle Russell, Consul General at Casablanca. This is the first installment in response to the request of Dr. Langer handed to me by Mr. Villard in the State Department just before I left. Other publications requested will be sent for Dr. Langer as they are published. It is almost impossible to secure maps and I cannot therefore as yet send sets of the Michelin or Tache maps.

2. I enclose report on supplies sent to Libya through Tunis, including information on possibilities for a fifth column to help us in that region. This report was prepared for me by Vice Consul David W. King, Control Officer at Casablanca last week, who has just made a trip on our behalf to investigate these problems in Algeria and Tunisia. Further information will follow.

3. I enclose information regarding air fields in the Canary and Cape Verde Islands, secured from the British intelligence services during my week in Gibraltar from which I have just returned. Unless I have unexpected good fortune, this report may exhaust sources of available information regarding aviation in the Islands. I have nothing to alter or to add to my report last week concerning aviation in the Bissagoes and Madeira. Colonel Bentley, you will recall, is covering the aerodromes and other possible fields in Morocco and his complete reports both telegraphic and written are on file in the War Department.

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4. I enclose under separate cover set of inshore soundings together with notes on three beaches especially suited for landing operations. Reception parties have already been arranged for the landing of small cargoes at the two most northerly of the three beaches marked on the chart. The arrangements however only induce the organization to land the cargoes, and transport it to a given point inland. This organization obviously must know nothing more than how to receive and deliver the goods. The problem still ahead is to provide the second organization, or rather several separate organizations to conceal and use the goods delivered. This work is going on, and I have already two good prospects to organize operating groups. I hope to be able to report some definite arrangement and to request shipment before many weeks. The problem is extremely complicated by the necessity to distinguish between agents who are willing to help in every way on the arrival of a large scale expedition, but who are not interested in smaller advance operations, the suggestion of which strikes them as a discouraging sign that we expect to be driven out of Morocco by the enemy; and who on the other hand agents who are willing to be supplied and who will act in any event whether to assist in welcoming friends or to embarrass enemies, which ever comes first. You will understand therefore that I am proceeding with the utmost speed as well as carefulness to distinguish between these two kinds of agents. It takes repeated investigation to discover to which group a volunteer belongs, and in the process of investigation no one of them is told of course any more than he should know.

5. This is to acknowledge gratefully the deposit of \$6400 to my credit with the Charge d'Affaires. I have already taken up the purchase of the two automobiles, and have sent two remittances to Algiers and Tunis where assistants from very reliable sources has already been secured. The agent in Algiers is particularly well qualified to be of great value in our fifth column work among Government officials and Army officers.

6. I shall not attempt to report fully upon my week at Gibraltar, February 16th to 23th, except to say that I was able to work very fast because of the splendid cooperation given to me. I was guest of the Governor, His Excellency Viscount Gort, the entire time and sat at the table with him and his Chief of Staff. Throught the Chief of Staff I was

given direct access to the intelligence services and to SOE. Apart from arrangements for the exchange of information and liaison with the Admiralty and the joint intelligence circles, I made good progress with SI and SOE. The chief of both these services at Malta was at Gibraltar where we discussed fully plans for W.T. between Malta and Tunis whose secret number is 1492 and whose station name is Columbus. I also discussed operations with SOE Malta and we arranged to have him smuggled into Tangier for a few hours yesterday. This was a very risky thing to do as he is a former prisoner-of-war, a Major who was released by the Germans on parole and if caught would have been shot at once. I am glad to say he is now back safely in Gibraltar. I shall report developments more fully after communication has been established between Malta and Columbus.

I have brought back with me from Gibraltar three W.T. sets, one long range mark III for my own use here, and two short range Parascottes, one for Tunis and one probably for Casablanca. The Tunis set has already gone in the pouch last night together with instructions. This small set for Tunis will not be able to reach Tangier or Gibraltar and should be replaced by a mark III of which we should have half a dozen as soon as possible if we are to expect communications from Morocco in the event the country is occupied by the enemy.

7. Reference your telegram number five. It is not clear what you mean by "skilled operators will be available". If this refers to SOE as I assume it does, how can these operators be introduced into the territory and live there without detection? Or does this phrase quoted from your telegram refer only to supplies and operators to be sent in at zero hour. Also with reference to your number five, I will in the future, when ever possible, cable direct to COINFORM. Unfortunately there have been times in the past, such as during my stay at Gibraltar where I had to use the British codes.

8. Reference my second unnumbered telegram from Gibraltar dated February 20th. The Chief of British SOE Gibraltar and North Africa will explain more fully to Colonel Solborg in Lisbon the urgent reasons for our request to transfer Raichle to Tangier to serve as special diplomatic courier.

9. Reference my telegram number eight. Consul General Russell at Casablanca has taken the position that the Control

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Officers may secure intelligence only from established and official contacts and not from secret agents. Fortunately he knows nothing of my SOE work which is much worse than anything he objects to. The trouble is partly repeated complaints by the French and others regarding the Military Attache who has been reported within military reservations inspecting air fields etc. Mr. Childs, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Cole at Algiers all understand and cooperate. This has been dealt with at length through the Charge d'Affaires to the State Department and may well be all settled before this reaches you. If not, I do hope the Consul General at Casablanca can be authorized at to cooperate with me in all that I do. Obviously I cannot promise to keep him informed of the general nature of my operations unless I am assured that he will not stop the work whenever he happens to disapprove.

10. The Chief of Staff Gibraltar admitted to me that they were acting on intelligence received to the effect that there will be an allout attack on Gibraltar by land, sea, and air before at the end of March. This is for your information so obviously the source cannot be quoted.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. Eddy

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Algiers, Algeria, January 21, 1942

AIRMAIL

Subject: Transmitting Memorandum prepared by Vice Consul
David W. King, concerning Military Requirements.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1067 of December 11, 1941, transmitting memoranda prepared by Vice Consul David W. King and myself regarding conversations with Captain Tochon on December 2, 1941 at Casablanca. There is enclosed a supplementary memorandum dated January 15, 1942, prepared by Vice Consul King at Casablanca, regarding further conversations which he had with two French army officers in the same group in Morocco, who have evinced interest in military action to resist an axis invasion of French North Africa.

The present memorandum which, it is understood, was prepared after considerable study by French staff officers in Morocco, represents their view of the minimum requirements for military equipment necessary for the French forces in such an undertaking. It will be noted that the persons in question suggest that 200,000 trained French effectives would be available, that the need would be, as has been previously suggested, for equipment, ammunition and technicians. As suggested by Vice Consul King, the figures given appear liberal, but they may be useful as a basis for comparison with previous data already before the competent departments of the Government.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERT D. MURPHY

Robert D. Murphy
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

In Single copy to the Department
Copy to Legation at Tangier

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YCasablanca, Morocco
January 15, 1942Memorandum for Mr. Murray from Vice Consul King

On Wednesday the 14th my friend Gunner and Footslogger came to see me by appointment and produced the following list of necessities as regards cooperation between existing French forces in North Africa and an American or British Expeditionary Force to combat German invasion or infiltration.

PART I. Expeditionary Corps.

a) (Aviation
(Armored Divisions)) In both cases as the French troops here are practically devoid of modern material, the planes, tanks, etc., would have to be part of the expeditionary force and manned by American or British troops. The quantity would depend on how many planes, tanks, etc., the Germans put in the field against us.

In any case, the minimum requirements for North Africa would be:

Planes, with personnel, munitions, etc.....1,000
This quantity would be required
from the first day of fighting
to the 10th day.
Replacements and reinforcements.....1,000
Required from the 10th to the 30th
day.

b) Anti-aircraft guns required: ?
As many as we think necessary to defend
the following positions:
1) Airfields occupied;
2) Ports or beach heads.

PART II Means of completing the efficiency of the French Forces in North Africa.Anti-Tank guns required:

50 75 m/m ordinary without shells or personnel } would be needed
} between the 2nd
} and 10th days

Casablanca, Morocco
January 15, 1942

Memorandum from Vice Consul King

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PART I. Expeditionary Corps.

a) (Aviation)
(Armored Divisions) In both cases as the French troops here are practically devoid of modern material, the planes, tanks, etc., would have to be part of the expeditionary force and manned by American or British troops. The quantity would depend on how many planes, tanks, etc., the Germans put in the field against us.

In any case, the minimum requirements for North Africa would be:

Planes, with personnel, munitions, etc.....1,000
This quantity would be required
from the first day of fighting
to the 10th day.
Replacements and reinforcements.....1,000
Required from the 10th to the 30th
day.

b) Anti-aircraft guns required: ?
As many as we think necessary to defend
the following positions:
1) Airfields occupied;
2) Ports or beach heads.

PART II Means of completing the efficiency of the French Forces in North Africa.

Anti-Tank guns required:

50 75 m/m ordinary without shells or) would be needed
personnel) between the 2nd
) and 10th days

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100 25 m/m French anti-tank guns if we would be needed
have them, without shells or per-) between the 2nd
sonnel, or failing that, then) and 10th days.

100 37 m/m anti-tank guns of our type
without personnel, but with shells.

Anti-Tank mines:

50,000 3-kilo mines 2nd to 10th days

Anti-aircraft:

Over and above those necessary for the defense of air-
fields, ports, etc.

(Small anti-aircraft type 20-25 m/m...200) 2nd to 10th days
(Medium caliber " 90 m/m..... 50) 5th to 30th days
(In complete units with personnel, munitions)
(and transportation

Tanks:

Light tanks to accompany infantry) 10th to 30th
with munitions and first set of) days
spare parts.....200)

Trucks:

1 1/2 to 3 ton light American trucks) 10th to 30th
no spare parts.....1,000) days

These would be absolutely indispensable for transport-
ing munitions, gasoline and other essential stores for
the front line. They can make shift with their own
patched-up trucks converted to gasogenes, etc., for the
service of supplies in the rear.

PART III. Service of Supplies

a) Ammunition

1st case: Ammunition for the French Infantry equip-
ment; i.e., rifles, machine guns, 7 mm and 7.5 mm rifle
and machine gun cartridges and hand grenades,
50 tons a day.....) after the
20th day.

Artillery ammunition for French) after the
guns...50 tons a day) 45th day.

b) gasolene

(Aviation: Sufficient to take care of any force of planes we send.

[illegible]

In brief, the French forces in North Africa have no:

Practically no military trucks in first-class condition.

75 英/法 guns
25 法/德 guns

8 mm machine guns
7.5 mm " "

8 m/m rifle

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They also have some 200,000 fairly well trained men but few specialists in tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft, etc.

/s/ David W. King
American Vice Consul